

(Copy for Mr. Grison)

Cable sent from Tokyo July 29, 1905.

*Root, Washington.

Following is agreed memorandum of conversation between Prime
Minister of Japan and myself

"Open Door." The Count well understands the traditional policy of the United States in this respect and perceives fully the impossibility of their entering into a formal alliance of such nature with (any) foreign nations. But in view of our common interests, he cannot see why some good understanding or an alliance, in practice, if not in name, should not be made between those three nations in so far as respects the affairs in the ^{bar} extreme East. With such understanding firmly formed, general peace in these regions would be easily maintained to the great benefit of all powers concerned. Secretary Taft said that it was difficult, indeed impossible, for the President of the United States to enter even into any understanding amounting in effect to a confidential informal agreement without the consent of the Senate, but that he felt sure that without any agreement at all the people of the United States were so fully in accord with the ^{people} (policy) of Japan and Great Britain in the maintenance of peace in the far East that whenever occasion arose appropriate action of the Government of the United States in conjunction with Japan and Great Britain for such a purpose could be counted on by them quite as confidently as if the United States were under treaty obligations to take it.

^{hint} (2) In regard to the Korean question, Count Katsura observed that Korea being the direct cause of our war with Russia, it is a matter of absolute importance to Japan that a complete solution of the Peninsula question should be made as the logical consequence of the war. If left to herself after the war, Korea will certainly drift back to her former habit of improvidently entering into any agreements or

treaties with other powers, thus resuscitating the same international complications as existed before the war. In view of the foregoing circumstances, Japan feels absolutely constrained to take some definite step with a view to precluding the possibility of Korea falling back into her former condition and of placing us again under the necessity of entering upon another foreign war. Secretary Taft fully admitted the justness of the Count's observations and remarks to the effect that in his personal opinion the establishment by Japan of a ^{use troops} suzerainty over Korea to the extent of requiring that Korea enter into no foreign treaties without the consent of Japan was the logical result of the present war and would directly contribute to permanent peace in the far East. His judgment was that President Roosevelt would concur in his views in this regard, although he had no authority to give assurance of this. Indeed Secretary Taft added that he felt much delicacy in advancing the views he did, for he had no mandate for the purpose from the President, and since he left Washington Mr. Root had been appointed Secretary of State, and he might seem thus to be trespassing on another's Department. He could not, however, in view of Count Katsura's courteous desire to discuss the questions, decline to express his opinions which he had formed while he was temporarily discharging the duties of Secretary of State under direction of the President, and he would forward to Mr. Root and the President a memorandum of the conversation. Count Katsura said that he would transmit the same confidentially to Baron Komura.

[Taft]

[ca 7-29-05]

End of Quotation.

Prime Minister quite anxious for interview. If I have spoken too freely or inaccurately or unwisely I know you can and will correct it. Do not want to butt in but under the circumstances difficult to avoid statement and so told truth as I believe it. Count Katsura especially requested that our conversation be confined to you and the President so have not advised Grison. *79, there any objection* If necessary under your direction Foreign office can give him a copy.

Wong Kai Mah and Wang Ta Hsieh two Chinese Government officials will sail from Yokohama tomorrow by Mongolia. Former was imperial commissioner to World's Fair and has for some time past been residing in Yokohama. Is under orders to proceed to Washington. Latter is Chancellor Imperial Foreign Office proceeding Washington under Government orders. Neither has more than the certificate of the Chinese Consul General at Yokohama as to his identity. Department of Commerce rules this is not sufficient under the statute. It is thought this visit to be a test of sincerity of our protestations of a desire to ameliorate conditions for Chinese having the right to enter country. Consul General Miller and Crist Special agent Department of Commerce recommend their admission without any trouble. I concur and think a special order should issue. Boycott question is just at critical stage.

Taft.

July 29, 1905.

From Tokio.

To Root,
Washington:

The following is agreed memorandum of conversation between
Prime Minister of Japan and myself:

* Count Katsura and Secretary Taft had a long and confidential conversation on the morning of July 27th. Among other topics of conversation the following views were exchanged regarding the questions of the Philippine Islands, of Korea, and of the maintenance of general peace in the far East.

First, in speaking of some pro-Russians in America who would have the public believe that the victory of Japan would be a certain prelude to her aggression in the direction of the Philippine Islands, Secretary Taft observed that Japan's only interest in the Philippines would be, in his opinion, to have these Islands governed by a strong and friendly nation like the United States, and not to have them placed either under the misrule of the natives, yet unfit for self-government, or in the hands of some unfriendly European power. Count Katsura confirmed in the strongest terms the correctness of his views on the point and positively stated that Japan does not harbor any aggressive designs whatever on the Philippines; adding that all the insinuations of the yellow peril type are nothing more or less than malicious and clumsy slanders calculated to do mischief to Japan.

Second, Count Katsura observed that the maintenance of general peace in the extreme East forms the fundamental principle of Japan's international policy. Such being the case, he was very anxious to exchange views with Secretary Taft as to the most effective means for insuring this principle. In his own opinion, the best and in fact the only means for accomplishing the above object would be to form good understanding between the three governments of Japan, the United States and Great Britain which have common interest in upholding the principle of amity. The Count well understands the traditional policy of the United States in this respect and perceives fully the impossibilities of their entering into a formal alliance of such nature with any foreign nation, but in view of our common interests he could see why some good understanding or an alliance in practice if not in name should not be made between those three nations insofar as respects the affairs in the far East. With such understanding firmly formed, general peace in these regions would be easily maintained to the great benefit of all powers concerned. Secretary Taft said that it was difficult, indeed impossible, for the President of the United States of America to enter even to any understanding amounting in effect to a confidential informal agreement, without the consent of the Senate, but that he felt sure that without any agreement at all the people of the United States were so fully in accord with the policy of Japan and Great Britain in the maintenance of peace in the far East that whatever occasion arose appropriate action of the Government of the United States, in conjunction with Japan and Great Britain, for such a purpose could be counted on by them quite as confidently as if the United States were under treaty obligations to take.

Third, In regard to the Korean question, Count Katsura observed that Korea being the direct cause of our war with Russia it is a matter of absolute importance to Japan that a complete solution of the peninsula question should be made as the logical consequence of the war. If left to herself after the war Korea will certainly draw back to her habit of improvidently entering into any agreements or treaties with other powers, thus resuscitating the same international complications as existed before the war. In view of the foregoing circumstances Japan feels absolutely constrained to take some definite steps with a view to precluding the possibility of Korea falling back into her former condition and of placing us again under the necessity of entering upon another foreign war. Secretary Taft fully admitted the justness of the Count's observations and remarked to the effect that, in his personal opinion, the establishment by Japanese troops of a suzerainty over Korea to the extent of requiring that Korea enter into no foreign treaties without the consent of Japan was the logical result of the present war and would directly contribute to permanent peace in the East. His judgment was that President Roosevelt would concur in his views in this regard, although he had no authority to give assurance of this. Indeed Secretary Taft added, that he felt much delicacy in advancing the views he did for he had no mandate for the purpose from the President, and since he left Washington Mr. Root had been appointed Secretary of State and he might seem thus to be trespassing on another's department. He could not, however, in view of Count Katsura's courteous desire to discuss the questions, decline to express his opinions which he had formed while he was temporarily discharging the duties of Secretary of State under the direction of the President and he would forward to Mr. Root and the President a memorandum of the conversation. Count Katsura said that he would transmit the same, confidentially, to Baron Komura."

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