

The “DPRK Problem”

And how to proceed....

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Short answers:

- WE HAVE NOT CREATED THE LEVERAGES NECESSARY
- NONE OF THIS IS TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY
- REMEMBER, THIS IS ASIA: “the majority of Sun Tzu’s work emphasizes the importance of espionage, secrecy and deception.”
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/chinese-strategic-thoughts_b_6417754.html
- WE CONTINUE TO BE SURPRISED BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS, e.g., the “total surprise” [to us] by the Pakistan and India tests in the 90’s

The “negotiation cycle” of the DPRK - from the 1950’s onward

- 1. Cause some massive catastrophe that shocks the world/US
- 2. Act belligerent at the counter reaction
- 3. Grudgingly accept some low level negotiation
- 4. Magnanimously take concessions that we/or others give them
- 5. Act normal for a short time proving the appeasement crowd is right.
- 6. Rinse/Repeat as needed....
- [Thanks to Professor Lamont Colucci, Ripon College]
- Don’t forget the Winter Olympics – there will be a #1

And we buy it, time after time: This from 2/07

- “The Six-Party Talks were based on hard lessons we learned since the Agreed Framework. Yes, they were at times disappointing, but they were an effective fulcrum that allowed us to put more and more pressure on Pyongyang. The Joint Agreement of September 2005, in which the North agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons programs, was a milestone.”
- <http://www.icasinc.org/2007/2007w/2007wkrh.html>

Endemic of the systematic failures of US approach to arms control and related security negotiations

- Fact of agreement is more important than terms thereof - happened again with Iran
- Cheating scenarios are often built in or ignored – and the bad guys always cheat! How many times do we need to “learn’ this??
- “Equally authentic texts” – language skills?? – essentially two [or more] separate agreements
- Bottom Line: Considering the history of our dealings with the DPRK on nuclear issues, there can be no responsible “diplomatic resolution” - with them

Some favorite arms control quotes - a spectrum...

- “You clearly don’t trust each other so why should we trust you?”
- “We can’t believe our government - so how can we believe yours?”
- “We didn’t see your demarche – it went to another part of our foreign ministry”
- “You know Daniel, we live in shit...you know that don’t you?”

We must BUILD LEVERAGES:

- Targeting doctrines - PD-59 and NSDD-13 should be the templates <http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb390//> - STATE was/should be excluded from this process
- Deterrence is made up of two key parts: “Capability and will” [Gen. Russell E. Dougherty, CINCSAC, '74-'77] – must demonstrate BOTH
- Define behaviors considered direct threats to the US - complete range of responses

More leverages

- Discussions with the Japanese/ROK's for “cooperative” nuclear arrangements – shared release concepts are nothing new for us
- Totally isolate the DPRK – consider shared blockades
- Bi-lat discussions with the Chinese and Russians on consequences – i.e., neither of them would accept this kind of threat
- Nor should what we do be a surprise to them
- No land/conventional war on Korean peninsula – been there/done that

Conclusions – a Different Kind of “Diplomacy”

- We should not be surprised at the situation in the DPRK – caused by combined naïve/failed diplomatic efforts of four past administrations
- Other Asian countries will likely go nuclear – see recent NYT Henry Kissinger interview – and this directly threatens China. Do we realize this? The PRC does.
- **BOTTOM LINE:** We have not yet motivated China to solve this problem - we must find the leverage to do it, e.g.,
- Will the Chinese take down the DPRK nuke/ICBM programs in exchange for Japan, ROK [and perhaps Taiwan] NOT going nuclear?