[Editor's note: We gratefully acknowledge the special contribution of this paper by the Honorable Seiji Maehara to ICAS. sjk]
Japan's Foreign and Economic Policies: Assessing the Abe Administration
Seiji Maehara
Member of the House of Representatives of Japan
Presented to the Center for American Progress
March 14, 2014
(ver. 2; 030614; 11:30 pm)
[Opening remarks] My name is Seiji Maehara, a Member of
Japan's House of Representatives. Thanks to Dan Bob from The
Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA which kindly invited me to this
seminar and to Glen Fukushima of the Center for American
Progress who organized this event.
Allow me to also introduce my fellow colleague from the House
of Representatives, Mr. Junya Ogawa. He has held important
positions and is a great asset for who are helping to forge a
brighter future for Japan.
Three years ago yesterday, the Great East Japan Earthquake
struck my country, and caused great damage, the effects of which
were tripled by the ensuing tsunami and nuclear accident at the
Fukushima Daiichi power plant. Amongst all the outpouring of
assistance extended to us from around the world, some of the
warmest and most important aid was provided to us by the United
States. And in the midst of this unprecedented tragedy,
Operation Tomodachi was born and with it, the unparalleled
assistance which continues to this day. Again, you have my
deepest thanks and gratitude for your friendship.
Today, let me share with you how the Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) views the Abe Administration, especially as it relates to its
foreign policy and economic agenda.
On the topic of foreign policy, let me start by sharing my thoughts
on Japan's relationship with South Korea, China, and the US.
Next, I will move on to discuss their economic policy and explain
the pros and cons of the current policy and provide you some
thoughts on the longer term structural problems Japan needs to
tackle. Finally, I would like to touch on what our relationship
should be and how we can realize that by deepening our
alliance.
On foreign policy, our relationship between South Korea and
China remains frozen. It is a pity that we have not seen any
summit meetings between Japan and South Korea or China,
although more than one year has passed since PM Abe assumed
office. South Korea is an important neighbor for us especially
because we share fundamental values such as democracy, rule of
law and a market economy. Both of us are also close allies to
the US, and we must cooperate very closely with each other and
with the US. This is especially true should something critical
happen in North Korea. Having an untested, inexperienced,
31-year old inherit the leadership position who is trying to
consolidate his dictatorial powers causes great concern. We
must be prepared in case anything imminently dreadful would
occur.
During the DPJ Administration, North Korea sank the South
Korean warship, the "Chonan", and shelled the South Korean
island of Yonpyondo. In response to these incidents, Japan and
the United States immediately supported South Korea and helped
to deter further North Korean provocation. Most importantly,
we should not forget what China did during this time, which was
to support the position of the North Koreans. This case very
well illustrates the crucial significance of maintaining a strong
trilateral cooperation among Japan, the US and South Korea for
the security of the North East Asia region.
The DPJ Administration also placed much value on the
relationship with South Korea and addressed some key bilateral
issues as follows:
- We made it very clear that the Takeshima Islands constitute
an integral part of Japanese territory;
- We adhered to two key statements on historical matters: the
"Murayama Statement" in which Japan expressed apology for our
colonial rule, and the "Kono Statement" in which we addressed
the issues related to what is called "Comfort Women";
- At the same time, key officials in the Administration such
as the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, and the
Foreign Minister refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine
where class A war criminals are collectively honored; and
- We also committed to make further efforts towards
addressing the "Comfort Women" issue from a humanitarian
perspective, while we firmly maintained our position that this
issue had already been resolved by the Treaty on Basic
Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea.
It is my hope that without further delay, leaders of Japan and
South Korea meet one another to re-establish and re-strengthen
our relationship, especially from a strategic perspective.
Recently, two of Prime Minister Abe's top aides made statements
like these:
"Although the US Government said they were
disappointed with Prime Minister Abe's visit to Yasukuni
Shrine, no one under the Republican Administrations had
made such misinterpretation or tried to find fault there. It
is rather the Japanese side which was disappointed by the
Americans. The US is getting afraid of saying the right
things to China. Americans said they are disappointed
because they needed some excuses for China. Why the U.S.
does not show more respect to their important ally like
Japan."
I don't agree with those people. What I am reminded of here is
the words of former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that "there
are no friend or foe in diplomacy, there is only the interest of
states." An alliance is formulated not out of charitable
consideration. Parties to the alliance must understand respective
national interests and respect them. The US-Japan alliance is,
regardless of whatever party is on the ruling side, a crucially
important bilateral relationship. Of course, the interests of
alliance partners may conflict with each other. But what is most
important is keeping our internal conflicts private and between
ourselves and not allow others to view our disagreements.
Behind the scenes, we might fiercely argue with each other, but
still we should still showcase our strong bond to outsiders. We
have to understand precisely, which country would benefit from a
worsening of the Japan-US relationship.
Next, I would like to touch upon our relationship with China.
This relationship is also a strategically important one. Again, I
wish that the Japanese leader will meet his Chinese counterpart as
soon as possible, just as I wished in the case of the Japan-Korea
relationship. That being said, I would like to briefly share with
you the historical context of the Senkaku Islands so that both
Japan and the US can have a common understanding on this issue
vis-à-vis China.
The Senkaku Islands were incorporated into Japanese territory in
January 1895 via a cabinet decision, after Japan carefully
observed the situation for ten preceding years and confirming that
there was no conflicting influence or rule from any other country.
There is no doubt that the Senkaku Islands constitute an integral
part of Japanese territory. Around 1970, China started to claim
the islands belonged to them. Coincidently, China's claims came
only after the UN made public that there might be underground
resources (such as oil and gas) embedded in the surrounding
ocean area. Before this time, even the Communist Party's
official gazette,
The People's Daily referred to Senkaku as
"Senkaku of Okinawa" and the maps the Chinese government
published did not include Senkaku.
I recall my first meeting with Secretary Clinton after I assumed
the post of foreign minister when she clearly assured me that,
"Senkaku is within the application of Article 5 of the Japan-US
Security Treaty". This was the first statement of its kind made by
the Obama Administration. Whenever I think of this, it renews
my respect and appreciation to Secretary Clinton and reminds me
of the sincere efforts of Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell to
make this happen.
On the Senkaku issue, China claims that:
- Japan should take back our decision of nationalizing the
Senkaku islands;
- Japan should confirm that there are territorial disputes here,
and;
- Japan and China should jointly develop this area.
However, let me make it
very clear that Japan would
never ever agree on such claims. The DPJ Administration only
acquired ownership of the Senkaku Islands out of the concerns
that the quiet control over the islands, (in other words, the status
quo) might be undermined by the then Tokyo Governor's
statement that the Tokyo regional government might purchase the
land and cause unnecessary friction. China's claim that Japan
nationalized the Senkaku Islands to reinforce our effective control
over the islands has no basis in fact. Japan has and continued to
maintain sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and this was only
a transfer of ownership of the islands from a private Japanese
owner to the central government. I believe it is important that we
persistently work on this issue, while acknowledging that China
has a different viewpoint.
In addition, China has also promulgated other problematic issues
such as an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) which China
unilaterally set in place, advancing an ever increasing military
budget, and continuing their reckless behavior in South China Sea
where they could impede and threaten the freedom of navigation
on the high seas. In concert with the US and other like-minded
countries, we need to say what we have to say in a firm and
confident manner. We must continue to communicate and have
dialogue with China and work with them to promote a peaceful
rise. There is a saying that overall agreement matters more and
smaller difference matters less. I very much appreciate the
broader perspectives this saying includes and with that in mind, I
would like to improve and strengthen our relationship with
China.
Let me also offer a few words on Japan-US relations. Needless
to say, for Japan, the US is the most important partner and ally in
the international community. More than that, not only is this
alliance important for our bilateral relationship, but it is extremely
crucial for the stability and prosperity of the entire Asia Pacific
region; sort of a public good. Many people in this region who
share our fundamental values have high hopes for the
continuation of our strong alliance. Given the situation on the
Korean Peninsula, the rise of China, and a certain level of
instability in the domestic politics of various areas within Asia,
both Japan and the US need to closely cooperate with each other
and further deepen our alliance. From this perspective, I would
like to offer three of my thoughts here.
The first is on Okinawa. The Okinawa Prefecture accounts for
about 0.6% of Japan in terms of size, but it hosts 74% of the US
military facilities and areas that exist in Japan. In this sense,
without the cooperation of Okinawa and its people, we cannot
guarantee the effectiveness of the Japan-US alliance. Therefore,
we must expedite the return of those facilities and areas that both
authorities have already agreed upon, and in a real, tangible way,
reduce the burden on Okinawa. At the same time, in light of the
fact that there remains numerous cases of US service members or
members of its civilian component who have committed crimes in
Japan, both countries need to engage in even more serious
discussions on how to ensure the transfer of custody of those
Americans who have committed those crime are transferred to the
Japanese side. This discussion could include the reviewing of
the Status of Forces Agreement itself.
I would also like to draw your attention more specifically to the
return of the Futenma Air Station and the construction of its
replacement facility off the coast of Henoko and Camp Schwab.
I would like to begin this topic by sincerely apologizing for any
confusion and inconvenience we caused to the affected people,
especially to the people in Okinawa during the Hatoyama
Administration. Now, we see a very brave decision made by
Governor Nakaima of Okinawa which has marked a significant
and practical first step towards the construction of a replacement
facility.
That being said, we cannot be too optimistic about future progress
since there remains deep-rooted opposition in Okinawa and there
have been reports that anti-security alliance activists are gathering
in Okinawa. It is yet to be seen whether the construction will
move forward as planned.
If the DPJ were still the ruling party, and while I would not say
this publicly, but since I have developed a strong belief that the
Japan-US alliance is crucially important throughout my 20 years
as a lawmaker, let me dare say that we must have an alternative or
Plan B. In other words, even if the current replacement plan in
Henoko should get bogged down in the future, we have to be
prepared that such a deadlock would not undermine the very
foundation of the Japan-US security arrangement. That's why
leaders in both countries have to start thinking about a "Plan B" in
a very quiet manner, so that an alternate plan in is our hands
should the Henoko plan fail.
The second thought of mine is about the recent discussion on
collective self-defense. For the purpose of enhancing the
effectiveness of the Japan-US security arrangement, various
measures such as inspecting suspicious vehicles, escorting US
vehicles, mine sweeping operations, and providing fuel and
materials to US forces should be made available depending on
various specific scenarios. What I believe is important is that we
take an approach based on specific scenarios, not based on
conceptual or theoretical debate. On a case-by-case basis, we
have to identify whether we need to change the interpretation of
collective self-defense, whether such measures can be taken
within the expanded interpretation of individual self-defense, or
whether such measures can be taken by revising the existing law
to deal with contingencies in the areas surrounding Japan. As
we review the Guideline after a 17-year interval, I hope this will
lead to some tangible progress which will eventually enhance the
effectiveness of the Japan-US security arrangement while taking
into account the real needs of the US side.
Another dimension I would like to mention on discussing
collective self-defense is the reactions from our neighbors,
especially South Korea. Last year, I visited Seoul twice and
exchanged views with South Korean Diet Members, government
officials, and academics. What struck me was how negatively
my Korean counterparts viewed the discussion of collective
self-defense in Japan and how much they were alarmed by this
discussion. I repeatedly explained that we are focused on threats
on the Korean Peninsula when we have such discussions and that
once we become able to exercise collective self-defense, this will
actually contribute to the security of South Korea. However, my
explanation fell short of earning their understanding. Since
close cooperation among Japan, the US and South Korea will be
indispensable if some unforeseen events occur on the Korean
Peninsula, I cannot fully underscore the importance of earning
South Korea's understanding and cooperation as it relates to this
important issue. I believe Prime Minister Abe, as far as he aims
at changing the interpretation on collective self-defense, needs to
explore every possible way to improve the relationship with South
Korea. Of course, I do hope that South Korean President Park
Geun-hye will also be like minded on this issue.
My third thought is about TPP. I will not go into the details on
what is being negotiated given that multilateral negotiations are
still ongoing as well as parallel bilateral consultation, but all the
parties have to make concerted efforts toward striking a deal, by
constantly reminding ourselves of the strategic importance of the
TPP. If Japan and the US, which are allies in the security
dimension, can also join together on the same platform of free
trade and economic partnership, that can only further strengthen
our cooperative relationship. That's why many countries
including China and South Korea are following the course of this
negotiation with a very keen interest. What is required of
Japan and the US is a negotiation strategy based on such a
broader perspective followed by making a real decision.
Keeping with the theme of economics, let me specifically talk
about the Japanese economy. The economic policy of the Abe
Administration consists of three pillars. The first is quantitative
easing of a new dimension, the second is agile and expeditious
fiscal spending, and the third is implementing a growth strategy.
Most notable is the supplemental budget of 10 trillion yen which
is the equivalent of approximately $100B dollars, and the massive
quantitative easing where our Central Bank, the Bank of Japan,
will undertake about 70% of newly issued Japanese Government
Bonds (JGBs). These measures led to a rapid depreciation of the
yen and an approximate 60% rise in stock prices over the last year.
Candidly, I can appreciate PM Abe's efforts to change people's
mindset by strongly advocating the need to conquer deflation and
thus revive the overall economy.
That being said, stimulating the economy by leveraging debt has
resulted in an even larger and ever increasing fiscal deficit.
Even if the BOJ massively undertakes JGBs, and provides huge
amounts of yen, resulting in the depreciation of the yen's value
and raising the asset prices of commodities such as stocks and
bonds, these policies cannot last forever. Just as the US has been
struggling with the same thing, Japan will also face quite a bit of
difficulty when ending these monetary easing policies. We need
to clearly recognize that these policies are just like some
adrenaline shots. Moreover, we have started to see some side
effects as well.
The weakened yen has raised the import price of oil, LNG, and
food products, which has resulted in the decrease of disposable
income of many households whose salaries or pensions remain at
the same level. A weak yen has not necessarily increased
Japan's exports, while it has increased Japan's imports, resulting
in a deficit of not only the trade balance but also to the current
account balance. If the current account deficit takes root, money
is going to flow out of Japan and thus we will need to rely more
on foreign countries for selling the JGBs. This means that we
have to face a fall in the value of JGBs, and bear the risk of rising
interest rates.
In any case, we should not just live and die by the fluctuation of
current stock prices, we need to squarely tackle the structural
problems of Japan. When I say structural problems, I would say
they include the following items which impede the future
economic growth of Japan:
- The decreasing trend of the overall population;
- an aging population combined with a diminishing
number of children;
- a massive and ever increasing fiscal deficit; and
- strict government regulations in the fields of
agriculture, medical care, and energy.
In the last general election, the DPJ lost a large number of seats,
but that is the nature of an election system centered on single-seat
constituency where results dramatically fluctuate from
election-to-election. And now, I would like to once again
establish our policies and principles, lead the realignment of
opposition parties, bring back a sense of positive tension to
politics, and return as a ruling party to take the helm of our
domestic and foreign policies. My wish is to advance the
partnership between Japan and the United States in a way that is
deeply rooted in our respective national interests, and make
concerted efforts with you towards peace and prosperity for the
world.
Thank you very much.
This page last updated March 19, 2014 jdb