The ICAS Lectures

2016-1025-SWB

U.S. Strategy to Address the Human Rights Situation in North Korea

Scott Busby


ICAS Fall Symposium

October 25, 2016, 10:00 AM - 6:00 PM
The Heritage Foundation Allison Auditorium
Washington, DC


Institute for Corean-American Studies, Inc.
Email: icas@icasinc.org
http://www.icasinc.org

Biographic sketch & Links: Scott Busby

This is the text prepared and submitted by Scott Busby.

A transcription of the text proceedings with Q & A follows this text.

U.S. Strategy to Address the Human Rights Situation in North Korea

Scott Busby

DRL DAS Scott Busby
Institute for Corean-American Studies
Tuesday October 25, 2016



Thank you everyone for being here today and I thank ICAS for inviting me to speak about the very important issue of the deplorable human rights situations in North Korea and our strategy for addressing it. The United States has been working hard to respond to North Korea's illicit nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, both of which pose an unacceptable threat to our security and the international non-proliferation regime. Yet even as we insist on consequences, including strong sanctions, in response to North Korea's nuclear violations, we are also fully committed to an effective response to North Korea's atrocious human rights record. This year marks a milestone for U.S. policy regarding human rights in North Korea. We took a series of big steps, and for the first time, imposed sanctions on North Korean officials, including Kim Jong Un, responsible for or associated with human rights abuses.

As most of you are aware, the DPRK is one of the world's most repressive countries. It is near the bottom of virtually every report that ranks human rights conditions in all countries around the world. Under its leader Kim Jong Un, the totalitarian regime dominates every aspect of its citizens' lives and restricts the exercise of fundamental freedoms, including freedoms of expression, religion, peaceful assembly, association, and movement. North Korean authorities commit egregious human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, enslavement, torture, and prolonged arbitrary detention. Numerous defector accounts and NGO reports have suggested that the regime has locked away between 80,000 to 120,000 citizens in its vast network of political prisons under unfair procedures. Many of these inmates are reportedly subject to severe beatings, electric shock, prolonged periods of exposure to the elements, humiliations such as public nakedness, confinements for up to several weeks in cells that are so small that they are unable to stand upright or lie down, being forced to kneel or sit immobilized for long periods, being hung by the wrists or forced to stand up and sit down to the point of collapse, and mothers are being forced to watch the infanticide of their newborn infants. Women are particularly vulnerable to sexual assault, forced abortions, and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence. Defectors reported that many prisoners died while detained in these facilities as a result of such cruel torture. These reports are deeply disturbing, and we condemn the North Korean government for its use of fear and cruelty to control its people.

Two years ago in 2014, the UN Commission of Inquiry led by the Honorable Justice Michael Kirby from Australia, Sonja Biserko from Serbia, and the Honorable Marzuki Darusman from Indonesia, who served for several years as the U.N. Special Rapporteur on North Korean human rights, released a comprehensive report condemning the North Korean regime for its human rights record and for the atrocities committed against its people. The report unequivocally concluded that North Korea "does not have any parallel in the contemporary world" when it comes to human rights violations and defined the scope and severity of the problem as widespread and systematic, "pursuant to policies established at the highest level of the State."

The release of the UN COI report has helped immensely to strengthen the case for others to support our efforts to increase international pressure on the DPRK to improve its human rights record. In particular, we have called upon the DPRK to take steps to immediately release all political prisoners, dismantle the political prison camps, and provide adequate fair trial protections.

Our policy is intended to increase pressure on the DPRK government to prioritize the lives of its people. We have made clear that our willingness to engage with the DPRK government depends, among other things, on whether it is willing to take concrete steps to address the serious, ongoing human rights violations in the country. And this includes the implementation of the UN COI report's recommendations.

To that end, our strategy to promote human rights in North Korea is focused on three key objectives. First, we seek to increase international awareness of the dire human rights situation in the DPRK. Second, we are trying to do everything we can to increase access by the citizens of North Korea to information about life outside North Korea. And lastly, we seek to make clear to the North Korean leadership and those most responsible for serious human rights violations in North Korea that they will be held accountable if and when that becomes possible.

Let me begin by saying that our efforts to raise international awareness have focused on amplifying the voices of defectors by sharing their stories and experiences under the oppressive North Korean regime. We do this through a variety of partnerships with other governments, nongovernmental organizations, and news organizations. Just this past year, for instance, we hosted a number of side-events at the UN with like-minded governments that share our view on North Korea's human rights record. These included an event last March at the UN Commission on the Status of Women that we co-hosted with four other governments and an event on the margins of the UN General Assembly High Level Meetings in September. We also participated in high-profile events hosted by civil society groups in both Washington and Seoul, and advocated for multilateral bodies, including the UN Security Council, to address the human rights situation in the DPRK. In addition, we also participated in numerous interviews with media outlets that broadcast into North Korea as well as to the region and internationally. We worked with the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia to report information into the DPRK on our recent sanctions designations of North Korean individuals associated with human rights abuses. We hope to inform average North Koreans through these broadcasts that we know about the vile acts being done by these perpetrators, that we absolutely do not condone such abuses, and that we intend to hold the responsible parties accountable. We will continue these efforts.

It is imperative that we engage closely with our like-minded partners in these efforts. Along those lines, we are in regular discussions with our partners to improve the coordination of our messages to magnify each other's efforts. Our trilateral relationship with South Korea and Japan is stronger than ever. We are working closely with both governments to jointly appeal to other governments to support these efforts. We are also coordinating closely with and have co- hosted numerous events with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights which established a field office with staff in Seoul last July to track human rights violations in North Korea.

We also continue to cosponsor and lobby for the passage of strong annual resolutions at the Human Rights Council and UN General Assembly. In this regard, we are currently working closely with other governments to pass another strong resolution condemning the human rights situation in the DPRK at the upcoming UNGA Third Committee meeting.

We are also continuously engaging with numerous civil society groups and defector activists to shine a spotlight on North Korea's horrific human rights violations. In addition to participating in civil society-hosted events, we consider their participation at our own events to be just as critical. For example, two defectors were able to meet with U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Samantha Power before the UN Security Council discussed the human rights situation in the DPRK in March this year. Ambassador Power shared the defectors' stories as a part of her statement at the council meeting, which helped to place a human face on the millions who suffer under the oppressive rule of the regime. In a trip to South Korea earlier this month, she met more defectors and listened to harrowing stories of young people who had escaped from North Korea just a few weeks before. Given the closed nature of the DPRK, supporting and investing in this community -- and making sure their stories are told -- is essential to documenting the human rights situation and increasing international pressure on the government.

The second part of our North Korean human rights strategy is to increase access to information for as many North Koreans as possible. We must do everything we can to facilitate the flow of information into and out of North Korea as well as among the North Koreans within the closed country. For nearly 70 years, the North Korean regime has taken extreme measures to exert complete control over access to information, denying its citizens knowledge of the existence of alternative ways of life in order to secure its survival. However, we saw that things started to change during the famine of the mid-1990s through the growth of informal markets, which brought in a surplus of consumer goods along with outside information from China and South Korea. We have seen indications that more and more North Koreans are being exposed to information from the outside through DVDs, MP3s, cell phones, and tablets. They are coming to see the living standards of other countries and are realizing that their counterparts in the free and democratic South Korea are faring far better than they are, contrary to the lies that they are being told by their own government. A chasm has been formed between the traditional state propaganda and people's understanding of the world and it is getting harder for the government to hide the truth about the country's relative poverty and the reasons for it.

Our goal here is to take advantage of cracks in the information blockade and help accelerate the bottom up trends already underway in North Korea that could lead to internal change. We want to ramp up our efforts in showing the average North Korean that the enjoyment of freedom of movement, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion is possible and commonplace around the world. In order to do this, we are expanding our support for programs that increase access to information inside the country. We have partnered with defector-led organizations to push information into North Korea through networks built around the information markets. Those same networks are able to bring information out of the country, creating a feedback loop that allows activists to better curate the content of information which they then can push back into the country. This subsequently increases the demand and expands the reach of these information programs. These networks are essential in that they also allow international organizations to better document the situation in the DPRK by bringing news out of the closed country. They also provide average North Koreans with information about what is happening in neighboring provinces and cities to which they otherwise wouldn't be exposed.

In this effort, we continue to partner with broadcasters, including the Broadcasting Board of Governors here in the U.S. and independent nongovernmental broadcasters in South Korea to effectively tailor our messaging content for North Koreans. This includes basic entertainment like soap operas and movies - everyday material that average people will be inclined to watch - as well as news and documentaries. We believe that the more information gets inside, the more people's appetite for knowledge increases.

We are seeing that our efforts to increase the flow of information are effective in exposing the North Koreans to alternative ways of life and changing their perceptions of the outside world. Recent defector surveys demonstrate that before leaving the DPRK, more than 92 percent of survey respondents had watched a foreign DVD and more than 70 percent had access to a mobile phone. Nearly 30 percent have listened to a foreign radio broadcast.

Defectors continue to be an important source of information about conditions inside the country, as well as demonstrating the illegitimacy of the regime, and we continue to work closely with them. Last year, 1,276 North Korean defectors resettled in South Korea, a decline of 8 percent from the previous, which the media and NGOs attributed to the DPRK government ramping up efforts to strengthen their border controls. While the overall number of defectors has been decreasing, however, we have seen an increase in the number of senior DPRK officials who have defected.

The final part of our strategy is accountability. We continue to seek opportunities to promote accountability and to send a strong signal to North Korean officials that their actions have consequences. As a key part of these efforts, we released a report on July 6, identifying eight entities and 15 North Korean officials, including Kim Jong Un, who we determined to be responsible for or associated with serious human rights abuses and censorship. In conjunction with that report, the Department of the Treasury added 11 of those individuals and five entities to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. As I mentioned earlier, this marks the first time we specifically sanctioned North Korean officials for being responsible for or associated with human rights abuses. We believe this sends a strong signal condemning those abuses and our determination to see them stopped.

By taking these actions, we seek to warn the North Korean leadership and officials, particularly the mid-level officers including prison camp managers and guards, interrogators, and defector chasers, that their actions are not hidden. Our message has consistently sought to remind them that the world is watching, and some day they will be held to account for what they have done. In so doing, we hope to deter some of them from engaging in such abuses and encourage them to adopt practices that are more in line with international human rights standards.

We also continue to remain focused on maintaining pressure through the UN Security Council and partnering with the Seoul field office of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and other organizations to continue to build a credible body of information to support future accountability measures. Despite the notoriously opaque nature of the DPRK, we must continue our efforts to collect and evaluate any new information with the goal of bringing to light more individuals, at all levels, associated with serious human rights abuses.

Moving forward, we will need to use every opportunity to send a strong, clear message of resolve to push North Korea into taking concrete steps to address the core concerns of the international community on its human rights record. The United States will continue to let the North Korean regime know that it will be judged by its actions, not its words, and that any future relationship depends in part on the regime taking concrete steps to improve its human rights situation.

In this regard, we will continue to seek ways to coordinate closely with our allies and international partners to amplify our efforts in increasing pressure on the DPRK to address its deplorable human rights record. We will seek every opportunity to give a voice to the voiceless and remind the North Korean people that they are not alone and are not forgotten.

We have made some important progress in recent years, but we realize that much more remains to be done to effect change on the ground for North Koreans. We realize that this can only be done with the help of people like you. I commend our partners here today for your hard work in bringing attention to the plight of the North Koreans. It isn't easy, but I want to encourage you to remain vigilant and steadfast in this very important fight to bring freedom to the North Korean people. We must continue to work hard to galvanize support from others in this effort, particularly in the Korean-American community, and encourage active involvement at all levels to bring attention and awareness to the North Koreans suffering under the oppressive regime.

Our long-term security and prosperity depends on promoting the values of freedom and democracy around the world, including in the DPRK, and with your help, we hope that North Korea chooses to stand on the right side of history by taking meaningful steps, among other things, towards respecting human rights. Thank you, and I'd be happy to take your questions and comments.

Return to prepared text.

- - - - - - - - - -


Transcription of Scott Busby's presentation with Q & A.

North Koreaís Human Rights Issues: What To Do About It?

Scott Busby
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor, US Department of State
October 25, 2016




[0:00:00]
Thank you Dr. Kim for this uncommon opportunity to introduce the Honorable Scott Busby, the first featured speaker of ICAS Fall Symposium 2016. Mr. Scott Busby serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labour at the US Department of State in Washington DC, where he oversees the Bureauís work on Human Rights at the United Nationsí Internal Freedom and Business and Human Rights. Previously, he served as Director for Human Rights on the National Security Council in the White House from 2009 to 2011, where Mr. Busby managed a wide range of human rights and refugee issues. From 2005 to 2009, he was coordinator of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum, and Refugees in Geneva, Switzerland. Mr. Busby got his start in Federal Services as an Asylum Officer in Migration and Naturalization Service. He holds advanced degrees in Sociology and Law from the University of California at Berkley, and received his bachelor of arts from Amherst College. Ladies and Gentlemen, please join me in welcoming the Honorable Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby.

[0:01:42]


[Applause]


[0:01:51]
Scott Busby: Now, as Dr. Kim asked me the last time I had a 9th grader introduce me, and I donít think Iíve ever had a 9th grader introduce me. So thank you very much for doing that. And thank you Dr. Kim to you and the Korean-American Studies Association for hosting this event once again and for inviting us to participate in it.

[0:02:15]
So Iím today to talk to you about the very timely issue of Human Rights in North Korea. Thank you everyone for being here. Thank you for ICAS, to ICAS for inviting me. The US has been working hard, of course, to respond to North Koreaís elicit nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, which I understand youíve heard about in your last session. Both of which of course pose an unacceptable threat to our security and to the international non-proliferation regime. Yet even as we insist on consequences for those programs and actions, including strong sanctions, we are also fully committed to an effective response to North Koreaís atrocious human rights record. This year, in many ways, marks a milestone for US policy regarding human rights in North Korea. We took a number of important steps and for the first time, imposed sanctions on North Korean officials, including Kim Jong Un, who are responsible for, or associated with human rights abuse; and Iím happy to talk about that in more detail during the Q&A.

[0:03:29]
As most of you are aware, the DPRK is one of the worldís most repressive countries when it comes to human rights. It is near the bottom of virtually every human rights report that ranks human rights conditions in countries around the world. Under Kim Jong Un, the totalitarian regime dominates every aspect of its citizensí lives and restricts the exercise of fundamental freedoms including the freedoms of expression, religion, peaceful assembly, association, and movement. North Korean authorities commit egregious human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, enslavement, torture, and prolonged arbitrary detention. Numerous defector accounts and NGO reports have suggested that the regime has locked away between 80,000 to 120,000 citizens in its vast network of political prisons under unfair procedures. Many of these inmates are reportedly subject to severe beatings, electric shock, prolonged periods of exposure to the elements, humiliation such as public nakedness, confinements for up to several weeks in cells that are so small that they are unable to stand upright or lie down, being forced to kneel or sit immobilized for long periods of time, being hung by the wrists Ė you get the picture.

[0:04:54]
Women are particularly vulnerable to sexual assault, forced abortions, and other forms of sexual and gender based violence. Defectors reported that many prisoners died while detained in these facilities as a result of such cruel treatment. These reports are deeply disturbing and we condemn the North Korean government for its use of such fear and cruelty to control its people. Two years ago, as many of you know, in 2014, the UN Commission of Inquiry, led by the Honorable Justice Michael Kirby from Australia, Sonja Biserko from Serbia, and the Honorable Marzuki Darusman from Indonesia, released a comprehensive report condemning the North Korean regime for its human rights record and for the atrocities committed against its people. The report unequivocally concluded that North Korea ďdoes not have any parallel in the contemporary world when it comes to human rights violations,Ē and it defined the scope and severity of the problem as widespread and systematic, pursuit policies established at the highest levels of the state. The release COI report has helped immensely to strengthen the case for others to support our efforts to increase international pressure on the DPRK to improve its human rights record. In particular, we have called upon the DPRK to take steps immediately to release all political prisoners, dismantle the political prison camps, and provide adequate fair trial protections. Our policies are intended to increase pressure on the government to prioritize the lives of its people. We have made clear that our willingness to engage with the DPRK depends, among other things, on whether it is willing to take concrete steps to address the serious ongoing human rights violations in the country. And this includes implementation of the COIís recommendations. To that end, our strategy is to promote human rights in the DPRK on three key objectives. First, we seek to increase International awareness of the dire human rights situation in the DPRK. Second, we are trying to do everything we can to increase access by the citizens of the DPRK to information about life outside North Korea. And lastly, we seek to make clear to the North Korean leadership and those most responsible for serious human rights violations that they will be held accountable if and when that becomes possible.

[0:07:29]
Let me begin by saying that our efforts to raise international awareness of the human rights situation in the DPRK have focused on amplifying the voices of defectors by sharing their stories and experiences under the North Korean regime. We do this through a variety of partnerships with other governments, non-governmental organizations, and news media. Just this past year, for instance, we hosted a number of side events at the UN with like-minded governments that share our view on North Koreaís human rights record. These included an event last March at the UN Commission on the Status of Women, that we co-hosted with 4 other governments. An event more recently on the margins of the UN General High Assembly Meetings in September. That event highlighted cartoons done by a number of defectors from North Korea. We also participated in high profile events hosted by civil society groups in both Washington and Seoul, and advocated for multi-lateral bodies, including the UN Security Council, to address the Human Rights situation in the DPRK. In addition, we have also participated in numerous interviews with media outlets that broadcast into North Korea as well as to the region and internationally. Weíve worked closely with the voice of America and radio-free Asia in these efforts, to report information on the situation in the DPRK, as well as our most recent human rights sanction designations of individuals associated with human rights abuses. We hope to inform average North Koreans through these broadcast that we know about the vile acts being done by the perpetrators, that we absolutely do not condone such acts, and that we intend to hold the responsible parties accountable. We intend to continue with these efforts.

[0:09:25]
It is imperative that we work closely with our like-minded partners in these efforts. Along these lines, we are in regular discussions with them to improve the coordination of our messages to magnify each otherís efforts. Our tri-lateral relationship with South Korea and Japan is particularly important in this regard, and is stronger than ever. We are working closely with both governments to jointly appeal to other governments to support these efforts. We are also coordinating closely with, and have co-hosted numerous events, with the UN Office of the High Commissioners for Human Rights, which established a field office with staff in Seoul in last July, to track ongoing human rights violations in the DPRK. We also continue to co-sponsor and lobby for the passage of strong, annual resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council and the General Assembly. In this regard, we are currently working closely with other governments to pass another strong resolution condemning the human rights situation in the DPRK at the UN committee in New York.

[0:10:33]
We are also continually engaging with numerous civil society groups and defector activists to shine a spotlight on North Koreaís horrific human rights violations. In addition to participating in events organized by civil society, we consider the participation of Civil Society in our own events to be equally critical. For example, two defectors were able to meet with US permanent representatives to the United Nation, Ambassador Samantha Power, before the UN Security Council discussed the Human Rights situation in the DPRK in March this year. Ambassador Power shared the defectorsí stories as part of her statement at the council meeting, which helped to put a human face on the millions who suffer under the oppressive rule of the regime. In a trip to South Korea, earlier this month, Ambassador Power met more defectors and listened to more stories of young people who had escaped North Korea just a few weeks before. Given the closed nature of the DPRK, supporting and investing in this community and making sure their stories are told is essential to documenting the human rights situation and increasing pressure on the government. The second part of our North Korea Human Rights Strategy is to increase access to information to as many North Koreans as possible. We must do everything we can to facilitate the flow of information into and out of North Korea, as well as among and between the North Koreans within the country. For nearly seventy years, the North Korean regime has taken extreme measures to exert complete control over access to information, denying its citizens knowledge of the existence of alternative ways of life in order to secure its survival. However, we saw that things started to change during the famine of the mid 1990s through the growth of informal markets, which brought in a surplus of consumer goods along with outside information from China and South Korea. We have seen indications that more and more North Koreans are being exposed to information from the outside through DVDs, MP3s, cell phones and tablets. They are coming to see the living standards of other countries and are realizing that if their counterparts in the free and Democratic South Korea are faring far better than they are, contrary to the lies that they are being told by their own government. A chasm is formed between traditional state propaganda and the peopleís understanding of the world, and it is getting harder for the government to hide the truth about the countryís real situation and the reasons for it. Our goal here is to take advantage of the cracks in the information blockade, and help accelerate the bottom-up trends already underway in North Korea that could lead to internal change. We want to ramp up our efforts in showing the average North Korean that the enjoyment of freedom of movement, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion is possible and commonplace around the world. In order to do this, we are expanding our support for programs that increase access to information inside the country. We have partnered with defector-led organizations to push information into North Korea through networks built around information markets. Those same networks are able to bring information out of the country, creating a feedback loop that allows activists to better curate the content of information which they then can push back into the country. This subsequently increases the demand and expands the reach of these information programs. These networks are essential in that they allow international organizations to better document the situation in the DPRK by bringing news out of the closed country. They also provide average North Koreans information of what is happening in neighboring provinces in their own country and cities, to which they otherwise wouldnít be exposed. In this effort, we continue to partner with broadcasters, including the broadcasting board of Governors here in Washington, and independent, non-governmental broadcasters in South Korea, to effectively tailor our messaging content for North Koreans. This includes basic entertainment, like soap operas and movies, everyday material that average North Koreans will be inclined to watch, as well as news and documentaries. We believe that the more information gets inside, the more peopleís appetite for knowledge will increase.

[0:15:07]
We are seeing that our efforts to increase the flow of information are effective in exposing North Koreans to alternative ways of life and changing their perceptions of the outside world. Recent defector surveys demonstrate that before leaving the DPRK, more than 92% of them had watched a foreign DVD and more than 70% had access to a mobile phone. Nearly 30% have listened to a foreign radio broadcast. When it comes to defections, defectors continue to be an important source of information about conditions inside the country. And we continue to work closely with them. Last year, 1276 defectors were settled in South Korea, a decline of 8% from the prior year, which the media and NGOs have attributed to the DPRK governmentís ramping up efforts to strengthen their border controls. While the overall number decreased, however, we have seen an increase in a number of senior DPRK officials who have defected, and indeed, this has gotten the attention of the regime and the regime is trying to crack down on officials who might defect as well as their family members. The final part of our strategy is pursuing accountability. We continue to seek opportunities to promote accountability and to send a strong signal to North Korean officials that their actions have consequences. As a key part of these efforts, we released a report on July the 6th, identifying 8 entities and 15 North Korean officials, including Kim Jong Un, who we determine to be responsible for or associated with serious human rights abuses and censorship. In conjunction with that report, the Department of the Treasury added 11 of these individuals and 5 entities to the specially designated nationals and blocked persons list: this is a list of people or entities who are sanctioned. As I mentioned earlier, this marks the first time we specifically sanctioned North Korean officials to be responsible for or associated with human rights abuses. We believe this sends a strong signal condemning these abuses and our determination to see them stop.

[0:17:21]
By taking these actions, we seek to warn the North Korean leadership and officials, particularly mid-level officials at prison camps, interrogators, defector chasers, that their actions are not hidden. Our message has consistently sought to remind them that the world is watching and someday they will be held to account for what they have done. In so doing, we hope to deter some of them from engaging in such abuses and encourage them to adopt practices that are more in line with international human rights standards. We also continue to remain focused on maintaining pressure on the regime through the UN Security Council and partnering with the OHCHR Office in Seoul. Despite the notorious opaque nature of the DPRK, we must continue our efforts to collect and evaluate any new information with the goal of bringing to light more individuals at all levels associated with serious human rights abuses. Moving forward, we believe we need to use every opportunity we have to send a strong, clear message of resolve to push North Korea into taking concrete steps to address the core concerns of the international community on its human rights record. The US will continue to let the North Korean regime know that it will be judged by its actions, not its words, and that any future relationship depends in significant part on the regime taking concrete steps to improve its human rights record. In this regard, we will continue to seek ways to coordinate closely with our allies and partners, to amplify our efforts in increasing pressure on the regime. We will seek every opportunity to give a voice to the voiceless and remind that the North Korean people that they are not alone and not forgotten. We have made some important progress in recent years, but we realize that much more remains to be done to effect change on the ground for North Koreans. We realize this can only be done with the help and support like yourselves. I commend our partners here today for your hard work in bringing attention to the plight of North Koreans. It isnít easy, but I want to encourage you to remain vigilant and steadfast in this very important fight to bring freedom to the North Korean people. We must continue to work hard to galvanize support from others in this effort, particularly in the Korean-American community, encourage active involvement at all levels to bring attention and awareness to the North Koreans suffering under the current regime. Our long term security and prosperity depends on promoting the values of freedom and democracy around the world, including in the DPRK. And with your help, we hope that North Korea chooses to stand on the right side of history by taking meaningful steps among other things towards respecting human rights. Thank you, and I am looking forward to taking your questions and comments.

[0:20:17]


[Applause]


[0:20:38]
Larry Niksch: Mr. Assistant Secretary Busby, you have comparisons drawn from time to time between the previous situation in Burma and North Korea today. In thinking back to Burma, during the period of strict military rule, the Bush administration, and the early days of the Obama administration, they made many of the general criticisms that Assistant Secretary Busby has made today about North Korea. One of the things the administrations and the State Department did with Burma, as I remember, was to focus very specifically and with considerable discipline on the single proposal of getting the International Red Cross into the Burmese prison camps. And this emphasis and the issue persisted for several years, but finally the military regime in Burma gave way, and the ICRC was admitted into the prison camps. Has there been any thought about really devoting some real concentration onto a kind of specific issue like that to pressure the North Korean regime in the hopes of getting at least a little bit of movement on one particular issue like that, in terms of getting the North Korean regime to budge a little bit?

[0:22:53]
Scott Busby: Thank you, Larry for that comment. I wasnít aware of that part of the history of our diplomacy towards Burma. I would note that the current transition in Burma, which is still a work in progress, our belief is that the sanctions that we imposed on the Burmese leadership, the military regime and its supporters, were absolutely critical in terms of encouraging them to eventually open their fists and allow some sort of transition to take place. And our hope is that through our position of sanctions on the DPRK, we might be able to have a similar effect. Now, the DPRK, even though the former military regime was quite a repressive and closed regime, the DPRK regime is even more closed and economically not quite as expanded in terms of where its assets are being held, and that type of thing. Nonetheless, we believe that sanctions could be a key element, and under the law that called for us to name individuals responsible for human rights abuses and sanction them, we are supposed to continue identifying individuals every six months. So weíre in the throughs of putting together a second list of individuals and entities that we hope to release in December. In terms of the ICRC issue in particular, I wasnít aware of that in Burma, and it hasnít come up yet in our talk around the DPRK. We have been pushing for the DPRK to allow the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to come in, and at one point the regime did make a tentative offer for him to come in, but it was clearly an effort to try to stave off one of the many UN resolutions on the human rights situation. So when he went back to them and said, ďGee Iíd love to come,Ē they backed off because it was clear that the resolution was going to go forward. So that is one thing weíve pushed on. But I will raise this issue of ICRC getting access. The regime is so allergic to any outsiders having access that I think it will be a pretty heavy lift. But itís a worthwhile project to pursue.

[0:25:13]
Moderator: Larry, any follow up questions?

[0:25:14]
Larry Niksch: No.

[0:25:15]
Moderator: Okay, Joe or Peter?

[0:25:20]
Joseph Bosco: First, I want to commend you, Dr. Kim, and ICAS, for featuring this part of the North Korean experience as the lead part of your program. We tend to focus on the terrors of the nuclear issue, but the horrors of the human rights issue is equally troublesome. I think that Secretary Busby has the most unenviable position in Washington. Day after day, he has to look at the grotesque situation, the horrible treatment of the North Korean people, knowing how little the United States Government can do under present policies. And that leads to my questions, which are two questions. One is, do we have any indications that as we increase the sanctions and we increase the public visibility, the regime itself takes any action or feels any pressure at all to modify its policies, or does it simply think it can tough it out and continue on with its cruel treatment? And the second question is, you mentioned the BBG, the Board of Broadcast Governors and the cooperation you have with them. My understanding is that in the past, the BBG has cut back on short-wave radio broadcasts, certainly in China, and I expect possibly into North Korea as well, under the argument that most people have internet access so they donít need radio. I think thatís an inaccurate premise when it comes to North Korea. I was wondering if you could enlighten us if your budget is adequate for what youíre trying to accomplish with radio.

[0:26:04]
Scott Busby: Two very good questions. On the effect of sanctions, I canít get into a lot of detail on this, but is clear to us that the regime is paying attention and that it has some impact. It may not be having quite the financial impact that it might in other countries, where there is greater interdependence of the countryís leadership with the international financial system. But it clear has gotten their attention. An interesting thing happened, I think it was a couple years ago, when we first started talking accountability for the leadership of human rights abuses at the conference in New York. It was very interesting that right at that time, the regime did release the two or three Americans who had been held for a long period of time and made a very concerted diplomatic effort to try and get that language out of the resolution. They failed; we and others held firm on that language. But clearly they are paying attention to some extent to what the international community is doing, including our sanctions. On BBG, good point. We are in fact one of the last acts that this administration is trying to take, in addition to try and reign in the nuclear threat, is to increase the amount of money we are devoting to information programs, including the BBGs. Now the BBG budget is separate from our budget, the State Departmentís budget. But in the effort to increase the resources devoted to this issue, we clearly have set off some additional funds for BBG, including for getting more radio broadcasts into North Korea, and television broadcasts as well.

[0:28:47]
Moderator: Very good. Peter?

[0:28:48]
Peter Huessey: Thank you, Kim, and thank you ICAS for putting this on. Mr. Secretary, thank you. As an individual having spent two years living in South Korea, I remember vividly the day that Mrs. Parkís mother was murdered by the North Koreans at a church service in downtown Seoul. My fondest hope is that the North Korean regime disappears and that the people be liberated. Iím very much interested in practical things. The question is that all the companies that support North Korea, the luxury goods, and military goods, how many of those companies still do business directly or indirectly with the United States. I know sanctioning this company because they do business with this company who in turn supplies North Korea Ė they can process innocence. But my view is that if you do due diligence and anything with this regime, it beyond odious. I would hope that we get to the point where nobody does business with America that does with business with anybody that does business with North Korea. I know thatís a stretch, I know thatís hard to do, but I donít see that they will react to anything else. I was surprised that they were worried about being personally held responsible for the laborers and the camps and so forth, because who else Ė these people donít do anything on their own. Could you address the question of what particularly the NGOs, the analysts in this business, those of us who are private citizens, as well as members of the House and Senate, what can we really do? I mean, this regime has been around for 70 years. What can we do to help people? What can we do to help not only the US Government, butÖ Iíve got European countries that have embassies in North Korea and negotiate with them and trade under the table and say, ďweíre trying to have an outlet so we can talk,Ē and I donít think that works. So with that preface, if you could talk about that.

[0:31:12]
Scott Busby: Very good point. And with our effort to kind of ramp up our sanctions both on the nuclear issue as well as the human rights issue, we are looking more and more at this. In the executive order the President issued last March, as well as in the UN Security Council Resolution, it provides authority, it calls on us to sanction companies that are exploiting North Korean laborers overseas, because that is another source of our currency for the regime. So weíre beginning the effort to identify those companies and sanction them. We want to be fairly careful here, because there may be some programs, some countries where such laborers are being better treated and getting exposed to the outside more, plus maybe earning a little cash for themselves. So in countries where we think it might be a net positive in terms of enlightening them and helping to increase the flow of information about the outside world in North Korea, those might not be the companies that we focus on. But clearly those companies who are exploiting laborers, they are now on our target list. We have had discussions about luxury good manufacturers in the extent to which they may be contracting companies in China, in Russia, that are using forced labor by North Koreans. We havenít definitively identified the supply chain, if you will, enough so that we can call them out publicly. But weíre in the throughs of looking at that issue. Now to the extent that you all, as private citizens, or as NGOs can generate that type of information, obviously hugely helpful to us. We have resources, but we donít have unlimited resources. Those of you in particular who may have contacts in the private sector who know how to get out that information, we would welcome that sharing of information with us.

[0:33:24]
Moderator: Thank you, Scott. Now Iíd like to open this up to the floor. Anyone that has questions for the Secretary, would you please raise your questions?

[0:33:46]
Man 1: I thought that I would have more time to prepare questions, but I will just say a few. One is that human rights, when we list the rights that are violated, we think about freedom of expression, religion, and so on. And the freedom of accessing information is regarded as some sort of means to achieve the other rights that are more basic. But I think this freedom to access information itself is a human right. I wonder if there is some way we can expand and make it more appropriate in the North Koreanís situation. Thatís what North Koreanís system of human rights atrocities particularly different. Itís not just a matter of degrees, you mentioned how they are the lowest on scales of human rights atrocities, but itís not a differences in degrees, itís a difference in categories. And I think that difference in categories can be more accentuated and we can somehow list these human rights as another one. And another thing that is implicit, a culprit of human rights violations in North Korea, is China, especially in regards toÖ About 80% of North Korean defectors are women. 60 to 70% of these women defectors have been subject to human trafficking. And these people suffer from very specific cases of violations. One is, if they have a child born out of their marriage to a Chinese farmer, the child is registered as a Chinese national, but the mother cannot be. And the mother is constantly under threat of forced relocation back to North Korea. And once they are separated, this forces many mothers to defect to South Korea without their children. As a result, some of these women are getting together and organizing themselves, Unification Moms, itís a recent phenomenon. And three representatives, who are founders, are now in Washington right now. They arrived two or three days ago, if you have any. So the PRC, is there any way to somehow put the PRC into the chain to becoming part ofÖ China has been mentioned frequently as a tool we can use to combat the nuclear threat, but China is rarely ever talked about as a tool for human rights, so I wonder if they can do anything.

[0:37:00]
Scott Busby: Yeah, so several good questions and points raised there. In terms of freedom of access to information, Iíll need to look at the universal declaration of human rights and the international covenant on civil and political rights again, but as I recall, there is not an express right to access information. Now, that right has been inferred to the right of freedom of expression, to freedom of the press, that sort of thing. But it isnít clearly outlined which I didnít mention it as a separate right. But clearly, in our efforts to get information into North Korea and to make it possible for North Koreans to receive information, this is very much at the heart of our policy. But weíll think about highlighting that specifically as a key violation or problem. Chinaís role is key, and I mentioned in response to some of the other comments. One of the major problems with the current sanctions regime is that China is not really enforcing it. As many of you know, China is buying coal from North Korea in huge quantities, ostensibly under this exception under the UN Sanction Regime, sort of humanitarian basis. We think thatís unacceptable. In fact, weíve made that point to them repeatedly. Our Deputy Secretary of State, Tony Blinken, is actually on his way to the region right now and heíll be meeting with the Chinese to, among other things, raise this concern. Because the amount of hard currency theyíre getting, thatís probably the largest source of currency for the regime, so getting the Chinese to effectively and honestly implement the sanctions is critical. Now in terms of Chinaís role in facilitating and condoning the human rights concerns, is also critical. The Commission of Inquiry report actually did identify the repatriation of North Koreans from China as a key problem and called the Chinese out for doing that. Weíve seen recently slight improvement in Chinese behavior insofar as they are not forcing everyone back. Youíre probably well aware of the case of the restaurant workers, mostly women, that defected from China a long time ago. That couldnít have happened if the Chinese didnít let it happen. And there have been a few other cases like that where the Chinese have seemed to let people quietly move on to South Korea or elsewhere. At the same time, there seems to be still a significant number of asylum seekers in China who are being returned, particularly those who are apprehended closer to the border. I couldnít agree with you more on calling them out on this, we do include it in our annual human rights report on China. We do mention it in the UN resolutions that are adopted. So we continue to try to call them out, but China is a big and powerful country. There are also a lot of other significant human rights abuses in China right now, which you probably know. The regime is really cracking down on civil society, so this is one of many issues. But I couldnít agree with you more that the role of China is critical and all of us should be doing all we can to call them out in repatriations where they engage in that behavior.

[0:40:36]
Man 2: I just wanted to address a couple of points you guys made, because there are some errors here. Putting a lot of energy in ICRC inspections is just going to result in {unintelligible| situations, so I donít think thatís going to go anywhere. The control of luxury goods, I donít know, as an Intel guy, I donít know if I want to cut off the flow of luxury goodsÖ I also note that a speaker of Economics said, that a lot of luxury goods are going through Russia. She was Russians. And that you can buy luxury goods in Dubai with no control whatsoever, so I donít know how much control you guys are going to get out of that. The only good news on the Human Rights front in the camps is that they seem to be down on the inclusion of family members. Whether thatís a response to International controls and complaints, or whether logistically handling a bunch of kids, itís hard to say. The question, isnít it time that we ramp upÖ unleash the covert operators. I mean itís just crazy whatís going on, what could be done. Rather than sending up a couple balloons every six months, how about 50 balloons every single day? How about ships at sea that are broadcasting? How about the stratospheric internet broadcasting for those that have internet access? Thereís so much that could be done. Iíve got a list of 20 that I made up and I know that a committee of guys like me could come up with hundreds of suggestions, and none of it is being done. When are we going to unleash the covert operators?

[0:42:25]
Moderator: Thank you, next question quickly?

[0:42:28]
Woman 1: Mr. Busby, Iím heartened to hear that these additional strong steps that the State has taken this year. My question is why donít we go further? Why donít we demand that North Korea release their prisoners in prison camps immediately? We are always concerned about having a cease fire in Syria, for example. But the crimes against humanity in North Korea are killing and torturing people every day. So thereís a lack of urgency, I feel, in attention to this one issue and so in line with this idea of doing more, I wonder about a lot more political effort in the UN General Assembly, because after all it is political will that is the foundation of the success of worldwide sanctions. I believe we have no reason not to push hard on the notion that the DPRK regime has been losing its legitimacy through these atrocity crimes and that, in fact, the international community should coalesce around a One Korea policy. And this is not that far- fetched because after the liberation of Korea when Japan was defeated, the UN General Assembly explicitly stated that there is only one Korean legal government, and that was the Republic of Korea. The Objectives of the UN General Assembly were that there would be a unified, independent, and democratic One Korea. Now, over the years, things have morphed. In the 1990s, for political reasons that did not foresee the catastrophe that DPRK would become, the UN allowed both the DPRK and ROK to be members of the UN. But I contend that at this point in 2016, especially with the development of international law, the responsibility to protect the greatly increased accountability for atrocity crimes, that DPRK has lost its legitimacy, does not deserve to be a UN member. And by acting in the General Assembly, you avoid the veto power of China, of course. And through greatly increased political will, I think that we can change or influence the calculus of China to realize that itís propping up of this pariah entity is no longer so useful for them. I think thereís no other way China will cooperate. Itís only through massive political will, I think.

[0:46:26]
Scott Busby: First of all, on the prison camps, we have regularly called out for the immediate release of the folks in the prison camps, the closing of the camps. I canít give you the statements firsthand, but if you do a search on the State Departmentís website, statements on North Korea and human rights, in almost all of them youíll see calls to close the camps. In terms of political will, this issue is being raised at the highest levels of the Chinese government by the highest levels of the US government. Thatís one of the reasons, if not the primary reason, that the Deputy Secretary of State is going out to China right now, to raise this issue. Samantha Power has regularly raised this issue with her Chinese counterparts. China is increasingly emboldened and not as susceptible to pressure as maybe it was a decade ago. So it is becoming increasingly difficult. Russia, as you know with the Syria issue, is equally as intransigent. So we have very tough political battles to get both of them to take significant action when it comes to North Korea or any human rights problem. Thatís why we thought that the Security Council Resolution that we managed to get through in March was a significant step forward. On the One Korea kicking North Korea out, Iím not as familiar with the history of the One Korea policy, as you described, so I need to educate myself a little better. On kicking North Korea out, weíll have to think about that. Thatís obviously a very tall order, but itís something weíll have to consider. Maybe you and I could discuss some of this afterwards.

[0:48:09]
Moderator: Now, Tong?

[0:48:14]
Tong Kim: I enjoyed listening to Secretary Busbyís presentation, neatly arrange the line of international awareness and then access to information outside North Korea, and also accountability. The first objective in raising international awareness of the seriousness of the North Korean human rights situation has been very successful. In that regard, I think the US policy on North Korean human rights has been successful, and especially with the report by the COI, the Committee of Inquiry, that came out, as Secretary Busby referred to, 2004. That also has to do with accountability. They recommended that the North Korean case, involving individuals including Kim Jong Un, be forwarded to ICC for charges of crimes against humanity. Thatís my first part of the question, whether the US is still pursuing thatÖ I havenít heard much on it, whether the US is still proceeding. Second part: information program will eventually lead to some internal change from within as a result of spreading information from outside into the audience of North Korea. If that internal change happens along the lines that we perceive that we want is going to have a positive impact on North Korean human rights situation. But, it is a long short. Itís a long haul. We cannot guarantee, and you even mentioned, that the effectiveness of human rights policy or sanctions, there are certain areas we can say are effective, but other areas and more concerns about the actual state of the North Korean human rights situation. I have not seen any indication or report that North Korean human rights situations has improved as a result of application of US human rights policy, as it has been doing so far. That said, whether the administration would ever consider anything other than sanctions, raising international awareness, information program. Apart from these, which theyíve been engaging with so long and with limited resources. Whether the administration has ever considered engaging North Koreans directly on this issue as we try to do with the nuclear missile issue as well. Lastly, not too long ago, President Park of South Korea, called for massive defections of North Korea, how is this going to affect or fit in to one of the three lines of US policy, accountabilityÖ To me it sounds more like with having to do with internal change eventually.

[0:52:00]
Scott Busby: Very good points. I realize I didnít react to one of the questions before as there were obviously two in a row. I canít obviously talk about our covert programs, but weíre trying to get information in any way we can. And indeed, there is a North Korean defector in South Korea now who is developing drones, small drones, to get information, which we think will be far more effective than a balloon program. So anyways, there are a large number of projects involved, but I canít talk about other things that weíre considering. The information efforts, that I talked about in my remarks, are not covert. Our Bureau is funding them. There is a lot going on there, and it is a major focus of our activity.

[0:52:48]
In terms of engaging the North Koreans directly, we have a hard time doing that. They are not so open to talking to us. Most of our communications with them happen through third parties right now. On occasion, when there have been opportunities to raise issues directly with them, human rights have been among the things that we have raised. But our experience so far is that mere talk is not sufficient. We really need to apply some leverage, which is why this new sanctions effort is something that weíve undertaken and we want to ramp up even further. The more we can identify individuals who may be responsible for human rights issues, and put them on the sanctions list, I think the more real pressure theyíre going to feel to possibly change their behavior.

[0:53:48]
Moderator: In Bum, any comments?

[0:53:52]
In Bum Chun: Well sir, I just want to thank the United States for its leadership in the international community for taking interest in the North Korean human rights issue. There was once a time when I myself had difficulty going to bed because of the human rights tragedies that must be going on, even at this very moment in North Korea. I have two questions for you sir. Number one, are you concerned that your efforts might actually be hardening the North Korean positions, that they will need nuclear weapons exactly because of these types of efforts, because it threatens their regime survivability? And the second question is how much focus are you putting towards your own allies, for instance South Korea, and would the United States be willing to accept more North Korean defectors coming into the United States? And I ask the second question because thereís something interesting going on where a North Korean woman who defected from South Korea is actually wanting to go back to North Korea. So the bottom line is that a lot of these North Korean defectors are having a difficult time adjusting to capitalist environment. So there needs to be a greater effort by the South Koreans and everybody else to help these defectors be successful, which I think is probably going to be a lot more sensible and easier for us to do. And when this word of mouth gets into the ears of the North Koreans, theyíll be more likely to defect. Right now, as it stands, a North Korean in North Korea, they might think that ďOkay, Iím going to get three hamburgers if I defect to South Korea, but Iíll be a slave. Why should I if I can just have half a hamburger a day?Ē So we need to educate our allies as well as give more opportunities to North Koreans, so thatís why I asked the second question.

[0:56:01]
Scott Busby: Excellent questions. First, in terms of whether our efforts on human rights may be hardening the regime, particularly when it comes to nuclear weapons. I think there was a time several years ago when that was a concern, where people felt the regime might be open to negotiations around the nuclear issue. We have seen such erratic and scary behavior out of Kim Jong Un and the regime when it comes to the nuclear issue that, as far as we can tell, is unconnected to the pressure we might be putting on them on human rights. Certainly, he reacted quite negatively to the designation of him as a human rights abuser, and the other times that weíve called them out. But something of the things heís done, in terms of missile launches and the like have been disconnected from human rights advocacy that weíve done. So at this point, we donít feel like the human rights effort detracts from the effort to reign in his nuclear ambitions.

[0:57:09]
In terms of the ROK, we are working very very closely with them. Weíve started a quarterly human rights dialogue with them around the human rights in the DPRK to make sure our efforts are closely lashed up. Ambassador Bob King and I, in fact, are going to be going out to South Korea next month for the second iteration of that dialogue. So very key country. And when it comes to defectors, I have not spent, in fact Iíve never spent any time in South Korea other than at the Seoul Airport, so this will be my first trip there. I do know that there is difficulty adjusting to life in a free capitalist world. Iím also told that South Koreans are not as welcoming of North Koreans that they might be, that there is a sort of subtle discrimination in South Korea. I defer to those who have lived in South Korea to talk more about that. But certainly to the extent that this group can help enlighten South Koreans, to encourage South Koreans to be more welcoming of North Koreans, I think that will be very important. The US has expressed a great deal of willingness to receive North Koreans. The vast majority of them, understandably, believe that coming to the US would be even more difficult than trying to integrate in South Korea just because of the language and culture differences there. Itís easier, obviously, there in the region, to stay in touch with family members and contacts in North Korea. So even if itís a challenge to integrate in South Korea, most defectors see it as an even greater challenge to integrate in a place like the US. That said, we have received some North Koreans and they seem to have reasonably well after defecting.

[0:59:14]
Moderator: Thank you, just one more question.

[0:59:33]
Woman 2: Thank you, Honorable Busby for all youíve done. I appreciate that very much. I would like to ask about the experience youíve had with Myanmar and other countries, including Vietnam. Would you like to see or reflect some good lessons that you have learned from Vietnam and if thereís a step further that would show the effectiveness of US diplomacy that can be applied that will show the light at the end of the tunnel. But also, the big question is does the US have a project, working together with China, to improve the human rights in North Korea, in Vietnam, especially in the Indo-China region. Because I believe that if that is put under the oversight of the United Nations, that would help the whole region tremendously. Right now, I think Vietnam is suffering tremendously because of the problems that China imposed on the government. So is there political will that the US government displays to China, and what would you propose to the next President of the US.

[1:01:26]
Scott Busby: Lessons from Myanmar and Vietnam, Iíve already talked about the incredibly role that sanctions played in the Myanmar transition. So I think that imposing these sanctions on North Korea in human rights grounds is an important step, and I think we just need to expand our efforts on that regard. The real challenge here, by the way, is getting sufficient information about who is really responsible for abuses, and for purposes of designating someone for economic sanctions, itís very important that we have an airtight legal case in terms of the evidence we have against an individual. But in this regard, you all can play a key role to the extent that you all can become aware of information about particularly individuals who might be responsible for human rights abuses, you should be sharing it with us. In terms of Vietnam, we have seen some overall human rights improvements over the past couple of decades, particularly in the past five years. We havenít hadÖ there have been some sanctions on Vietnam in terms of weapons sales, transfers, that sort of thing, which were lifted recently by President Obama. But I wouldnít say itís the sanctions that really had the impact, it was rather Vietnamís wish to have a sort of counterveiling influence vis a vi China, as well as Vietnamís interest in integrating into the international economy, and we thought that the Trans-Pacific Partnership was a nice carrot to dangle in front of the Vietnamese. And we have gotten them to commit to things like allowing for freedom of association among workers that they wouldnít have agreed to otherwise by holding up the promise of them becoming part of the TPP deal. Now, itís unclear whatís going to happen with that deal, but weíll just have to see who gets elected President and whoís in the new Congress. In terms of Chinaís interest, China is obviously incredibly influential in the region, and in the world, increasingly so. Is China interested in human rights as part of their influence, Iím afraid not. Theyíre not very receptive to our overtures to them when it comes to their own human rights problems. Indeed, Xi Jinping has probably led a crackdown on human rights in China as severe as that after the events of Tiananmen Square. So China is not, unfortunately, a positive influence when it comes to human rights in the region. That said, as we discussed earlier, calling them out when they engage in forcible repatriation of people from the DPRK, taking advantage of the relative freedoms in China compared to North Korea, is important. Even though there are constraints in China on freedom of expression, freedom of information, they still have much more than there is in North Korea. So weíre taking advantage of some of things that China has, that people in China have access to, to hopefully provide those same things to North Korea. But I donít think weíre going to have a willing partner with the government of China to try and improve human rights in North Korea or in the region.

[1:04:47]
Woman 2: Another part of my questions was the political will. And I believe that the US is the only country that China would listen to because the US has been supporting China economically, so is that an economic tool that we can use to talk with China, especially at this time as I believe China is facing some economic problems.

[1:05:05]
Scott Busby: Thatís a big issue, and whether or not we have leverage, I think, is an open question. Some people believe we do. So far, we havenít been able to get the Chinese to change their behavior on some domestic concerns of ours, including on North Korea, on other issues like climate change.

[1:05:56]
Moderator: Thank you everyone.

[Applause]


[End]

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