Footnotes for:

Searching for a Korean-Japanese Strategic Partnership:
Nucleus of a Trans-Pacific Security Community

Akihisa Nagashima

 1The bilateral Japan-Korea defense relations began with Director General of Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Yamashita Ganri's visit to South Korea in 1979 for the first time since the end of WWII, which followed by a series of defense summits between Japan and Korea: Japanese Defense Ministers visited South Korea in 1990, 1995 and 1997, and South Korean Defense Ministers visited Japan in 1994, 1996 and 1998. Moreover, Japanese Chairmen of the Joint Staff Council visited Korea in 1990, 1995 and 1996, while South Korean counterparts visited Japan in 1990, 1994 and 1996. See Michishita Narushige, "Japan-ROK Security Relationship and the Korean Unification," a paper prepared for the conference of the Korean Institute for national Unification (Seoul, Republic of Korea, August 19, 1997): 3.
 2See Michael J. Green, "U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Security Cooperation: Prospects and Pitfalls," a paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Washington, D.C.: August 28-31, 1997).
 3A Workshop Report on "Trilateral Naval Cooperation: Japan-U.S.-Korea" Sponsored by Center for Naval Analyses, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, and National Institute for Defense Studies (Tokyo, February 13-14, 1997): 33. See also CDR Ohtsuka Umio, JMSDF, "Prospects for Japan-Korea Defense Cooperation: Partners or Rivals," prepared for the Hudson Institute and the East Asian Security Studies Group Japan Conference on Japan and Korea's Future (Tokyo: December 5-6, 1997).
 4The expressions were based on a 1995 statement by Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi who said that "Japan ... through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations." The statement was issued August 15 that year, the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. The recent apology "is different from past ones because the two countries announced it in a document" signed by the leaders of the two countries, President Kim Dae-jung told the press conference. "The apology and remorse (expressed) is directed to South Korea - therefore, their significance is different from past ones," President Kim said. The Japan Times (October 8, 1998).
 5Mainichi Shimbun (October 9, 1998): 3.
 6Under the agreement, putting aside the long-standing territorial disputes over Takeshima/Tokdo, Japan and Korea will have exclusive fishing zones extending 35 miles from their coasts and a joint fishing area, which stretches from 131.66 to 135.5 degrees east longitude. Both countries also agreed in principle to put a limit on catches to conserve maritime resources in the joint fishing area.
 7Michael J. Green, "Japan-ROK Security Relations: An American Perspective," a paper prepared for the Project on Amarica's Alliances with Japan and Korea, sponsored by Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University (July 1998): 10.
 8The exercise was designed to test a new "fleet combat experimental Delta" system that uses satellites and computers to provide a real time picture of the disposition and condition of forces. One aim was to demonstrate how deeply U.S. bases in Japan would be involved if a contingency broke out in Korea, according to Asahi Shimbun (October 11, 1998):1.
 9These bases include Yokota Air Base, Camp Zama, Yokosuka Naval Base, Sasebo Naval Base, Kadena Air Base, Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, and White Beach. Like other American facilities in Japan, these bases are supported by a United Nations Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Government of Japan. It is significant that, unlike other U.S. bases in Japan, they can be used, without consultation with Japan, to support U.N. Forces in Korea in the event of a contingency there. For more details, see Paul S. Giarra, "Integrating Essential Bases in Japan: Innovative Approaches to Maintaining America's Strategic Presence," in Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin eds., The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future (forthcoming, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998).
10Tokyo Shimbun (October 21, 1998):1.
11Ralph Cossa, "Korea: The Achilles' Heel of the U.S.-Japan Alliance" Discussion Paper for America's Alliance with japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University (May 1997): 5.
12CDR Ohtsuka Umio, JMSDF, op. cit.: 5.
13The Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper 1996-1997 (Seoul, 1997): 18. See also Kim Chun-pom, "Inevitable Changes in ROK-U.S. Security Relation," Seoul Win (August 1998): 214-221, FIBS Translated Text, FIBS-EAS-98-218.
14Lee Seo Hang, "Naval Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: The Case of Korea," Korea Focus on Current Topics, 5:2 (March-April, 1997): 33. For Japanese concerns, see Defense News (November 25-December 1, 1996), and U.S. concerns, see Michael J. Green, "Japan-ROK Security Relations," op. cit.: 11.
15For more details, see Nagashima Akihisa, "Futsu no kuni ni motomerareru seiji no shinryo: Anzen-hosho big bang seikou eno michi [Political Prudence Is Needed in a "Normal State": Keys to Success for Japanese "Security Big Bang,"]" in Anzen-hosho no big bang [Security Big Bang] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun-sha, 1998): 9-37.
16Nihon Keizai Shimbun, (September 2, 1998): 2.
17The China refuses to completely rule out the use of force for what from Beijing's perspective are sound reasons -- to do so limits Beijing's sovereign options and, more importantly, might encourage Taipei to be even bolder in challenging the current status quo.
18Michael J. Green, "Japan and the Future of the Korean Peninsula," a paper prepared for the Association of Asian Studies Annual Meeting (Washington, D.C.: March 18-25, 1998).
19Michael O'Hanlon examines U.S. forward presence in the post-confrontation period on the Korean peninsula. According to his projection of "most balanced" U.S. presence in a unified Korea is roughly 20,000 to 30,000 troops focused on the broad regional security tasks ranging from routine maritime patrols to peacekeeping to antiterrorist missions. Specifically, one of the two brigades of the U.S. Army's second infantry division now in Korea could return to the United States, while airpower could remain at roughly the current strength. But additional U.S. forces might be added in Korea: either some of the USMC currently stationed in Okinawa, or a naval unit like an aircraft carrier battle group. See Michael O'Hanlon, "Keep U.S. Forces in Korea after Reunification," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (Summer 1998): 5-19.
20Ahn Byung Joon, "Toward a Regional Alliance for Unification and Stability: A Test of American Engagement," in C. Fred Bergsten and Il Sakong, eds., The Korea-U.S. Economic Relationship (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics and Institute for Global Economics, 1997): 11-26. See also Jonathan D. Pollack and Cha Young-Koo, A New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of U.S.-Korean Security Cooperation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), in which the joint study conducted by the Korean Institute of Defense Analysis and RAND Corporation suggests four alternatives for an U.S.-ROK alliance after unification: a robust peninsular alliance; a reconfigurated peninsular alliance; a regional security alliance; and a political alliance.
21Paul S. Giarra and Nagashima Akihisa, "Managing the New U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Enhancing Structures and Mechanisms to Address Post-Cold War Requirements," in Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future (Forthcoming, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998). In actuality, though, until Japan completed its legislation to implement the Guidelines requirements, such a new role and missions sharing will never become effective in operational sense.
22Washington-based journalist Kil Jeong Woo explains the Koreans' ambivalence towards the Guidelines review as follows, "In principle, the South Korean government supports the Guidelines because they were shaped with the possibility of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula as their immediate focal points. It is cautious, however, because the Guidelines may signal a reduction in the American presence in the region. This worries the Korean public: in recent years, surveys have consistently ranked the United States as the most reliable ally and Japan as the least reliable." See Michael J. Green and Mike M. Mochizuki, The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance in the 21st Century (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998): 76-77.
23In fact, according to Seoul Shimun (May 30, 1998), "the ROK and the United States are currently considering the future of the 1953 ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty to take into account the current status of their alliance." The focus of the treaty would be shifted from coping with the North Korean threat to "cooperation between the two countries for peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region." The article continues that "the source said that the new treaty would contain provisions for a continued U.S. military presence in Korea after the peninsula's reunification. Bearing in mind the new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, the source reported that a potential ROK-Japanese security cooperation agreement is also under consideration." For more details, see Kim Chun-pom, op. cit.
24A series of the K-J Shuttle meetings sponsored by the Okazaki Institute (Japan), the Yoido Society (Korea) and Pacific Forum/CSIS (the United States) have been the most notable second-track security dialogues among the United States, Japan and Korea.
25Yun Dokmin emphasizes specifically on ROK-Japan cooperation for SLOC defense in his striking article entitled "Kan-nichi ampo wo kangaeru toki [Time Has Come to Consider Korea-Japan Security Cooperation]," This Is Yomiuri (December 1996): 197-198.
26Paul Bracken, "Naval Cooperation in Northeast Asia," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (Summer 1998): 205.
27CAPT Brian Robertson, RAN, "Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific," Proceedings (March 1996):67.
28For details, see The Okazaki Institute/Ogawa Akira, "Simulation: A Contingency on the Korean Peninsula How the US and Japan Move According to the New Guidelines," The Okazaki Institute website:
29The phrase "assistance projection" was coined by the participant in the first trilateral naval cooperation workshop held in Tokyo in February 1997. See A Workshop Report on "Trilateral Naval Cooperation: Japan-U.S.-Korea," op. cit.: 18-19.
30RADM Kawamura Sumihiko, JMSDF(Ret.), "Trilateral Cooperation for Assistance Projection," a paper prepared for the 1998 Japan-Korea-U.S. Trilateral Naval Cooperation Workshop (Hawaii: May 14-15, 1998), The Okazaki Institute website: For more details of U.S.-Japan naval cooperation, see James E. Auer and Agawa Naoyuki, "Historical Implications of U.S.-Japan Naval Cooperation, " a paper presented for a workshop on Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations, co-sponsored by the Okazaki Institute, the Policy Study Group, and the Pacific Forum/CSIS (Washington, D.C., April 29-30, 1996).
31According to Paul Bracken, so far, South Korean naval modernization has been mainly platform oriented, it has not emphasized shore-based intelligence and data fusion, and without these they are essentially blind as a modern force. Indeed, command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (C4I) are key elements and important for the U.S. Navy to consider in planning a U.S.-Japan-ROK tripartite cooperation. See Paul Bracken, op. cit.: 211.
32Kyodo News International wire story (June 20, 1994), cited in Paul Bracken, Ibid.: 210.
33Michishita Narushige, op. cit.: 2-3.
34Michael J. Green, "Japan-ROK Security Relations," op. cit.: 1.
35Yun Dokmin clearly states that Korea would most likely be positioning itself as flexible as possible between surrounding great powers, namely, China and Japan. See Yun Dokmin, op. cit.: 197.
36But we should note that relying too much on multilateral arrangements of largely diplomatic content will not prove effective because the strategic conditions remain fluid, uncertain, and submerged below the surface of diplomatic and economic contacts. See Paul Bracken, op. cit.: 213.
37According to Deutsch's historical findings, there are some conditions essential and helpful for the establishment of pluralistic security community: a) essential conditions: (1) compatibility of major values; (2) mutual responsiveness; b) helpful conditions: (3) distinctive way of life; (4) core area and their capabilities; (5) superior economic growth; (6) expectation of joint economic reward; (7) wide range of mutual transactions; (8) broadening of elites; (9) links of social communication; (10) greater mobility of persons; (11) reluctance to wage "fratricidal" war; (12) outside military threat; (13) strong economic ties; and (14) ethic and linguistic assimilation. As space is limited in this short paper, for more details, see Karl Deutsch, Ibid.: 117-161. Deutsch categorizes the security community into two types: "amalgamated," in which two or more previously independent units merge into single larger units with some type of common government which becomes one supreme decision-making center, and "pluralistic," which retains the legal independence of separate governments, two or more supreme decision-making centers with a close, regular consultation. The Former is exemplified by the United States since 1877; England since the 17th century; England-Wales since 1542; England-Scotland since 1707; Germany since 1871; Italy since 1859; France since the late 19th century; Canada since 1867; the Netherland since 1831; Belgium since 1831; Sweden since 1815; and Switzerland since 1848. Cases of successful pluralistic security community in history include United States between 1781-1789; Prussia and the German states except Austria between 1560s and 1866-1871; Norway-Sweden since 1907; United States-Canada since 1970s; and United States-United Kingdom as early as 1871. Karl Deutsch, Ibid.:29-30.
38This idea is along the line of what Desmond Ball calls "building block" approach. See Desmond Ball, "A New Era in Confidence Building," Security Dialogue (1994); and "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region," Security Studies (Autumn, 1993): 44-77.
39Kim Chun-pom points out that pride and national sentiments of the Korean people should be reflected in restructuring the alliance arrangements, specifically concerning "exercising wartime operation control right" in the combind command. See Kim Chun-pom, op. cit.
40For more details, see Paul S. Giarra and Nagashima Akihisa, op. cit.
41Park Hahnkyu suggests that if the working-level talks between director-general level foreign and defense officials, which Tokyo and Seoul agreed to hold in April 1997, "the security dialogue will develop into a "two-plus-two" meeting between foreign and defense ministers from the two countries." See Park Hahnkyu, "Between Caution and Cooperation: The ROK-Japan Security Relationship in the Post Cold War Period," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (Summer 1998): 114. See also Michael J. Green, "Japan-ROK Security Relations," op. cit.: 21.
42Recent K-J Shuttle scenario gaming conducted in October 1998 revealed Japanese self-restricted ban on collective defense is one of the most problematic obstacles when the Japanese and Koreans attempt to cooperate militarily in the event of a contingency around the Korean Peninsula.
43Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, in fact, says nothing about "collective self-defense," but Article 98 states that "treaties concluded by Japan and established by the law of nations shall be faithfully observed." That means Article 9 must be read in the context of the U.N. Charter and the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, both of which outlaw war but recognize a right of self-defense without distinguishing between individual and collective defense.
44Nagashima Akihisa, "Saying Sayonara to the Barren Debate on Collective Defense," Japan Digest (September 25, 1997): 5. See also Richard P. Cronin, "Japan-U.S. Security Cooperation: Implications of the New Defense Cooperation Guidelines," CRS Report for Congress 97-979 F, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress (Washington, D.C., October 30, 1997).
45Yoshimi Yoshiaki, "State's Crime Should be Compensated by State," Asahi Shimbun (August 22, 1995): 18. According to Professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki of Chuo University, who discovered new information which prompted the Miyazawa government to accept the state's responsibility of organizing comfort women and Kono Yohei, then the Cabinet's Chief Secretary, to issue a formal apology in August 1993, there are still considerable amount of classified information within the related ministries of Japan. At the time the National Police Agency had issued passports for women sent to front-lines stretched all over Asia; however that has remained unclassified. The Ministry of Home is supposed to hold a significant amount of information, because the Ministry partly succeeded the Interior Ministry which controlled the Korea and Taiwan Governor's Office in the prewar period. As well thousands of administrative journals and war diaries are considered to be kept in the National Institute for Defense Studies of Defense Agency, but only hundreds of them have been declassified so far.
46Germany, for example, has a legislation to limit cabinet members' remark on Nazism. Needless to say, of course, we should not constrain any other person's freedom of speech, including politicians' right to express his/her "interpretation of history" that is supposed to be free, as President Kim suggested.
47In my view, "Peace Line" happens to provide an ideal middle ground for both. Suppose that there is no Takeshima/Tokdo, then draw the line at a point equidistant between territories of Japan and Korea, i.e., between Ulung-do and Oki-shima, which happens to be the same as the "Peace Line." That is, while Japan does not have to drop its territorial claim over Takeshima but still yields the rocks to Korea. Korea does not have to abandon its effective control over Tokdo but instead set back its EEZ to the line, so that both can find a real fisheries agreement to allow both countrymen to operate jointly within the certain zone or exclusively within each EEZ. To sum, this is only the way that Koreans keep their "actual" control over Tokdo, while Japanese keep their "virtual" sovereignty over Takeshima.
48Kimiya Tadashi, "Hokuto Ajia no Chitsujyo Keisei Nikkan no Sekimu [Building a Northeast Asian Order: The Responsibilities of Japan and Korea]," Gaiko Forum (June 1998): 48-55.