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## **More Powerful Way to Change North Korea**

### ***1. Introduction. North Korea as international player with the long state history.***

***1.1. Historical milestones and self-perception of North Korea.*** The history of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) formally begins on September 9, 1948. But it is not quite correct to regard the history of this state as limited by 70 years (1948 – 2018). Each nation has its own identity. The national self-awareness is determined not only by language, but also by national history, which exists in a form of personal memory of each individual that makes up a nation<sup>1</sup>.

One can call North Korea as “North Korean regime” doubting its legitimacy. But doing this it is useful not to forget that personally any North Korean citizen keeps in his mind the idea about long and proud history of his country.

The history of the Northern part of the Korean Peninsula includes Ancient Joseon (2333 – 108 BC) Goguryeo (37 – 668 AC) and Balhae (698 – 926) states. The Northern part of the Korean peninsula also was a part of the unified Korean states of Goryeo (918 – 1392), Joseon (1392 – 1897) and Han (1897 – 1910); it was also a part of the Japanese colony Joseon (“Korea”; 1910 – 1945). In this succession of historical states one can clearly see, that the Northern part of the Korean peninsula was not always a part of the unified Korean state but also had its own history (including periods, when its territory partially belonged to Chinese Tang (618 - 907), Yuan (1280 - 1367) dynasties or “barbarian states” Liao (916 - 1124) and Jin (1115 - 1264)).

After liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule in 1945<sup>2</sup> and its following division into Northern and Southern states (1948), the two Koreas were not fully recognized by the world community. The DPRK was recognized by the USSR and former socialist countries while the Republic of Korea was recognized by the USA, Japan and the Western world. This situation changed on September 17, 1991 when both Korean states simultaneously became members of the United Nations. Since that date the DPRK also became a full legal member of the world community.

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<sup>1</sup> Kurbanov S.O. Razmyshlenija ob istoricheskoj nauke i roli lichnosti v istorii. S primerami iz istorii Koreji (Reflections on historical science and the role of the individual in history. With examples from history of Korea). St. Petersburg, RHGA Publishing House, 2016. P. 26 – 27.

<sup>2</sup> According to official North Korean narration of the Korean history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Northern part of Korea was liberated by Kim Il-sung and his partisan detachments. (전영률, 김창호, 강석희. 조선 통사. 하. (Jeon Yeong-ryul, Kim Chang-ho, Kang Seok-hui. General History of Korea. Vol. 2.) Pyongyang, Academy of Social Sciences, 1987. P. 300 – 301).

**1.2. Countries' perception of their own policies.** Despite the process of globalization and worldwide adoption of so called “universal human values”, countries and cultures remain keeping their own cultural, political and economic features. So, the “behavior” of these different countries in the world arena also varies as well as their perception of foreign countries.

It is quite “natural” and explicable that each country (and its government) believes that its own perception of the external international foreign policies is “right” and “true”.

North Korean leaders are considering their behavior (politics) being “true” and “just”.

The United States of America together with the Western world, the Republic of Korea and the majority of the UN members consider North Korean external (and internal) behavior (politics) as being “wrong” and “threatening” them. This statement can be proved by a series of the UN resolutions imposing sanctions on the DPRK. These sanctions are aimed to change North Korea, so its behavior (politics) could transform into “true”, “safe” and “secure” to the World community.

Before discussing possibilities of changing North Korea, first of all it is necessary to pose the question: “Does somebody have any right to demand changes in North Korea and to make efforts to achieve this?”

## **2. Confirmation of rights to demand changes in North Korea.**

If somebody from “outside” who does not legally represent North Korean state and its people wants to change North Korea, first of all this person or state, or any government or international organization needs to get confirmation that it has the right to demand changes in the DPRK.

It is not enough just simply refer to any “violation of human rights” in the DPRK or to statements that North Korean nuclear and missile programs are “threatening” somebody’s safety and security. Any “simple one way declaration” can only lead to debates over who is right and who is wrong. Any action that is initiated solely by "simple declarations" can be questioned, even if initially it has positive goals.

For example, North Korean authorities consider that they provide their population with a full set of human rights<sup>3</sup> and any Western reference to a “violation of human rights” in the DPRK is wrong.

Before beginning any actions aiming to change North Korea it is necessary to do the following:

- 1) To adopt an international law that permits an external impact on the state and its culture

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<sup>3</sup> 조선에 대한 이해. 문답집 9. 인권 (Understanding of [North] Korea. Collection of answers to questions No 9. Human rights). Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 2015.

(or an impact on North Korea exclusively);

- 2) To make a legal decision on possibilities of an external impact made by an international legislative organ;
- 3) Accurately fulfill the decisions of this international organization.

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*All the arguments presented below are based on the assumption that there is a legitimate decision of an international organization about the possibility and legality of exerting impact on the DPRK to make effective changes in this country.*

### **3. Possible ways of changing North Korea.**

**3.1. Alternatives in changing North Korea.** After getting the legal confirmation of the right to make an impact aiming to change North Korea, it is necessary to choose (to decide) ways of impact.

First of all, it is necessary to have a clear distinction between *peaceful changing* and *full destruction* of this country (destruction which is regarded as the first step of future rebuilding of North Korea).

Destruction of the whole country **can not** be accepted as a suitable way of transformations. This statement should be accepted without debates. Only *legal* and *peaceful* impact on North Korea aiming for its internal changes may lead to peace and prosperity both in this country and in the whole East Asian region.

Once decision of not destroying North Korean state will be made, it is necessary to avoid any actions which can be interpreted as a threat to North Korea and its leaders, including mass-media rhetoric.

Any mass-media activities which can be perceived as demonstration of threat to North Korea have only one effect: they will slow down the process of internal changes, forcing North Korean authorities to fully concentrate on the issue of preserving, strengthening and protecting the regime in conditions of counteracting any cardinal reforms.

**3.2. The peaceful impact on North Korea** aiming to change this country and its regime can be done in two possible ways:

- Direct impact (pressure; influence) from outside or
- Indirect impact on North Korean elite or active strata of population who is capable to organize others.

**3.2.1. Direct impact. Sanctions.** Sanctions are powerful instrument if they are implemented on a country which has well developed system of external relations and depends on the external market or external economic, military and political help.

Can sanctions make changes in North Korea?

Present (April, 2018)<sup>4</sup> situation demonstrates contradictory information on their results. On one hand, the U.S. mass-media state that the sanctions were effective<sup>5</sup> and they had brought North Korea to an idea of the U.S. – North Korean negotiations. On the other hand, some experts are evaluating the present economic situation in North Korea as “not bad” or even “good”<sup>6</sup>.

North Korean historical, economic and political case is so special that sanctions implemented on this country are less effective than in any other “average” country. What are the reasons for this statement?

First of all it is necessary to note that except 1945 – 1950s, North Korea did not have well developed system of international relations. DPRK’s relations with the USSR became to decline after death of I.V. Stalin (1953) and following Soviet criticism of personality cult of I.V. Stalin (1955)<sup>7</sup>. In 1960s the Korea Workers' Party even called for a struggle with the USSR<sup>8</sup>. Though formally the USSR maintained “friendly” relations with North Korea, they were always quite complicated until 1984, when Kim Il-sung visited the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.

North Korean relations with China (PRC) were quite close but also have experienced a series of problems. In early 2000s North Korean leader Kim Jong-il (1942 – 2011) has visited China quite often and tried to learn Chinese modernization experience, but since 2012 until the late March of 2018 the new North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has not visited China or any other foreign country which can be explained by necessity of “ideological legalization” of his power which needed quite long time (5~7 years)<sup>9</sup>.

North Korean relations with the Republic of Korea have experienced its rise in 1998 – 2008,

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<sup>4</sup> The article gives more relevant information in comparison with the text of the paper, which was presented on February 14, 2018.

<sup>5</sup> Trump: Sanctions are having a 'big impact' on North Korea // <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/02/trump-says-sanctions-are-having-an-effect-on-north-korea.html> (2018.01.02).

<sup>6</sup> 방북 日언론인 "北경제 나쁘지 않아...무역거래 등엔 어려움" (A Japanese correspondent visited North Korea: North [Korea] Economy is not bad... Difficulties in foreign trade) // <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/nk/2018/03/20/4807040000AKR20180320022400014.HTML?template=5567> (2018.03.20).

<sup>7</sup> SSSR and Koreja (The USSR and Korea). Moscow, Publishing House of Eastern Literature, 1988.

<sup>8</sup> Tikhomirov, V.D. Korejskaja problema I mezhdunaridnyje factory (1845 – nachalo 80-kh godov) (Korea Issue and International Factors (1945 – beginning of 80s). Moscow, Vostochnaya Literatura, 1998. P. 69.

<sup>9</sup> Kurbanov S.O. North Korea in 2012-2016 and Perspectives of Korean Unification. // A paper presented for the Institute for Unification Education, Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea. Seoul, April – May, 2016.

but since coming to power of presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hae the inter-Korean relations have absolutely declined by early 2016.

The North Korean *Juche* ideology and policy of self-reliance (which has quite long history and suggests methods of survival in isolation) is the principal way of overcoming sanctions.

At the present time (April, 2018) the only sphere where North Korea is strongly dependent from the external supplies is oil import. Of course, the DPRK also needs new foreign technologies, machinery, medical equipment, medicines, humanitarian food help etc. But in principle, they can produce all these by themselves, though it may be (or may be not) out of date or not sufficient.

Any sanctions imposed on North Korea can lead to reduction of its population to the level when the country will be able to feed it with its own agricultural resources. “Instead of using cars they will use carts with ox”. They will continue heating their houses with coal which natural resources are sufficient.

In this context the indirect impact may be the most effective tool to contribute to the process of changes in North Korea.

**3.3. Indirect impact. More high quality foreign made products and fashions as first step for changes.** Any changes must be preceded by understanding of the insolvency of the current state of affairs and understanding of alternative ways of changes (improvements). Understanding means knowledge that is obtained through information or experience. Information can be provided directly in the forms of specially designed texts, live transmissions etc. The information can also be obtained indirectly through the acquisition and use of products created in another, free democratic world and for using in this free democratic world.

a) Material goods change human minds.

New products as a result of development initiate another new stage of development. If there is no market, but there is a product that attracts potential consumer, the market will appear.

b) Cultural products may change human minds.

**3.4. 1970s – 1980s Soviet Union Experience.** The author of this article was born in the USSR. He has spent his childhood, youth and early adulthood in the Soviet Union. He remembers quite well the lack of beautiful and diverse clothing, the lack of the hart-touching diverse cultural products, though he does not deny the comparatively high level of development of Soviet humanities. At that time legal and underground import of Western goods together with legal and underground penetration of Western culture (such as, for example, pop music) greatly influenced on minds both of young and adult generation making them doubt about the truth of the ideas of Communism and the ideality of a planned economy.

**3.5. Magic power of the blue jeans bringing individuality and freedom.** Soviet way of planned economy did not pay too much attention to individuality and diversity of goods. “Traditional” North Korean way of life and production is also based on similarity of looks of ordinary people. It may be explained by lack of production facilities and influence of ideology of collectivism reflected in North Korean constitution<sup>10</sup>. Otherwise latest visits of foreigners to Pyongyang<sup>11</sup> demonstrate the increased degree of individuality and diversity in clothing styles of the inhabitants of Pyongyang. The prohibition of diversity reflects dictatorial tendencies in the social policies of the authorities, while diversity promotes the development of democratic trends.

In the Soviet Union the blue jeans were partially allowed already in 1970s while it was very difficult to purchase them. In 1980s the blue jeans became the most popular clothing in the USSR. Blue jeans have one very important peculiarity. After long time wearing of blue jeans they become user-only-owning very individual clothing that exists only in one copy in the world. The blue jeans culture promotes personal individuality. The blue jeans are prohibited to wear in North Korea. In the year 2004 the author of the article has seen one man in Pyongyang wearing blue jeans. He took a photo of this man. But it is quite difficult to derive whether this person was a Korean or a foreigner from an Asian country.

So, more active trade with North Korea aimed to provide its population with more diversity of products (especially like personal clothing) can bring changes in minds of North Korean population. This is what the Soviet experience of the 1980s demonstrates vividly.

**3.6. Indirect impact. Providing more varieties of information. Soviet experience.** The second way of indirect impact on North Korea is providing its population with various types of information of the following categories:

1. Demonstration of life styles and conditions better than in North Korea.
2. Providing with stories about personal freedom in comparison with North Korean realities, as well as benefits of freedom.
3. A huge amount of attractive pure (neutral) cultural information that can replace the everyday spiritual culture of the citizens of the DPRK, imbued with propaganda and ideology. This also can become one of the powerful instruments of mind changes in North Korea.

The Soviet experience demonstrates that it was Western goods and Western popular culture that had transformed minds of Soviet people (especially young people), made them unhappy with the realities of their time. As a result they have come to idea of changing Communist system to democratic, more opened and friendly to Western culture and societies (in 1980s –

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<sup>10</sup> Constitution of the DPRK. 2012 Edition. Article 63.

<sup>11</sup> The author of this article has visited Pyongyang in late September, 2016 and has witnessed noticeable changes in the external appearance (clothing) of citizens, demonstrating their greater prosperity and greater freedom.

1990s).

**3.7. Indirect impact. Images of the future of unified democratic North Korea.** Another important area of information that can change North Koreans' mind is detailed description *of development plans* of every North Korean region in the future (for example, after unification with the South).

It is a very delicate, very difficult but necessary task. One can send to North Koreans a lot of information about “free and wealthy” life in South Korea or anywhere. North Koreans can easily react on this information answering in the following way: “It is life there, in the South Korea. That life is not for us. Our fate is to live under conditions and circumstances as is.” (This statement is based on my personal Soviet experience).

It is necessary to show the North Korean population a number of possibilities for the better life in their home regions. It is necessary to demonstrate people that good life is not somewhere abroad, behind a demilitarized zone, but what is possible here at their home, and it is possible pretty soon.

It seems that North Korean authorities clearly understand importance of giving its population hope for better life. If this hope and plans of reforms will be developed by present North Korean authorities, it will strengthen their position and strengthen present socio-economic system. Thus, in April 3 – 7, 2018 a delegation of Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI) intended to visit Pyongyang and discuss situation in North Korean regions together with possibilities of their economic development<sup>12</sup>.

**3.8. Indirect impact: teaching people what and how to do.** Besides, there is another important type of information that should be provided to North Korean population, so they would be able to improve their political system, society, economics etc. This is educational information. It is necessary not only to inform North Koreans with knowledge about alternative ways of better life, but also teach them what and how to do.

Since their birth, North Koreans were taught to follow orders of highest leaders, party leaders of various levels, local administration leaders etc. They even can not imagine that they have rights and possibilities to behave any other way except following orders. (Of course, people living in Pyongyang are different, more mobile). But people who are dissatisfied with the regime prefer to flee, rather than struggle for improvement of the situation in their homeland.

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<sup>12</sup> 아시아 학자들 내주 방북 "지역현안·경제개발 논의" (Asian scholars will visit North the next week for “discussing the present situation and development perspectives in regions).

Available at:

<http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/international/2018/03/31/0601070000AKR20180331029700076.HTML?template=5566>

**3.9. Information structuring and Korean social culture.** When developing methods of production and delivery of information to [North and South] Koreans, it is necessary to take into account their social psychology and mentality. Notwithstanding 70 years of Korean division, some cultural and mental features remain very similar in both Koreas.

Russian citizens have active contacts with South Koreans. Among them are Russian employees and managers working together with Koreans in South Korean companies. Russian employees are experiencing considerable difficulties with their [South] Korean colleagues, caused by Korean national consciousness and psychology. These difficulties are clearly seen in negotiations and decisions making process. For example, Russians are complaining about difficulties in obtaining from Koreans prompt answers to the questions posed.

Korean culture of traditional “Confucian collectivism” (existing in North Korea too, but without any reference to Confucianism) does not promote decision-making abilities and independent thinking with no connection with opinion of elders or people who are at a higher social level. Korean language in its grammar reflects social stratification

To illustrate this provision, we can give an example citing the case of one North Korean defector who told me his story in 1980s<sup>13</sup>. At that time he was an exchange student in Moscow and fell in love with a girl from Poland. Then he made a decision not to return back to North Korea. His decision became known in North Korea and a group of North Korean secret service agents was sent to Moscow. They met Mr. Park and interrogate him trying to force him to go back to Pyongyang. Mr. Park told me that he was able not to surrender to North Korean authorities because during interrogation he has used Russian language. He told me that if he spoke Korean, being based on the norms of linguistic etiquette, putting himself lower in position than the secret service officers, he would surely obey. But he spoke Russian. Russian polite speech put the interlocutor on an equal footing with the speaker and at the same time psychologically distances the interlocutor from the speaker.

This example clearly shows the fixation of social stratification in Korean language.

Social stratification does not allow to oppose an officially respected person. Before Korean protest against a superior, this superior person should lose his high social status in the eyes of the majority of population<sup>14</sup>. Otherwise any direct criticism against a superior from the outside could hardly be accepted by Koreans. It should be Koreans themselves who will decide to respect their leader anymore or not.

Thus, providing North Korea with information it is necessary to structure it in accordance with Korean socially stratified culture.

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<sup>13</sup> Name of the defector and his name are changed.

<sup>14</sup> Before South Korean population began the series of 2016 “candle light demonstrations” against acting president Pak Geun-hae, they have got a huge amount of information completely decrypting the president.



**3.10. Power of information from outside and Kim Jong-un concern about this.** The information from abroad is a very powerful mean of social influence. Especially in the case if that information is delivered from abroad and it is adjusted to realities of local culture, so local population is able to accept it.

From the other hand, if the state is not able to meet the increased information needs of the population, then the population begins independently seek these sources of information from abroad.

The speech of the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un presented at the 5th Conference of WPK (Workers' Party of Korea) Cell Chairpersons on December 24, 2017 demonstrated the increased influence of foreign culture and information on modern North Korean society.

In his speech Kim Jong-un has repeatedly addressed to the problem of “corrupt bourgeois reactionary culture” and Korean people “harboring illusions about the enemies' culture” and “ideological and cultural poisoning by the imperialists”<sup>15</sup>. All these critical utterances were combined by Kim Jong-un in the term indicating new realities in modern North Korean society: “non-socialist practices” (비사회주의적 현상)<sup>16</sup> or “non-socialist realities”.

This speech of Kim Jong-un clearly illustrated partial ideological damage of the present political regime as a result of outside influence as well as the power of foreign cultural information.

Who are those North Korean people who are influenced by “enemies' culture”?

We can suppose that these are the people who 1) can travel abroad or 2) have enough money to buy (openly or underground) media or 3) have friends and relatives who already possess new information media. These people influenced by “enemies' culture” represent North Korean elite living in Pyongyang or in North Korean developed areas, such as Raseon or near the Kaesong Industrial complex (until the time of its fully closure in February of 2016<sup>17</sup>), etc. We can derive them as “new North Koreans” who potentially can become the new power of changes in North Korea.

In Russia in 1990s we used the term “new Russians” which indicated new rich people, former citizens of the Soviet Union who suddenly were able to make a big amount of money during the process of privatization of the state property and economic transformation after

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<sup>15</sup> Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at 5th Conference of WPK Cell Chairpersons // <http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.special.getArticlePage.kcmsf> (2017.12.24).

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> 정부, 개성공단 가동 전면중단...北핵·미사일 대응카드(종합) (Government, Kaesong Industrial Complex to shut down ... North Korea Nuclear and Missile Response Cards (Comprehensive) // <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/politics/2016/02/10/0505000000AKR20160210064000014.HTML?template=2085> (2016.02.10).

collapse of the Soviet Union. All “new Russians” were more flexible being able to adjust to the new post-socialist realities. They were one of the driving force at the initial stage of socio-economic reforms in new Russia. Similarly, the "new Koreans" can become the social layer that can be the driving force of changes in the new Korea

**3.11. Information delivery: direct delivery, cultural exchange, trade.** When working with the information delivery issue, it is necessary to clearly understand different ways and methods of its delivery.

The direct information delivery throughout the country with the use of ordinary media, such as radio, satellite transmissions etc. can be the simplest way. When using oral speech for information providing (during broadcast) it is necessary to remember that the most effective would be Pyongyang dialect of Korean language or any regional dialect (for example, Hamgyeong province dialect, very special one, in the case of broadcasting to this province).

At the same time it is also useful to teach North Korean population to use the Seoul dialect, or at least, to ensure that the Seoul dialect became familiar, not alien, and associated with hopes for better life. To achieve this aim it is better to transmit in Seoul dialect some cultural programs and avoid using Seoul dialect in political discussions.

Another important aspect of information delivery is necessity of avoiding any direct critique of North Korean state and its leaders. My personal experience of a citizen of the Soviet Union who was exposed to information from Western countries shows that direct criticism of the country's leadership causes only a feeling of rejection and unseemliness in relation to the one who broadcasts such criticism.

At the same time, any “neutral” cultural information demonstrating alternative life, geographic regions of the World, customs and traditions of other nations enlarge the general perception of the human space on Earth and give to the North Korean population abilities to look differently at their own society. This information too can play very powerful role in changing North Koreans’ minds.

What could be the means of information delivery to the North Korea?

1. First of all, it is necessary to point the importance of traditional conservative analog radio transmission. While the whole world refuses to use classical radio broadcasting technologies in favor of the Internet, leaving only radio stations in the FM band (which audience is largely oriented towards auto drivers), in North Korea, where an ordinary citizen does not have the opportunity to get access to the international network, radio broadcasting still plays a very important role.

Ordinary North Korean population has radio receivers, including those with a short wave band<sup>18</sup>. Radio is the most anonymous mean of getting information.

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<sup>18</sup> Kurbanov S.O. S bloknotom po Koree. Zapiski vostokoveda (With writing-pad through Korea: 1987 – 2011. An Orientalist Travel Notes). St. Petersburg University Publishing House,

2. It is also possible to use TV broadcasts for information delivery. It is less effective, because only people living near state borders have the opportunity to receive TV programs from abroad. Receiving of satellite transmissions needs special satellite antenna which is difficult to hide. Anyway, already in 1980s some of people who lived in Kaesong city, located near DMZ, watched South Korean TV broadcasts<sup>19</sup>.

3. Distribution of DVD, memory cards and other media carriers may play some role in information supply to North Korea. But this method of information delivery is not quite suitable, because physical media can be easily detected, and its owner can be punished.

4. Official cultural exchange is a legal way of information delivery. Otherwise it may be one of the strongest and powerful informational tools.

On April 1 and April 3, 2018, South Korean delegation of artists representing South Korean popular music, including a girl-group “Red Velvet”, visited Pyongyang and has presented performances<sup>20</sup> approved by North Korean authorities. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un together with his spouse has visited the first day concert. From one hand, it may be interpreted only as a manifestation of North Korean principle of inter-Korean relations: “minjok-kkiri”, which literary meaning is “[exchanges] within the framework of the [Korean] nation [and without interference from outside]”. From the other hand, the allowance of “foreign capitalist culture” though it is of Korean National origins, can not help but surprise. It may mean that “modern pop culture” is already penetrated into North Korean society and it is limitedly allowed. That means, that North Korea has already began some limited reforms in its cultural life<sup>21</sup>.

5. Limited trade with North Korea providing its population with everyday life goods is another mean of information delivery already discussed in the paragraph 3.3. of this article.

**3.12. Information delivery: regional differences.** North Korea is not the country where all regions are similar one to another. At the present time and in the past there were more developed and more backward provinces. The more developed regions of the past were located in the Western part of North Korea, because they were on the trade route between the Korean capital Seoul and China. The same region was one of the centers of multiple peasants’

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2013. P. 356 – 357.

<sup>19</sup> Information is obtained by the author of the paper in 1985 through the Polish diplomatic mission.

<sup>20</sup> 경애하는 최고령도자 김정은동지께서 남측예술단의 공연을 관람하시였다 (The top leader Kim Jong Un visited the performance of the South Korean troupe) // <http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.special.getArticlePage.kcmsf;jsessionid=C47D12DC8180969A66562555DBDD857A> (2018.04.02).

<sup>21</sup> The limited cultural freedom in Pyongyang may be illustrated by the possibility of using children's products with images of heroes from Walt Disney cartoons.

uprisings<sup>22</sup>. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century the Hamgyeong province became the center of the heavy industry. Pyongyang is a very special North Korean city with much more higher standards of life and more freedom than in other regions. The Kaesong city located near Kaesong Industrial Complex which until 2016 was operated by South Korean small and medium enterprises is another center being more flexible for outside information consumption

So, when planning information delivery to North Korea, it is necessary to clearly understand where and what kind of information may be the most effective in accordance with the peculiarities of each individual region.

### ***Conclusion.***

Information is a significant power, especially in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Even the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un well understands it, and he points to the negative impact of “ideological and cultural poisoning by the imperialists” information from outside on the internal "socialist" system in North Korea.

The information impact does not necessarily mean negative effects. The information impact could be positive and fruitful.

When planning to use the informational power to have an impact on North Korea, it is possible and it is necessary to use it for positive results and fair goals. The power of information should not destruct, but improve North Korean society in global humanitarian sense, making it more flexible and friendly to the whole World community.

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<sup>22</sup> 1811 – 1812 Hong Gyeong-rae rebellion. In 1894 – 1895 here were dislocated Northern troops of the Donghak peasants war etc.