The ICAS Lectures

2015-0618-JNM

North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Threats, Regional Security, and US National Security

James N. Miller


ICAS Summer Special Symposium

June 18, 2015, 1:30 PM - 4:30 PM
Hart House Office Building Room 216
United States Senate
Capitol Hill Washington DC


Institute for Corean-American Studies, Inc.
Email: icas@icasinc.org
http://www.icasinc.org

Biographic sketch & Links: James N. Miller

North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Threats, Regional Security, and US National Security

James N. Miller
President, Adaptive Strategies LLC;
Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
June 18, 2015


MP3 Audio Recording by the US Senate Recording Studio.
James N. Miller's presentation and Q & A discussion, introduced by David Lee






[Editor's note: The text was transcribed by David Lee, ICAS Intern.



[0:00:00]

Moderator: Now, we have a strategy. We are raising a big, deep bench. So you will be introduced by one of our interns, a college student. David, introduce Dr. Miller please.

[Pause] [Microphone Adjustment]

[0:00:17]

David Lee: Before I begin, Iíd like to thank Dr. Kim for this opportunity to introduce our first distinguished speaker today.

[Pause]

Dr. James Miller is the President of Adaptive Strategies, LLC, which provides consulting to private sector clients on strategy development and implementation, international engagement, and technology issues. He serves on the Board of Directors for the Atlantic Council, and on the Board of Advisors for Endgame, Inc. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Defense Science Board. As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from May 2012 to January 2014, Dr. Miller served as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on strategy, policy, and operations, working to strengthen relations with allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, and to reduce the risks of miscommunication with Russia and China. He served as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, from April 2009 to May 2012. For his accomplishments, he was awarded the Department of Defenseís highest civilian award, the Medal for Distinguished Public Service four times, twice by Secretary Gates, and by Secretaries Panetta and Hagel. He also received the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffís Joint Distinguished Civilian Award. Dr. Miller was present at the creation for CNAS, serving as Senior Vice President and Director of Studies from 2007 to 2009. He previously served as Senior Vice President at Hicks and Associates, Inc. During the 1990s he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Requirements, Plans, and Counter Proliferation Policy, Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University, and senior professional staff member for the House Armed Services Committee. Dr. Miller received a B.A. degree with honors in economics from Stanford University, where he played tennis for a team that won several national championships. He also earned Masterís and Ph.D. degrees in public policy from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming Dr. James Miller

[Applause]

[0:02:36]

Moderator: Itís all yours, Jim.

[0:02:38]

Jim Miller: Sang Joo, thank you; and David, that was very nicely done. Very strong bench youíve got here already.

[0:02:45]

Moderator: Thank you.

[0:02:46]

Jim Miller: Thanks to ICAS for today and to our Ė in advance to our panel as well. Iíve been asked to talk today about North Korea. Specifically Iíll talk about the threats that it poses, and U.S. and South Korean responses in particular. As we get to the question and answer period and the inquisition from the panel as well, Iíll be glad to address the full range of questions about national security.

[0:03:12]

It turns out that today, June 18th, is the 73rd birthday of Paul McCartney, now Sir Paul of the Beatles. And though it might be tempting sometimes when thinking about North Korea to Let It Be, that would not be a wise choice. It may also be tempting not to take Kim Jong Un seriously. Heís only 32 or so. Heís friends with Dennis Rodman. He has reportedly required all school- aged males to get his otherwise unique haircut. And with everything thatís going on with the world today: ISIS and Iraq, Syria, Libya, and a growing number of other countries, the Iran Nuclear Deal with a deadline looming at the end of the month, Chinaís island building in the South Pacific, Russiaís continued intervention in Ukraine, and daily cyber intrusions; and thatís a pretty abbreviated list actually of our national security concerns of the day. With all these concerns, it would be easy in a sense to allow security on the Korean peninsula to be an afterthought, to be a backburner issue for policy makers. That would be a mistake. And I am pleased to say, and now having been out of government for over a year, pleased to see that that is not the case with this administration. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter was in Seoul in April, and advancing US-ROK efforts to build additional capacity and to deal with what he correctly called, and Iíll quote, ďan increasingly dangerous and provocative North Korea.Ē Secretary John Kerry was in Korea, in South Korea in May, where he had very direct and strong words to say about North Koreaís ďreckless abandon,Ē as he put it quite rightly. And although President Parkís planned White House visit this week was postponed, no doubt weíll have a meeting of the Presidents soon also. So US and South Korean leaders are engaged. They are talking the talk, and what Iíd like to discuss today is whether they are walking the walk. My answer to that question is yes. And Iíll explain in detail in a few minutes and Iíll be glad to get into more detail during the discussion period.

[0:05:35]

First Iíd like to set the context a little bit more by talking about North Koreaís capabilities and belligerence. It would be irrational for Kim Jong Un to invade the South. It would be the end of the end of the North Korean regime. We cannot rule out that Kim Jong Un would do something so irrational. We canít rule out that he would indeed so massively miscalculate, so we need to be prepared, as we have for decades, for that scenario. And we need to continue in our combined exercises to address that scenario: to prepare for it. But even Kim Jong Un should be able to recognize the enormous advantage of South Korea and US conventional forces if it comes to a sustained fight. North Korea is estimated to have a Gross Domestic Product of about 20 to 30 billion dollars per year. That is less than the smallest US state. In fact, Rhode Islandís equivalent GDP is more than twice North Koreaís. South Koreaís GDP of roughly 1.5 trillion dollars, 50-75 times the size of North Korea: and that gap is growing. And of course United States with a GDP of something over 16 trillion dollars, about a thousand times North Korea. Our militaries reflect that. US and ROK militaries are far more capable than North Koreaís. Better equipped, better trained, better fed. And thatís demonstrated every year, as it should be, in US-South Korea combined exercises, such as Key Resolve, Foal Eagle, and Ulchi-Freedom Guardian, which was known for many years as Ulchi-Focused Lens. So while Kim Jong Un could impose significant cost on South Korea and indeed on the United States by attacking, the fact that he leads a backwards nation with a weak military means that an invasion on South Korea, while costly to the South and to the United States and our allies would clearly be the end of the North Korean regime.

[0:07:38]

What Kim Jong Un does have for potential options that may seem more viable to him and that we need to counter, Iíll go through each of them in turn and focus on the last and most dangerous. First, as weíve seen recently, North Korea has a significant set of capabilities for military provocations against South Korea, as we saw on the sinking of Cheonan in March 2010 where 46 sailors died, and as we saw in the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November of 2010. After the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents in 2010, the US and South Korea set up a mechanism for counter-provocation planning, and in the event of a provocation, to coordinate responses. The United States understood and Iím sure understands that South Korea will want to have, and should have a strong an immediate response in the event of any provocations. That is essential for deterring any future attack. And at the same time, itís critical to ensure that South Korean and American forces are prepared for any potential North Korean response to our response, to a South Korean response; that the US and South Korea are ready and can control any escalation.

[0:08:55]

Now counter-provocation planning and coordination and immediate responses are all important. They may not prevent or deter all North Korea provocations, but preparation and swift responses will help deter. Itís also important to make sure North Korea pays a broader price for any future provocations, and in that vein particularly important to encourage China to punish North Korea. As Chinese President Xi Jinping said a couple of years ago in what was a clear rebuke to North Korea, and Iíll quote again, ďNo country in Asia should be allowed to throw a region, or even the whole world into chaos for selfish gain.Ē Now Iíd like to see China walk that walk more and squeeze North Korea harder when it is not behaving, including applying pressure through six- party talks, because China has by far the most leverage of any country on North Korea and its critical that it continues to apply pressure.

[0:09:58]

North Koreaís second more viable option is cyber-attacks, like the destructive hacking attack in 2014 on Sony entertainment, in retaliation for, I think I need to use quotes here, a movie with Seth Rogen, The Interview. As another example, itís been reported that North Korea also conducted a cyber-attack on some fifty thousand computers and servers held by South Korean broadcasters and banks some three months ago. US and South Korea need to reduce our vulnerability to cyber-attacks, and I know that both counties are working individually, and that theyíre now working together to strengthen cyber-defenses. And itís also essential that North Korea pay a price for these and any other cyber-attacks. That price could include an offensive cyber-response, although frankly that is somewhat challenging because of the limited IT infrastructure in North Korea. The price could include diplomatic pressure and a harder squeeze on economic sanctions, which was the case in the American response to Sony entertainment. And if the impact of a cyber-attack on South Korea or the United States or other allies were significant enough, North Korea should understand that a military response would be possible. Cyber is a very attractive tool for countries to use not only for espionage, but also for attack as weíve seen from North Koreaís actions; as weíve seen from Iranís earlier distributed denial of service attacks on our financial sector. I know that the administration is working hard to strengthen our cyber-deterrence posture, and Iím actually very pleased to have a chance to contribute a small bit as a member of the Defense Science Board, and a co-chair of a task force on Cyber-Deterrence. This is an urgent issue for the United States and our allies, including South Korea. Thereís a lot of work to do. One of the aspects thatís most important for the near term is really to ensure that itís understood that there will be significant responses.

[0:11:59]

Third category, North Koreaís potential military option, aside from invasion, comes from the massive numbers of rockets and artillery pieces it has within striking distance of Seoul. Many times over the years, North Korean leaders have threatened that it would turn Seoul into a sea of fire. Kim Jong Un needs to understand very clearly that even a limited attack on Seoul would result in a major response by South Korea backed by the United States, and would carry grave risks for his regime. So it is critically important for South Korea and the United States to continue to strengthen our defensive capabilities, and equally importantly our offensive and counter-strike capabilities.

[0:12:40]

And fourth, and really the focus of what I want to talk about today is that North Korea has a significant nuclear weapons program, and an extensive long range missile program. Iíd like to spend the rest of my talk on these capabilities and what we are doing, what the United States and South Korea are doing and should do to counter them. So as you all know, North Korea has been working to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Itís conducted three tests to date: in 2006, 2009, and 2013. I would say with mixed success at best in their tests. And there have been recent reports that North Koreaís nuclear capabilities are increasing. In terms of numbers, estimates, public estimates, range as high as that of the Institute for Science and International Security, which estimate or guesstimate would say 12 to 27 nuclear weapon equivalents, including both plutonium and uranium. Sieg Hecker, who has visited North Korea, whoís at Stanford now, but has visited North Korea a number of times in recent years, and in my view is very credible on this issue, said recently that Pyongyang has roughly 12 nuclear weapons with an annual manufacturing capacity of possibly 4 to 6 bombs. That would mean as many as 20 nuclear weapons by the time President Obama leaves office in a year and a half from now. Unfortunately, I believe that this is a credible estimate. I donít know that itís correct at all. I think itís a credible estimate, and itís a useful basis for planning. In addition, North Korea has made efforts to miniaturize its nuclear weapons, and weíve some claims and reporting on that recently. And I do believe that itís likely that North Korea has made some progress on miniaturization, which is a necessary step to have a warhead for an ICBM or other long range missile.

[14:30]

North Korea faces two significant challenges as it attempts miniaturization and if it attempts to put a nuclear weapon on an ICBM or other long range missile. First as I noted, North Korea has had limited success with its nuclear test programs. It does not have the type of hydrodynamic modeling that we can use; indeed that Russia, for example, could use to simulate nuclear explosions. And unless North Korea were to conduct a series of tests of smaller devices successfully, they would have a lot of uncertainty about whether or not their design would work in the real world. Second, and relatedly, a warhead coming in on an ICBM or a long range SLBM, which Iíll come to in a moment, or even a medium range ballistic missile at full range, would have to re-enter the atmosphere at a high velocity. So developing a re-entry vehicle that provides enough protection from extreme heats and G-forces, and a warhead that could withstand that environment and still work, is a hard challenge. North Korea has not test-launched its KN08 missile, and if it does, North Korea will have a real risk of test failure. It may believe it can extrapolate from tests of shorter and medium range missiles. That is a very uncertain business. So North Korea will have to choose between having a very uncertain and untested capability for missiles, on its long range missiles, or undertaking a major testing program that would almost certainly include many failures at the outset. So far it looks like North Korea has decided to forgo the integrated flight testing of long range missiles, in particular the KN08, and use the possibility that a nuclear weapon may work, and that this and other long range systems for a threat to the United States. North Korea has also reportedly also tested a submarine launched ballistic missile, or SLBM. This missile has variously been designated the KN11; the, forgive my pronunciation, the Bukkeuksong or Polaris 1, which was inscribed on the missile body for its most recent test: a clear example of signaling, if you will. Firing an SLBM has essentially the same technical challenges as an ICBM or other long range missile, plus the challenge of carrying the missile and warhead safely under water, and security, plus the challenge of ejecting the missile and igniting it after that ejection. Those are significant challenges. On the other side of the ledger, North Korea could move a submarine closer to the United States, and so reducing the range, thereby reduce the stresses that the re-entry vehicle went under on re-entry.

[0:17:15]

If North Korea were to deploy nuclear weapons on a submarine, the chances for an accidental or unauthorized launch could be significant, probably significantly greater than for a land based system. Thatís because thereís no way the North Korean Navy would have the type of competency or controls, skills and discipline that the US Navy or the British Navy for example have for their deployments. So the risk of a nuclear conflict, in fact, that ends up destroying North Korea would increase if North Korea goes down this path.

[0:17:45]

To say the least, Kim Jong Un does not seem to be very interested in the Six Party talks, because they would limit and ultimately roll back his program. His behavior from his rhetoric about turning Seoul and US cities into a sea of fire, to provocation, to internal purges suggest both that he feels insecure about his position and that heís willing to take extreme action. Kim Jong Un, as you know, executed his uncle, Jang Sung-Taek, in 2013. The public reports were it was because of his half-hearted clapping at an event. He executed the Defense Minister in April of 2015, reportedly for falling asleep at a meeting. I am sure there is a backstory associated with each of them, and that itís about power and control. Both men were executed, reportedly, by anti-aircraft guns in front of a number of military personnel, who were apparently supposed to receive a message.

[0:18:41]

So North Korea presents a real impressive danger to South Korea, and to the United States, and to the region and to the world. North Korea is developing nuclear weapons, long range missiles, and while I focused on the nuclear weapons side, North Korea also has a chemical weapons arsenal, and may have biological weapons in addition. Kim Jong Un is clearly a dangerous leader, and so I would like to go through what the US and South Korea are doing and Iíll make the case that theyíre on a good track. And I want to cover three key areas. For short hand, deterrence, broadly, missile defense, and then counter-force capabilities. As I said at the outset, I think the two countriesí efforts are broadly on track.

[0:19:28]

So first area of deterrence. We need to make sure that thereís no question in Kim Jong Unís mind that the US would use nuclear weapons in response to any nuclear weapons used against the United States, against South Korea, against Japan, or against any other US allies. And Kim Jong Un should understand that the US may use nuclear weapons even in response to a non- nuclear attack, for example a biological weapons attack. When the Obama administration conducted and completed its nuclear posture review in April 2010, it explicated rejected a no- first-use policy, or so called sole-purpose policy for nuclear weapons. And it said that while the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear use by others that nuclear weapons would be on the table against other nuclear capable states. And that they explicitlyÖ it clearly includes North Korea if it were to use chemical or biological weapons. The United States and South Korea now have a bilateral, tailored deterrent strategy against North Korea, nuclear and other WMD threats. Itís reviewed at the administerial level. In addition to the US nuclear umbrella, this strategy includes conventional strike and missile defense capabilities, which Iíll talk about in a moment. Thereís an implementation plan thatís being pursued, and itís important that not just planning, but exercises and preparations continue, and that both sides invest.

[0:20:57]

After the 2010 nuclear posture review, the US and South Korea established a bilateral extended deterrence policy committee. While I was in government, this committee was very helpful. And its work has continued, and itís been presented to the US secretary and the South Korean Minister of Defense relatively recently. I understand that the work of the extended deterrence committee has done well and been extended, and that is good news. And itís worth noting that the US and Japan have an analogous committee: the US-Japan extended deterrence dialogue for senior level discussions. These mechanisms are important for the United States to assure our allies and to strengthen deterrence for North Korea. Two final points about deterrence before I turn to missile defense and counter-force capabilities, both of which support deterrence of course. First it is US policy to deter not only WMD or weapons of mass destruction use, but also to deter transfer of WMD, and to hold fully accountable any state that transfers WMD. Because North Korea could either sell WMD or try and deploy it through proxies. It is essential that the United States continue to restate and reinforce this policy. As North Korea develops capabilities for mobile missiles and potentially submarine-launched ballistic missiles, we also need to make clear to Kim Jong Un and to North Korea that they will be held accountable to any accidental or unauthorized launch of a missile against the United States or allies. Kim Jong Un needs to understand that he will be personally accountable and that North Korea will suffer devastation if North Korean WMD nuclear weapons or other WMD are used, even if by accident.

[0:22:43]

Let me now take a few minutes on missile defense and on counter-force specifically, and then Iíll conclude. Missile defenses are important for three reasons. First as I noted is that they reinforce deterrence by reducing the benefit of any missile attack by North Korea, and second because deterrence could fail whether by Kim Jong Un miscalculation or loss of control. Missile defenses are critical for damage limitation for the United States, for South Korea, for Japan and for others. And third, effective missile defenses of the US homeland also help assure that Kim Jong Un has no misperception that he could deter the United States from undertaking a devastating response by holding the United States directly at risk, and to ensure that he has no question that the United States would be willing to go forward with South Korea to pursue regime change if necessary. Counter-force and other military capabilities are important as well, but missile defense plays a vital role.

[0:23:45]

Let me talk about homeland defense first, and then a little about regional defense. The United States currently has 30 ground based interceptors deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vanderberg Air Force Base, California, and itís made a decision to grow, which Secretary Hagel announced, to grow from 30 to 44 ground based interceptors. And itís of high priority, of course, that those interceptors in that system work effectively. And that means that the United States needs to work hard on the quality of the system and work hard on probability of kill, especially against North Korean ICBMs for the near term. That means continued work on the exo- atmospheric kill vehicle, as well as moving forward in parallel on a simpler and more robust design: the so called redesigned kill vehicle. It means our ability to discriminate decoys from re- entry vehicles needs to continue to improve. It means continuing to make the overall architecture more robust: that includes sensors and communications. And in my view, after we make the modifications that we need to in the system overall, we need to test the system more: more than one test per year. And the next administration will have a big choice: and that choice is whether to deploy additional interceptors beyond those 44, and if so, whether to do so at an East Coast missile field. I believe this administration was smart to prepare the groundwork for an east coast missile field as a hedge, including pursuing the environmental impact statements, which should be done by the middle of 2016. I also believe this administration was smart and is smart to not yet commit to deployment, and instead focus on system improvements for the current period and to be prepared for deployment later if needed. The next administration will need to assess whether North Korea and Iran have made sufficient progress in their missile capabilities and their nuclear breakout capacity to warrant moving forward with additional interceptors, and if so whether to place those interceptors in a new east coast missile field or to add into Fort Greely and/or Vanderberg. And the answer will depend on the assessment. If the answer initially is no by the new administration, it will have to continue to look and it will have to watch indicators and warnings. Our policy is to be ahead of the threat and itís important that we continue. And we need to continue to ask has the threat grown, and is it capable of growing further. And what is the timeline for that; not just the known timeline, but also the potential timeline. And what do we need to do to stay ahead? So we need to be prepared, and I want to say that the fundamental reason today for not committing is not about strategic stability. Itís not ability concerns with either Russia or China. Itís about cost. And even if we doubled the number of ground based interceptors from the planned 44 to say 88, the US-national BMD system would not be big enough to affect strategic stability with Russia. Iíve had this discussion with them repeatedly in office and out: a lot in office. And thatís true under new start or even under significant reductions under new start. The Chinese have raised concerns also about the potential growth of the US- national BMD system, and to that I say that they should really work hard to restrain North Korea. In any event, we should defer the decision and its costs until weíve made the investments in quality, until weíre prepared to go forward, until we see the indicators.

[0:27:24]

The US obviously is making significant progress in theatre missile defense as well. The army has activated 4 of 7 programmed theater high altitude air defense system, or THAAD systems. Battery 5 is scheduled for activation this year. Battery 6 and 7 are in progress. As we think about the regional architecture, one of the batteries has been deployed in Guam since April 2013. A new team; a new battery personnel just went out to man that. And I understand discussions are underway to consider deploying a THAAD battery in South Korea. I personally donít think a deployment is time urgent. I think itís smart to have preparations; itís smart to talk about it. But I donít think itís time urgent or necessary at this time. Let me add that just a few weeks ago, an important development, the US and Japan conducted the first flight tested, the standard missile 3, the so called Block 2A interceptor at Point McGoo, California. The SM3-2A is a critical capability for the Asia-Pacific, and for other regions as well. Now this first test didnít try to intercept a missile, which is the right choice for this phase of the program. It will get to that. And I think itís worth noting that the earlier variants of the missile, of the interceptor, the SM3-1A and -1B have both had very successful test programs, and theyíve done it by building those test objectives over time, and theyíve done it systematically. Weíre on track for a 2018 deployment of the SM3-2A both at sea and at land bases in Europe. South Korea is moving forward on additional missile defense capabilities as well. Thatís also important. And over time, Iíd like to see us make more progress in trilateral cooperation on missile defense and in other areas, trilateral being the US, South Korea, and Japan. I know that thatís challenging, but itís important. In addition to improving the capabilities of each otherís systems by integrating sensors and by coordinating command and control, itís a powerful signal to North Korea that our alliances are strong and united. Finally our counter-force capabilities and then Iíll conclude.

[0:29:33]

It would difficult for any US president to make a decision to undertake a pre-emptive attack against any country, including North Korea. Itís very challenging to have the type of intelligence that was so clear cut that a President would be ready to start a major war. Itís not impossible, but itís very difficult. Itís especially difficult after the Iraq War where it turned out that the United Statesí intelligence about Iraqís WMDs wars was incorrect. Not impossible, but itís very difficult. But that reality does not in any way reduce the importance of US and South Korea counter-force capabilities. After a conflict startsÖ After the first missile flies, or before that, but after a conflict is clearly starting, there is no doubt that the United States and South Korea, perhaps others, would have incredibly strong incentives and want the capabilities to take down North Korean missiles as swiftly as possible. Would this put North Korea in a use or lose position? Actually, to me itís more of a use and lose situation. North Korea should understand that if it uses its missile and/or nuclear capabilities, it will lose it and the regime will lose power. So counter-force capabilities are critical for the United States and for South Korea. Iím very pleased by South Koreaís commitment to develop its own kill chain and Korean air and missile defense systems as part of its counter-missile operations by the mid-2020s, the sooner the better. And Iím also very pleased by our mutual commitment to ensure that these new South Korean capabilities are fully operable in the United States. These capabilities and the US and South Korean commitment to combined operations at all levels reinforces deterrence and stability on the peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region.

[0:31:24]

So in conclusion, the United States does not, and in my view, will never accept a situation where it is vulnerable to North Korean nuclear attack. Our policy is to roll back North Koreaís nuclear program. But if North Korea has nuclear weapons, we need to be able to one: destroy most or all of them before they can be launched, two: intercept any that are launched, and three: impose punishing costs, including both conventional and nuclear strikes on North Korea if its leadership ever makes that decision. We have become used to be dealing with a dangerous and unpredictable North Korea. In my view, we have good policies, we have overwhelming military capabilities, and we have strong alliances between the US and South Korea, between the US and Japan. And we can count on the commitment of other allies. To just note one, Australia which sent 17,000 personnel into harmís way to serve in the Korean War between 1950 and 53. We need to keep updating and advancing our capabilities. And let me say here that the continued cloud of sequestration and budgetary cuts is detrimental to our posture in the Asia-Pacific as to everywhere else. Itís directly detrimental by reducing our capabilities and our readiness, and our ongoing activities. It has a secondary effect by reducing our ability to plan effectively for the future and to invest wisely in additional capabilities to make those long term commitments. And third, the world is watching and it undermines the seriousness of US commitment, and I believe Congress would be very wise to move beyond this and to work for a deal. Iím not optimistic. Iím not optimistic that it will occur in the near term, but I just believe that Congress would be very wise to move past this and make a deal with the administration. We need to; in addition to advance our capabilities, we need to do our utmost to encourage China, which has, as I said, by far the most leverage on North Korea, to push hard to moderate North Korean behavior. North Korea is without a doubt a serious threat: a clear and present danger. We need to sustain our close alliance partnerships on military capabilities across the areas I discussed today, and our clear signaling and diplomacy to deal with this issue. That includes continued flights, for example, of B52s and B2s, which weíve done over the last several years: flights over the peninsula. At the same time, and more broadly in a sense, and I know Danny Blair will talk about in the next session, the US needs to sustain and rebalance the Asia-Pacific, and we need to go forward with the TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. I expect that Admiral Blair will talk about these issues in detail. Economics and Trades issues are fundamentally important. Since the Admiral is covering them, Iíll leave it to him. Even as we work to reduce the risks posed by North Koreaís military and political leadership, our security is also strengthened more broadly by increased trade and economic cooperation. With that, Iíll stop. Thank you very much and I look forward to questions.

[0:34:35]

[0:34:36]

Moderator: Thank you

[Applause]

[0:34:40]

Moderator: Okay, Dave?

[0:34:43]

David Maxwell: Thank you, Doctor Miller. Those were very informative and important remarks and much to agree with. Just aÖ Iíd like to just ask two questions. One is, and you touched on integrated missile defense and the importance of that andÖ I just read today that ROK has increased their defense budget, I think, by about 7% for next year. Included in that is kill-chain, and Korean missile defense, but nothing that I could read about integrated missile defense. How would you propose that we try to influence the ROK government to participate in integrated missile defense? Because I think that we would all agree that layered defense and integration of our ISR, which we should be, I think, thankful for the recent intel sharing agreement, which I think is important. But we really need to convince the ROK government that participation in integrated missile defense is in all of our best interests. So one, I would like to know how you would go about trying to convince, and Iím sure you probably were when you were in office.

[0:35:57]

Second thing is that you just talked about being able to deter North Korea, influence them, ensure that we are signaling. And when I look at some of our signaling over the past couple of years: Syria, Redline, currently with ISIL: degrade and destroy ISIL, which I feel like we have a waysÖ ends-ways mismatch in what weíre saying our words are not being backed up by our actions. And those are twoÖ two examples where I think our signaling may hinder us in other places, particularly with North Korea. And given the fact that North Korea and Kim Jong Un is inexperienced in his decision making, maybe, certainly suspect, if not erratic and hopefully not too irrational, but I do fear his inexperience and potential irrationality. But are we signaling correctly, and do you think that our actions in Syria, both with the redline chemical and with ISIL, if those have a negative impact. Because I would just say that sometimes we need our own WMD, for me WMD means word, mind, and deed. Our words have to mean something to the mind weíre targeting, and itís got to be backed up by the deeds to make those words effective and have the proper influence. Sometimes I donít think weíre really executing our own WMD, word, mind, and deeds. So those are my two questions.

[0:37:33]

Moderator: Thank you, Dave. Jim Miller: Do you want me to answer both? Do weÖ Moderator: Sure, sure. Jim Miller: Okay. Moderator: We have time. Jim Miller: Okay. Dave, those are good questions. And you are right that I and others have encouraged integration of our missile defense capabilities. My view is that as ROKÖ as South Korea increases its capabilities in that area, that includes additional interceptors; that includes sensors; that includes command and control and communications capabilities as well. As itÖ As it continues to lift its game, and as we continue to conduct planning Ė combined planning, in broad terms and in specific areas, that the goal of US-South Korean capability will emerge and will be fairly strong. Yes there are individual challenges to that, but I do think as investments on the South Korean side proceed Ė it wonít happen automatically, but it will happen. I bet it will happen and it will take a period of years to bring that closer together and it will take effort at every level to really bring that together effectively, meaning from when the presidents meet to when the ministers meet to the day to day interaction of the staffs that are involved. And it will require a degree of sharing of intelligence and technology and information that we can do and need to do. Now expanding that to make it trilateral, I think, I understand will be more challenging, and if that was the thrust of your question, I agree that it will be to some degree these things are a matter of timing. And the US should continue to press, in my view, for trilateral cooperation and I guess Iím optimistic on this score over a period of years in that South Korea and Japan are both lifting their game with respect to missile defense capabilities. There is a real complementary aspect as you look at the lower tier that South Koreaís generally focused on and the upper tier with the SM3-2A that Japan is more focused on and where theyíre putting roughly 1 billion dollars for the development program, Japan is, for the SM3-2A. So I know itís challenging because of the history, of the relationship between the countries. It is manifested in their national security interests and in ours, that Iím optimistic that we will get there. I understand that there may be pressure from China not to proceed in this direction and that that could be a factor as well, and to sort of segue into the next section, the more the United States is clear about its commitment long-term, which I think for Korea and Japan especially, but for others in the region, ought to be pretty clear after the Post World War II period. But as we reinforce not just our commitment but our capabilities in the area, I think that that case will be strong and again I say if China feels that these missile defense capabilities presented a challenge, the very best way to deal with that is to apply significant pressure on North Korea.

[0:41:41]

With respect to your second question about US credibility, I think that there are a number of things that will happen in any given point in time that can be challenging for US credibility. As I mentioned, I think sequestration is in that category. Well itís in part the reduced spending Ė but our lack of coherence gives pause to our allies; they ask whether we can operate together as a country. And Iíll just say that I think that the single most important thing that we can do as a country to reinforce our credibility overseas is to make progress between this administration and future administration and Congress. I started my career on Capital Hill, and we certainly intra- Congress squabbles as well as issues with administration at the time in the late 80s and early 90s. But weíve gotten to a point of dysfunction that we need to overcome. And I think because the topic here is Korea and Asia, I will defer to commenting on the Syria question. I guess I could observe that I was working for Secretary Gates and Secretary Panetta during the period when this was discussed, and theyíve spoken publicly about it. But Iíd leave it at that.

[0:43:21]

[0:43:22]

Moderator: Well thank you, Jim. Don? Thank you for coming. Don?

[Technical issues with Microphone]

[0:43:33]

Donald Kirk: Ah yeah there it is. Thank you for inviting me. Thank you for all of your very knowledgeable remarks. I just wanted to introduce one other point which perhaps you might regard as not relevant. North Korea has been issuing statements to the effect that the agricultural situation is the worst in a century. We all remember the 1990s when they had this terrible drought that resulted in anywhere between 1 and 2 million people starving or suffering from illnesses that could not be cured. I wonder if thereís Ė it seems to me this cry of desperation we get from Pyongyang comes as an interesting contrast to the military hype. You know, just two days before they issued this statement, they fired three more missiles, which they seem to be doing every week or two. I wonder if thereís any room here for negotiation, which might seem really wishful thinking, if thereís any way that North Korea can be pressured or whether North Korea really can seriously present the kind of threat that it likes to make rhetorically while suffering through another round of desperate need for food and other supplies? The World Food Program is supposed to be considering additional supplies that North Korea has not been getting nearly as much aid as it once got. So does this play into the security aspect at all, or as I said, are we simply engaging in wishful thinking in thinking that they might hold back a little or show a little more rational attitude in the face of their own internal desperation for food?

[0:45:33]

Moderator: Thank you, Don.

[0:45:36]

Jim Miller: Itís a good question and as you implied, concerns about a potential North Korean collapse go back at least a couple decades or more and as I think about the set of issues that you raised there: agricultural challenges, the poor state of their economy, and the dim prospects for any real growth, the first security issue is whether they are potentially on a path over some period of time towards a degree of collapse or disintegration. I think thatís been over predicted in the past and I donít Ė I think some have underestimated the resilience of the regime and indeed of the patience of the North Korean people in that regards. But I think on this issue, it bears watching over the mid to long term. I think that in terms of the impact on the nuclear situation, I feel in a sense weíve seen this movie before in the context of the Agreed framework with oil and so on, but I think you can see several factors competing, or several possible courses of action competing for selection by the regime. One is to try and do a deal. I personally think thatís relatively unlikely on their part. Weíve made clear that Ė the United States has made clear that any further six-party talks would need to have serious discussions about their nuclear program and its rollback and so far they donít seem prepared to do that. Second potential course, which is moderately likely, is that the two are just essentially delinked and ignored. And the third, which is perhaps the most likely, is that the economic situation and the lack of economic growth and the potential starvation of thousands to hundreds of thousands to god knows perhaps more again adds pressure to the regime, and that one of the ways that Kim Jong Un thinks he can deal with that pressure is by conjuring up external threats. Thatís a game that he and his father and grandfather have played multiple times and I think that we should expect that thatís the foundation of their likely response. It may include additional provocations. It will almost certainly include continued testing of missiles. It will almost certainly include continued rhetoric and to me, the most likely response is in that category. Of course the US should always, and in my view South Korea and others, should be open to real negotiations if North Korea is prepared to do that. If your question is should we ask that the world community withhold food aid to North Korean people until it does so, I wouldnít support that as I think it cuts the other direction in terms of supporting Kim Jong Unís narrative about the hostile outside world. And I think it would be unethical to do so.

[0:45:23]

[0:49:25]

[Very soft due to lack of microphone]

Moderator: Thank you, Don. Tong?

[0:49:30]

Tong Kim: That was a very thorough and comprehensive review of the situation, and also US policies that you have described. I do have a number of questions. Number one: this is a very specific question that a few years ago, US cyber capabilities were reported to have attempted to North Korean nuclear program sites, but couldnít do it because of the lack of cyber structure in North Korea itself. The question is the authenticity of it: that report; I donít know if you can share. I think it was Ė it must have happened while you were still in office. Secondly, the dynamics: if there has been change in the dynamics of North Korea policy makers in Washington, especially between State and the Defense. Across the river, during when Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney were in the White House, they strongly believed that Defense should have more say or a stronger voice in the determination of US policy towards North Korea and nuclear issues as well. Do you think itís pretty much in balance now, because I donít see the sharing of different voices between State and Defense anymore? So is balance back? And number three: if Ė then you mentioned the necessity of THAAD or the possibility of it to South Korea, there are two views still pro and con regarding this possibility for deployment. The one con is based on efficacy, how accurate or how capable THAAD system will be when it begins operating with other systems as well, like the PAC-3 and multi-layered missile defense systems, and the cost. It is widely reported that the deployment of THAAD will cost over 1 billion dollars. These are the figures that have been reported, not to mentioned projectiles and interceptors, which are very costly too. So cost is an issue. Another argument is North Korea Ė once they know that THAAD is deployed on the Korean peninsula, they will still have different means of attack. They donít have to shoot their missiles so high or into space so that they will be subject to interception by the THAAD system, but they will use other meansÖ Of course they have about a thousand missiles of different kinds and they can reach any part of South Korea without using long range missiles. Then thereís another argument: if this THAAD system is really what is needed for the defense of South Korea from North Korean nuclear missile threats, that is a welcome thing to do. And part of your earlier discussionÖ The Korean government has not seemed to have decided on either way yet. Whether they see it as ready to discuss when the US raises these questions. So I think that because in town here, this has been discussed in some detail for quite some time. Now in defense of deterrence, I mean joint or combined deterrent to North Korean provocations, and especially since the incident of the Cheonan South Korean Naval ship. And also Yeonpyong, a terrorist shelling by North Korean soldiers, as you point out: they decided to counter provocation and the US was reluctant at the beginning because whether this countering this localized provocation might cause escalation. And then South Koreans and the Joint Chief of Staff Ė and they were even thinking about the kill-chain, the idea that you can

[unintelligible]

, and disrupt and also Ė you do all this by preemptive strike on North Korean nuclear sites and missile sites. The question here is how can you determine whether they will really launch a nuclear missile against South Korea or anywhere else. Itís a matter of judgement and Ė I remember I had a conversation with Walter Sharp when he was in Korea and the assessment in the Pentagon, I was told Ė probably you were in office at this point too Ė that Kim Jong Un, or Kim Jong Il even before that, would not use nuclear capabilities or bombs unless their days are numbered; unless they are determined and there is no other way for their survival. And until that point, therefore one of the rationale for the US counter-response to North Korean provocations. So I would like to hear some of your comments on that. And then last question I think is very important: the relationship between US policy rebalance to Asia and whatís happening in the Korean peninsula. And I donít know what your view of Ė some of the people in Asia think that Ashton Carter has become a key architect in US-Asia policy and [unintelligible] at the Shang Guo Lai Dialogue, and he says ďNo, it wasnít me. It was President Obama. He is the architect of US-Asia policy.Ē So Iíd like to hear your view along these lines.

[0:55:43]

Moderator: Okay, thank you Tong.

[0:55:46]

Kim Miller: Thank you, Tong. I donít have anything to say about cyber activities relative to North Korea.

[0:55:55]

Tong Kim: Iím not surprised. Jim Miller: I just donít have information on that. With respect to the Ė With respect to the relative balance of power, if you will, within the administration: for all of the criticism that one sometimes hears of the laborious inter-agency process of this administration, one thing that is, I think, true across the board, and certainly has been true in this area, is that when there are differences of views, they are addressed and worked through fairly systematically. And when I was in government, I was a part of those conversations. And you also Ė You have people in each of the departments and the White House, who in addition in one case with our Ė one assistant Secretary has now moved over. As well, you have a commitment to establishing clear and consistent policies and to implementing the Presidentís direction with respect to South Korea, the Korean Peninsula in general, and the Asia-Pacific. I think it is also the case that there is a coincidence of views among the key players as well, so that reinforces that. On missile defense capabilities, let me be clear. I donít want to advocate for or against specific deployment or for or against a specific system. If I were in government, I would do so internally. And the factors that you listed: efficacy, capability, cost, so forth, are all valid factors to consider and Ė at the same time, I have no doubt that an integrated, layered missile defense architecture is an important part of our deterrence posture vis a vi North Korea. Theyíve invested a lot in missiles as you noted, of various ranges. We donít have to match interceptor and interceptor for every North Korean missile because in the event of a conflict, we will be applying counter-force as well. But itís a critical part of our overall strategy and it Ė for the peninsula defense, theater missile defense is important to protect the population, to protect critical assets that enable other operations to continue and to give a window of time in the event of a short warning attack for counter-force capabilities to sped up and be able to have some effect. So I think itís a fundamental part of missile defense on the Peninsula, in Europe, and indeed in the Middle East: our fundamental part of our overall security approach. I was pleased that NATO added in the Lisbon Summit in 2010, added missile defense to the longstanding basis of deterrence, which for years has been conventional and nuclear. Now itís conventional, nuclear, and missile defense. And the US and South Korea have done the same. The US nuclear umbrella Ė significant conventional capabilities and missile defense Ė NATO has moved forward to treat cyber as an Article V contingency, one where nations would be obliged to come to other NATO nationsí assistance. And I think that as the US and South Korea work on that issue as well, weíll want to come to some similar understandings. But again, I wonít advocate for specific systems. I will, as a matter of disclosure, want to say that I do consulting for someone at the relevant companies. So in addition to not believing that I should advocate for any particularÖ I would have a conflict of interests or would Ė it would be inappropriate for me to do so for specific systems. On counter- provocations, I donít exactly share your sense of how things evolved over time in that my view was that the United States had a strong interest in a strong South Korean response to provocation. I believe that our senior leadership understood that quickly and what we needed to do was work through the details in terms of ,first, planning and coordination process, and second, in terms of how to think about the type of response and if you Ė one would frame it as tactical, operational, or strategic. There are other frames for that. But to get to Ė to work through that vocabulary and work that through, I think itís fair that it did slowdown that initial response to some degree. But I think that working those through and being in a position where weíre confident Ė we can never be completely confident that escalation will not occur, but confident in that weíve taken steps to have the upper hand and control escalation as best we can should it occur, and that we are prepared appropriately, if that makes sense. As I said in my talk, I believe that pre-emption is a very, very challenging scenario. But significant counter-force capabilities are critical because after the first missile is fired, or after conflict starts, those counter-force capabilities will be critically important. With respect to the rebalance and the Korea peninsula, I can tell you that Secretary of Defense Carter, when he was Deputy Secretary Carter, and when he was Undersecretary Carter, was a strong advocate for the rebalance. But I can also affirm that his public statement is absolutely correct: that the rebalancer in chief is the Commander in Chief in President Obama. And starting back, certainly by the time that Ė during the time that Tom Don was National Security Advisor, we would be asked on a regular basis not just what are you doing in theory to rebalance, but what specifically is each department doing to rebalance. And itís important to understand that while thereís a military component to rebalance, that itís equally or more important that we continue to shift our economic weight to the region where the bulk of economic growth will occur in the coming decades.

[1:03:08]

[1:03:10]

Moderator: Thank you. Joe?

[1:03:13]

Joseph Bosco: Thank you Dr. Miller for the excellent overview regarding the perilous situation that we face in the Korean Peninsula. Youíre certainly right to remind us that with all the other crises in the world, this cannot be allowed to be placed in the backburner. I have two questions relating to the role of China. You mentioned in your presentation China four times, and a couple times in your response to Dave and others. Youíve noted that China plays a critical, pivotal role in sustaining the regime in North Korea. It could not survive without Chinese support: food and fuel, and diplomatic support in the United Nations for example. But you also asked the question: why doesnít China step up to the plate and walk the walk? It apparently shares our concerns, or at least itís been telling us that for twenty years. But it has never walked the walk. And the question is why is that the case? Iíve argued in the past that the North Korean critical situation in fact serves Chinaís strategic interests because itís a major distraction to the United States diplomatically, as well as politically and militarily. And it also accords to China a special role as a responsible stake holder, a negotiating partner in the six party talks and elsewhere. So we look to China as kind of a good guy compared to North Koreaís bad guy. This serves Chinaís interests, but does it really serve the worldís interests in putting pressure on North Korea? You mentioned also the missile defense system that you Ė I thought you said that you did not favor deployment, early deployment. You agree with preparation, but not deployment. But I wonder since you also noted that China objects to that program, both conceptionally and operationally, why we donít use that as leverage over China to get them to then place pressure on North Korea? In other words, deploy the missile defense system or make it clear that weíre about to do so unless China can do something substantively to reign in North Korea. So perhaps you could give me your thoughts on those points.

[1:05:38]

Jim Miller: Yeah, Joe. Your statement that China is in some ways advantaged by the current situation in North Korea, I think, is fair. And itís also fair to say that if North Korea were squeezed so hard that you had large numbers of refugees Ė much larger numbers of refugees flowing into China, China would not see that in its interests. And so that that in a sense is a deterrent or detractor from them undertaking more substantial steps in many cases. I do think that China needs to be a responsible stakeholder. Weíve seen them make public statements; I referenced one by Xi Jinping. Weíve seen them apply pressure in some cases. I will tell you, Iíd like to see a lot more. So from that perspective Ė from that perspective I agree with you. With respect to specific deployment of the system, my principal issue with THAAD at this point is that we do have a limited number of systems. Weíve got a deployment in Guam that I believe we should sustain. And my experience with this and other high demand, low density assets is that theyíre a lot easier to deploy than to move again. And because Guam would be uncovered from a longer range stretch from North Korea if we moved THAAD, and because Guam is a US territory, I think that sustaining it Ė that keeping it there makes good sense. And having flexibility to load it elsewhere makes sense. So a rotational deployment Ė thereís interest in rotational deployment. In Asia, thereís interest in rotational deployment. In the Middle East, thereís interest in a rotational deployment among some; in Europe as well. And all of those can be considered preparations, as we had undertaken preparation. For example deploying in Turkey made good sense. But because itís such a Ė because that particular system is such a limited asset particularly Ė as you know in Turkey, we ended up deploying two Patriot batteries and with two others contributed by our allies. An analogous calculation occurs for Korea at this point in time. The time to deploy it in my view would be if we see an increase in tensions and if we see other indicators that make us believe that it should be that a THAAD battery should be deployed there as opposed to being withheld for another contingency. Over time, Iíd like to see more of that general type of capability, whether itís that system or not, deployed not just by the United States but deployed by our allies and partners. And in some cases, thatíll be because US sales. In some cases, it will be indigenous capabilities or other countries that may provide those.

[1:09:11]

Moderator: Thank you, Joe. Larry?

[Pause]

Speak into the microphone if you can.

[1:09:21]

Larry Niksch: Thank you Mr. Miller for your very interesting and, for the most part I think, on the point comments about the strategic situation on the Korean peninsula. I have two questions. The first is Ė you talked about North Koreaís program to develop a nuclear warhead for an ICBM that could presumably hit San Francisco. And you also talked about attempts by North Korea to develop a submarine launched ballistic missile. But you didnít talk about North Koreaís efforts to develop nuclear weapons for the intermediate range No Dong Missile. On the North Korea statement of May the 21st about its accomplishment, it did make the claim that it had developed a warhead for an ICBM and as you pointed out, there is widespread skepticism about that claim here. But that statement also claimed that North Korea had succeeded in developing nuclear weapons for its intermediate and short range missiles. And here, I think there is a lot of evidence and reports that that claim is more credible. You go back, for example, to Richard Engelís report on NBC news, a long standing senior national security correspondent, April 3rd 2013, in which he said that the US officials, with whom he was talking to, were telling him that they believed that North Korea had developed a nuclear warhead for a missile with a range of about 1000 miles. Now, a North Korean missile with that range is the No Dong. Chris Nelson, and many of you I know read the Nelson report Ė he reported on May the 5th, 2013, that within the US government, the likelihood that North Korea had developed nuclear warheads for the No Dongs were, as he put it, seems far more certain behind closed doors than in public. And his description of the US governmentís position on this, its reaction to this, seems to be the same today, as he described it, as over two years ago. So my first question is why is there this reluctance, frankly I think unwillingness at this point, on the part of the Obama administration and the executive branch, to disclose to the Congress and frankly to disclose to the public that North Korea has succeeded in this area and does not have nuclear capabilities, nuclear warheads for the No Dong missiles. And I think if you look at what Dr. Heckert said that the Chinese told him and the American experts in February that North Korea now has 20 warheads with a major acceleration capability for the future. They were talking about nuclear warheads in terms of what the Chinese said to the American delegation in February. So why is there this reluctance, this unwillingness to disclose this? Secondly, and related, at the meeting last May that we had, the ICAS meeting, you may remember that an administration official who spoke acknowledged that the Iranian Shahab 3 Missile is a twin of the No Dong missile that the Iranians developed with substantial North Korean input and assistance, starting in the late 1990s. Now at the end of May, about three weeks ago, a leading Iranian exile organization, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, issued a report disclosing that at the end of April, a seven person North Korean delegation of nuclear warhead and missile experts visited Tehran. The report was pretty specific about who these people were, the groups and organizations in Iran with whom they met, and the location of the meeting with top Iranian nuclear and missile counterparts. The National Council said that another such North Korean delegation was scheduled to visit Iran in June this month. There, from Washington, thereís been no reaction to this. From the State Department Ė no reaction from the Pentagon, no reactionÖ I guess my question at this point becomes: given what I think clearly is this North Korean accomplishment of now developing and producing nuclear warheads for the No Dongs, is there an awareness within the Obama administration, within the State Department, within the Pentagon, of any danger, that as North Korean production of these warheads increases, the danger will mount that North Korea will transfer some of these warheads to Iran for the Shahab 3? And is the administration taking any steps, or at least engaging in any discussion or planning about measures to try to stop this potential transfer, if the danger really does development? And, relatedly, in connection with what Joe said, those North Korean delegations going to Iran Ė those North Korean aircraft almost always refuel at the Beijing airport, right under the nose of the Chinese government, with no attempts to stop this traffic, no inspections of the air, of documents that these people might be carrying to Iran. And I think that kind of reinforces the point that Joe made about Chinaís unwillingness to really step up Ė to deal with this kind of situation.

[1:17:19]

Moderator: Thank you Larry. Itís all yours.

Jim Miller: Okay, thank you, Larry. On the question of No Dong and the potential threat from North Korean nuclear weapons, let me just say first that from a technical perspective, thereís no doubt that the shorter range the missile, the less the technical challenge associated with being able to produce a re-entry vehicle and a warhead for it that can survive that re-entry process. So the distresses are substantially greater for an ICBM than for medium range or short range missiles. So in that sense, I think you can Ė one can literally do the math of that and understand the differences and heed the other stresses. My belief is that we need to plan as if North Korea has nuclear weapons across a range of capabilities. So what I recommended and supported growing the ground based interceptor system, the ground based mid-course defense system in the United States from 30 to 44 and taking advantages of the head that Secretary Gates had created when he decided to stop momentarily Ė he said thirty. It wasnít the thought that North Korea had 44 nuclear weapons, or if you assume 2 for 1, 22 nuclear weapons. Itís that we want to stay ahead and that we have to plan and be prepared for the possibility that they will succeed even without very illustrious testing programs on nuclear weapons and without even a testing program. So that same logic applies for the shorter range systems as well. And I believe that we need to be prepared for that possibility and we need to make clear to North Korea as Ė I believed this administration certainly has done, that the use of nuclear weapons would have a devastating response. As I said in my remarks, there is no doubt that Ė with the administration focusing on nuclear weapons, even as we work to reduce their role in strategy, we asserted that, when I was in government, and itís still our policy Ė itís still the governmentís policy, that the fundamental purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear use for North Korea and for other nuclear capable states. Our US nuclear weapons are also intended to deter chemical or biological use, and could be put into play even against large scale conventional. But we need to Ė my view is that we need to plan as if North Korea has that capability and we need to deter it, and be very clear in our commitment, in our capabilities. And as I said, that deterrence has Ė and as a relatively recent statement by Secretary of Defense and ROK Defense Ministry note, that has three elements. It has nuclear umbrella; it has conventional; and it has missile defense. And that missile defense is not restricted to missile defense in the United States. It is intended to be missile defense for South Korea as well, as well as Japan. I cannot speak to any differences in views between the administration and Congress or a lack of communication between them. Congress should have access to any intelligence that the administration has, at least those on the relevant committees should. And so they should be seen, whatever it is the administration is seeing. On the question of North Korea and Iranian cooperation, weíve seen it in missiles and Iím very concerned that it could occur and I donít know whether it did occur. Iíve seen the, even in government, Iíve seen the same unclassified reports that you did. Iím very concerned about the possibility of that. Itís specifically why I wanted to reiterate that this administration and following the prior Bush administration, has made multiple public statements and indeed wrote in the 2010 nuclear posture review, that any state that transfers WMD or nuclear weapons to another state or to a sub state actor, will be held accountable for that. Of course we want to try and prevent it in the event that we are aware of it, not rely only on deterrence but work to prevent. And being out of government for well over a year now, I canít speak to the particulars. Itís possible that if I were in government, because it would be classified, I couldnít speak to the particulars. But I canít get into the details in this case Iím no longer in government.

[1:23:03]

Moderator: Well ladies and gentlemen, just one more question from the floor. Grace, speak up loud.

Grace[Kang]: [Unintelligible due to lack of microphone and quality of recording. Question on the usage of sanctions and enforcements of heavier sanctions on North Korea. Follow up questions on the HR757 and the ICC]

[1:24:20]

Jim Miller: On the first topic, I certainly support strengthening and enforcing sanctions against North Korea. It was the central aspect of this countryís response to the hack on Sony entertainment and it Ė in my view, it ought to be a significant set steps. Understanding the limitations to US leverage, understanding that we already have sanctions in place, we ought to use that tool as much as we reasonably can. I have not reviewed HR757, so Iíll refrain from comment. On ICC, I want to clarify, or ask you to clarify what would be the complaint. There are many complaints, but are you talking about the Cheonan specifically, or are you talking about other actions.

[1:25:18]

Grace[Kang]: [Unintelligible due to lack of microphone and quality of recording. Clarification of complaints on ICC]

[1:25:36]

Jim Miller: So not being an international lawyer.

[1:25:41]

Moderator: She is.

[Laughter]

[1:25:46]

Jim Miller: Given that I am not an international lawyer, I canít speak to the effective Ė the most effective pathways, or which is more likely to be successful. But what I would suggest from a policy perspective, if you will, is that holding Kim Jong Un and the regime accountable for their actions and what I Ė from a common sense perspective would say very much looks like crimes against humanity and against the North Korean people, makes a lot of sense. I donít Ė I canít Ė I donít have the depth on international law to tell you what the right pathways are. Getting the support of other countries for that, I think would be very valuable. We donít want it to be only the United States and South Korea if we go forward on the path, and the broader that support, the better. It may not affect his behavior directly, but itís an important signal, an important step and may increase our ability to take other steps as well.

[1:27:04]

Moderator: Thank you very much. Letís give Jim a big round of applause.

[Applause]

Moderator: We have something for you. Jim Miller: Oh, great. Moderator: This is for you

[Bell noise]

Jim Miller: Oh thatís great. Moderator: Thatís from Philadelphia.

[1:27:28]

Man 1: Admiral Blair has just arrived, so be carefulÖ Moderator: [Laughter] He has his chair.

[Logistical issues]



[Short break before Admiral Blair addresses the Panel]



[1:31:59]



[End]



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