Annual Liberty Award Dinner

The Honorable James A Kelly
Assistant Secretary for Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
United States Department of State

Thursday, December 16, 2004
6:30 PM - 9:00 PM

Blue Bell Country Club Grand Ballroom

Blue Bell, Pennsylvania

The ICAS Liberty Foundation
seeks to promote the cause of humanity, peace, prosperity and security
through cultural, educational and research activities.

Dear Friend:

We are pleased to share with you that The Hon James A Kelly has been nominated for the ICAS Annual Liberty Award 2004 for his "distinguished service to the nation and the people" and that Secretary Kelly will be honoured at the ICAS Annual Liberty Award Dinner 2004.

James A Kelly is Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. President Bush nominated Mr Kelly on April 3, 2001; he was confirmed by the US Senate on April 26, 2001 and sworn in on May 1, 2001.

Presently, Secretary Kelly serves as the US Chief Delegate to the Six-Party Talks (US, China, South Korea, North Korea, Japan and Russia) and he has sought, since the fact has been disclosed, to bring North Korea to the negotiating table and to convince the country to abandon its illicit nuclear weapons program.

From 1994-2001, Jim was president of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of Honolulu. The Pacific Forum has analyzed and led dialogue on Asia-Pacific political, security, and economic/business issues since 1975. It is the autonomous Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.

From 1989 to 1994, Jim was President of EAP Associates, Inc., of Honolulu, which provided international business consulting services with an Asia/Pacific focus to private clients. Previously, he served at the White House in Washington, DC as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ronald Reagan, and as Senior Director for Asian Affairs, National Security Council, from March 1986 to March 1989. From June, 1983 to March 1986, Jim was at the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific.)

Jim earned an MBA from the School of Business Administration of Harvard University in 1968. He is also a graduate of the US Naval Academy (BS, 1959) and the National War College (1977). Jim served in the US Navy from 1959 to 1982, concluding his active duty as a Captain, Supply Corps.

Previous honourees include The Hon Elaine L Chao (U S Secretary of Labour), The Hon Viet D Dinh (U S Assistant Attorney General; Professor of Law Georgetown University), The Hon Becky N Dunlop (Vice President Heritage Foundation), The Hon Tony P Hall (U S House of Representatives; US Ambassador to UN FAO), The Hon Charles Kartman (U S Ambassador), Dr Jeong H Kim (President Lucent Technology), Nobel Laureate Lawrence R Klein, The Hon Harold Hongju Koh (U S Assistant Secretary of State; Dean Yale Law School), The Hon Jerome J Shestack (Head of Litigation Wolf Block; former President American Bar Association), The Hon Richar L Walker (U S Ambassador), The Hon Alfred P West (Chairman SEI Investments) and The Hon John C Yoo (U S Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Professor of Law UC Berkeley).

Sincerely, Synja P Kim
President and Chairman
ICAS Liberty Foundation
October 21, 2004

The Board of Founders and Officers of

The ICAS Liberty Foundation

respectfully invite you to

ICAS Liberty Lecture


The Honorable James A Kelly
Assistant Secretary of State
United States Department of State

Thursday, December 16, 2004
6:30 PM - 9:00 PM

Blue Bell Country Club Grand Ballroom
Blue Bell, Pennsylvania

Reply card enclosed
RSVP by December 7, 2004

Business Attire

ICAS Liberty Foundation


The Honorable James A Kelly
United States Assistant Secretary of State

December 16, 2004 6:30 PM

Blue Bell Country Club Grand Ballroom, Blue Bell, Pennsylvania

Welcome and Introduction

Synja P Kim
ICAS Fellow, President and Chairman

- Dinner -

Congratulatory Remarks

John F Murphy
Professor of International Law
Villanova University

ICAS Annual Liberty Award 2004 Presentation

ICAS Liberty Lecture

The Honorable James A Kelly
"Life, Liberty and Pursuit of Happiness"

Champagne Toast

Special Tribute

Michael Chang & Emile Gogineni

Passacaglia by Handel

Concluding Remarks

Sang Joo Kim
ICAS Senior Fellow and Executive Vice President


Floral arrangements from this Dinner will be donated to
Gwynedd Square Nursing Center Lansdale Pennsylvania

ICAS Liberty Foundation seeks to promote the cause of humanity, peace, prosperity and security through cultural, educational and research activities.

Host Committee
Synja P Kim

Honorary Chairs Co-Chairs
Britton Chance Won C Baek
Lawrence R Klein Julia K Han
Martin Meyerson Il Hwan Kim
Jerome J Shestack In Whan Kim
Alfred West Sang Joo Kim

Sung Won Paek

Choon Ki Yoo


Council for America My Country
Global Link Solutions
Hanatour Courtesy Travel
ICAS Liberty Golf Classic Invitational
ICAS Youth Excellence Program
Jeffery S Orchinik
Prudential Fox & Roach and The Trident Group
SK Enterprises International
Sports Connection

ICAS Liberty Award Recipients

Elaine L Chao
Viet D Dinh
Becky N Dunlop
Tony P Hall
Charles Kartman
James A Kelly
Jeong H Kim
Lawrence R Klein
Harold Hongju Koh
Jerome J Shestack
Richard L Walker
Alfred P West
John C Yoo

The ICAS Liberty Foundation
965 Clover Court, Blue Bell, Pennsylvania 19422
610 277 9989 - www.icasinc.org

ICAS Annual Liberty Award Dinner 2004

This Year’s Recipient
The Honorable James A Kelly
United States Assistant Secretary of State

Thursday, December 16, 2004
Blue Bell Country Club Grand Ballroom
Blue Bell, Pennsylvania



Radicchio with Mixed Greens, Cucumber & Diced Tomato Dressed with White Balsamic Vinaigrette

Grilled Petit Filet Mignon & Seared Jumbo Shrimp with a Wild
Mushroom Reduction & Basil Vinaigrette

Sliced Tuxedo Chocolate Mousse Cake with White Chocolate Drizzle
Coffee, Tea, and Decaffeinated Coffee

ICAS Annual Liberty Award Nominee 2004
The Honorable James A Kelly

Nominated for his distinguished service to the nation and the people in advancing the
great American values - life, liberty and pursuit of happiness- and his outstanding
courage and dedication in the government during a time of crisis.

Special tribute by

Michael Chang Cellist
Emile Gogineni Violinist

Congratulatory remarks for dinner
honoring Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly

John F. Murphy
Professor of International Law,
Villanova University

Secretary Kelly, it is my privilege and pleasure to present you with some congratulatory remarks on your being chosen as the recipient of the 2004 ICAS Annual Liberty Award. As president Kim's reading of your outstanding background demonstrates, you are ideally suited to meet the formidable challenges facing you in your current position as Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. It is unusual indeed to find a government official who is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and the National War College as well as of the MBA Program at Harvard and who has then served as an international business consultant, a Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to the President at the White House, as Senior Director for Asian Affairs, National Security Council, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific) at the Pentagon, President of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies of Honolulu, and now as the U.S. Chief Delegate to the Six-Party Talks( U.S., China, South Korea, North Korea, Japan and Russia).

You will need all of this education and these multifaceted experiences to resolve the national security threat posed by North Korea's efforts to develop nuclear weapons in clear violation of its international treaty obligations not to do so. Unless I missed something, however, I believe that your background does not include a stint at law school. To help fill this gap in your experiences, I offer you a copy of my book, The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs, published this fall by Cambridge University Press. Surely North Korea poses a major rule of law challenge for you and your colleagues. Moreover, if your intense negotiations are to resolve this crisis peacefully, it is highly likely that international legal instruments, such as a new comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol for North Korea, will play a major role.

I wish you every success in these negotiations and in meeting the many other challenges facing you in 2005.

Remarks by James A. Kelly

Assistant Secretary, East Asia and Pacific Affairs

December 16, 2004

Chairperson Synja Kim, Dr. Sang Joo Kim, Professor Murphy and friends: I thank the Institute for this high honor and for the opportunity to comment, in the spirit of ICAS, on "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." I also appreciate the opportunity to comment on the United States and the Korean Peninsula. The United States Government puts the highest priority on maintaining our strong alliance with the Republic of Korea, and I am delighted to accept the award in that spirit.

I’d like to talk for a few minutes about the importance and breadth of the partnership the United States enjoys with the Republic of Korea, and then speak to what we are doing to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The growth of a robust and vibrant democracy in Korea over the last several decades has been a positive development both for Korea and for the United States. And among policy successes of the past four years has been the consolidation of this partnership. When President Roh was elected there was talk of a "middle path." But President Roh's election success and that of his Uri Party colleagues, has in fact broadened and reaffirmed our close ties.

Recent elections have empowered a new generation of leaders in Korea, many of them members of the reform-minded ‘386 Generation.’

That generation is too young to have experienced directly the Korean War, and many of them are often suspicious of U.S. motives. So as you might expect, the rise of this group to political leadership has challenged us to anchor bilateral relations more deeply, and in some cases to define the importance of our ties in new terms appropriate to a new generation and a new era. As we have done so, we have made it a point to develop extensive relationships with young Korean parliamentarians, who as you know constitute a large percentage of the current National Assembly. We have also made it a key priority to reach out, using the internet and other "new media" to new audiences in Korea.

We have taken on this important responsibility at all levels of our government as we have sought to forge stronger ties with Koreans of all ages. Secretary Powell has made this his own priority, as well. You may recall that when he visited Seoul recently, he had an extremely successful public town meeting with college students, whose questions were both polite and direct. For those who saw the pictures of that encounter, it was clear that the chemistry between Secretary Powell and these young people was excellent.

We are reaching out in this way in the context of a vibrant and dynamic bilateral economic and trade relationship. The scope of that relationship is huge. Korea is our seventh largest trading partner. U.S. firms have invested some $27 billion in the Korean economy. And Korean firms account for one-quarter of all foreign firms in the U.S. Our trade and investment links have fuelled prosperity in both our countries, and fostered burgeoning people-to-people ties. Well over 700,000 Koreans a year visit the U.S., and something like 100,000 Americans are resident in Seoul.

In short, the ties and the partnership between our two nations have never been stronger -- and they need to be at a time when we are together addressing some very difficult issues.

We are modernizing our security alliance. The current disposition of U.S. forces in Korea, essentially unchanged for half a century, frankly reflects another era and is an antiquated and inefficient approach to defense. Both governments recognized this fact and the need to realign and restructure the U.S. military presence, not only to rationalize the footprint of our base structure to meet the needs of the times, but also to take advantage of new technologies that allow us to increase overall capabilities while reducing the size of our force presence. I am happy to note that the Korean National Assembly has this week approved agreements that will allow us to consolidate our bases and eventually relocate U.S. forces from metropolitan Seoul, including from Yongsan Garrison to areas south of the Han River. As we do so, we are making a major investment in new systems and realigning some traditional roles and missions that will ensure that, when these moves are completed, we will have a more credible and capable deterrent to provide for the defense of the Republic of Korea.

Our two countries are also working closely together for a democratic Iraq, and earlier this month President Roh paid a highly appreciated visit to ROK forces in Irbil. The ROK is now the third largest presence in the multinational coalition in Iraq and has taken a leadership role in rebuilding that country.

And we are working closely together to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The DPRK leadership decades ago set out on a path that would allow it to acquire nuclear weapons.

North Korea began construction of its 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon in 1979. Under international pressure, it joined the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1985, but did not sign its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA until 1992. Within months, the IAEA found evidence of inconsistencies in North Korea’s declarations with respect to its nuclear program.

By 1993, IAEA pressure for additional inspections led North Korea to announce its intention to withdraw from the NPT. As tensions mounted, the U.S. and North Korea began high-level talks that culminated in the Agreed Framework of 1994. That agreement obligated the DPRK not to produce fissile material at its declared nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. The agreement’s goal, as stated in its preface, was "an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula."

That agreement did not, as we learned later, end the North Korean nuclear arms programs. By the summer of 2002, our intelligence community assessed that North Korea was pursuing a large covert program to produce enriched uranium -- in violation of the Agreed Framework, the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the DPRK’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. In fact, we determined that North Korea had been pursuing the program for a number of years, even as it was negotiating with senior American officials to improve relations.

In October 2002, I led a delegation to Pyongyang to confront the North Koreans with our assessment that they had a uranium enrichment program. DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju told us that the "hostile policy" of the U.S. Administration had left North Korea with no choice but to pursue such a program. When we pointed out our assessment that North Korea had been pursuing such a program for years, he had no response.

Once caught in violation of their international obligations, instead of ending their covert uranium enrichment program, the North Koreans escalated the situation. In December 2002, they expelled IAEA inspectors and began to reactivate the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon. In January 2003, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT. And on several occasions in 2003, it declared it had finished reprocessing its 8,000-plus existing spent fuel rods. If that is indeed the case, it could have produced enough fissile material for several additional nuclear weapons. Since then, the DPRK has stated it is strengthening what it calls its "nuclear deterrent capability."

The United States has adhered to two basic principles to deal with this threat. First, we seek the dismantlement of all DPRK nuclear programs in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner, subject to international verification. We cannot accept another partial solution that does not deal with the entirety of the problem, allowing North Korea to threaten others continually with a revival of its nuclear program.

Second, because the North’s nuclear programs threaten its neighbors and the integrity of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the threat can best be dealt with through multilateral diplomacy.

After a round of trilateral discussions in April 2003 in Beijing, we held the first round of Six-Party Talks, with China as host, in August 2003. The other five parties all told North Korea very clearly in plenary session that they will not accept North Korea’s possessing nuclear arms.

The second round of Six-Party Talks was in February 2004. The parties agreed to regularize the talks, and to establish a working group to set issues up for resolution at the plenary meetings. At the second round of talks, the ROK offered fuel aid to the DPRK, if there were a comprehensive and verifiable halt of its nuclear programs as a first step toward complete nuclear dismantlement.

The third round of talks, held in June in Beijing, were useful and constructive. The U.S. met directly with all of the parties over the course of the talks, and held a two-and- a-half-hour discussion with the DPRK delegation.

The U.S. and ROK during the third round tabled concrete, detailed proposals to achieve a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

The DPRK also participated actively in the plenary, offering a proposal for what it describes as the first step toward full denuclearization -- a freeze of its nuclear-weapons related programs in exchange for compensation from the other parties.

The Japanese also had constructive ideas, strongly supporting proposals that would lead to the timely and comprehensive denuclearization of the Peninsula subject to international verification, and expressing a willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK when it is verified that the DPRK is actually on the road to denuclearization.

Despite the agreement of all six parties in June to resume talks by end-September, and the willingness of five parties to hold to that commitment, the DPRK has not yet agreed to return to the table.

North Korea’s rhetoric notwithstanding, the U.S. leadership has said repeatedly that we have no intention of attacking or invading the DPRK, and that we have no hostile intent towards the DPRK. If the DPRK is prepared to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions, the U.S. remains ready, as we sought to convey in the third round of the Six-Party Talks in June, to coexist with the DPRK and to work in the context of the Talks to resolve the issues between us.

Diplomatic contacts among the Six Parties are continuing. We met with the North Koreans in New York twice over the last three weeks, and made clear we remain ready to resume the talks at an early date, without preconditions. We have also met with our partners in the talks, in Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing. All of us agree that the Six-Party Talks is the way forward -- to deal with the threat of North Korea’s nuclear programs, and to improve the lives of the North Korean people and bring the DPRK into the international community.

My hope is that the serious and extensive discussions with the United States, the Republic of Korea, Japan, China and Russia will convince the DPRK that a truly denuclearized Korean peninsula is its only viable option, and that it will come to understand that delay is not in its interest.

Against the backdrop of the Six-Party talks, the DPRK appears to be trying to undertake some measures in response to its disastrous economy. Its wage and price reforms are an important first step but have created inflation and other economic and social problems. Ultimately, then, it is too soon to evaluate the overall nature or long- term impact of these steps, but we encourage Pyongyang to move in this direction and hope they will serve as a foundation upon which to build improved economic relations with other countries in the future. By addressing the world’s concerns about its nuclear programs and other issues, the DPRK would have both new resources and opportunities to pursue policies for peaceful growth in the region that is already perhaps the world’s most vibrant, East Asia.

Let me conclude by stressing that the door remains open for the DPRK, by addressing the concerns of the international community, to vastly improve the lives of its people, enhance its own security, normalize its relations with the U.S. and others, and raise its stature in the world. The United States, working with our ally the Republic of Korea and others, remains committed to resolving the nuclear issue through peaceful diplomatic means. Looking at what we have achieved in the Six-Party Talks thus far, all of the elements of a resolution are clearly within sight. The only thing that is missing is a strategic decision by Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions and to negotiate in earnest. I trust that the DPRK will have the wisdom to make the right decision.

At this time, I would add a few words about the process and an important effect, even now, from the Six Party talks. First, a "chemistry" has developed among the six parties - a practice of frank discourse among all -- on an equal footing -- that promises to keep this unprecedented Northeast Asian security dialogue alive, perhaps even more useful in the years beyond resolution of the DPRK nuclear weapons issue.

Second, unlike ten years ago, Japan and South Korea have their own communications with the DPRK and it is clear that they are and will continue to be key to the resolution. Personally, I hated to arrive in Seoul with the task of informing a major government, with the most vital interests, of events to which they were not a party. This is not right and no American should have such a task. Our allies need to hear what is said directly.

Thank you again for this chance to meet with you today, and for the honor that you have bestowed on me.

(Update: December 21, 2004, jdb)