
Joint and Multinational Theater Headquarters in Korea: History, Organization and Manpower Activities

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Preface.

This research project is a companion piece to an article titled, "Theater-level Command and Alliance Decision-Making Architecture in Korea," published in the *International Journal of Korean Studies*, Volume XX, Number 2, Fall/Winter 2016. This particular work dissects how the United States (U.S.), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United Nations Command (UNC) Sending States structurally organize the theater headquarters in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula, and then resource them with personnel. An extract of this project, titled, "The United Nations Command and the Sending States," was published in the *International Journal of Korean Studies*, Volume XXI, Number 2, Fall/Winter 2017.

Admittedly, this is not scholarship in high demand by Alliance managers due to the dense subject matter. However, the author found a compelling need for such a detailed understanding of this particular subject by Alliance managers during several organizational redesign initiatives he participated in while assigned to Eighth Field Army in 2011-2012, and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in 2014-2016 while attached to the UNC and the ROK / U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). The author gained a unique insight into the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) headquarters during his assignments to both Eighth Field Army and USFK, that later proved invaluable to the development of this project. Later, while working wider Northeast Asian issues at Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) in 2017-2018 and at United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) from 2018 to the present, the author was able to examine the subject from a distance which allowed for the research to be more objective.

This research project contains the best available information on the matter and for the most part is *representative of the conditions present as of 2016.* It does not reflect redesign or transformative efforts that have taken place since, nor does it posit on where future redesign efforts may ultimately lead, but it does offer some advice at the end in the conclusion. There are some post-2016 data points and citations due to availability of relevant open source material and to amplify the narrative, where it felt appropriate. Arguably there are some minor errors, and some redundancy within the research project's sections in describing the organizational structure and manpower environment, and there are some areas which were simplified for consumption. For example, while personnel service support activities are addressed, the

paper does not dive too deeply into the personnel service support or force design worlds in order for the product to be more valuable to a broader, more operationally-focused audience. However, despite the errors and simplifications, it has both academic and relevant operational value to future organizational redesign efforts in the Korean theater.

Terminology.

This research project extensively utilizes very specific military terminology to describe the joint and multinational command environment found on the Korean Peninsula. In order to ensure a common understanding, U.S. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, is utilized as the foundational source for providing useful, standardized definitions of the military terminology used throughout this paper. U.S. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, is another key document for the reader to reference and understand in order to better comprehend how the respective commands are organized and operate. JP 3-16's Chapter II is highly recommended as additional companion reading to this paper and for understanding the doctrinal foundation of multinational commands and their organizational structure.

As this research project matured, the author identified some doctrinal terminology gaps in describing the theater / unified command relationships and their architecture. In these cases, definitions were developed to bridge the gaps in U.S. doctrinal terminology. Moreover, the author also amplified U.S. doctrinal terminology with clarifications in *italics* to provide context for not only how the terms are employed, but also why a term is used in both the paper or by service members in the ROK.

Alliance. "The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members;"[1] *the U.S. and ROK Alliance relationship is founded on their Mutual Defense Treaty and the security relationship is framed by the Terms of Reference for the Military Committee and ROK / U.S. CFC, and the Strategic Directive.*

Bilateral. *Not a doctrinal term as defined by JP 1-02. However, the Cambridge Dictionary defines the term as an adjective, "involving two groups or countries." In terms of this research project, the term is used as defined above, and as a substitute for defining two-party multinational arrangements. The term "bilateral" is used within this project to distinguish two-country arrangements, such as the case when the U.S. and the ROK are working together, from multilateral, "multinational" arrangements involving three or more nations as in the case of UNC where 18 nations are operating together.*

Combined. "A term identifying two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies operating together."[2] *This term is often misused to describe bilateral or multinational headquarters relationships (see "integrated staff") as it is intended to describe the combining of "forces" or*

"units" in bilateral and multinational operations, not internal multinational staffing arrangements within headquarters. Within this paper the term is used to convey that two or more nations service members are cooperatively working together on tasks and missions, e.g. "combined labor," "combined approach," "combined fashion," "combined effect," etc.

Integrated Staff. "A staff in which one officer only is appointed to each post on the establishment of the headquarters, irrespective of nationality and Service."[3] *The doctrinal definition, as defined, doesn't adequately explain the integrated multinational headquarters described in JP 3-16, which is a headquarters with a "designated single commander" and a "staff composed of representatives from all member nations."*[4] *Additionally, JP 3-16 does not sufficiently articulate that integrated commands often maintain a decision making construct in which all participating member nations collectively provide operational and/or strategic guidance and direction to the command.*[5] *Integrated commands are also typically characterized by multinational, joint staffing from the participating member nations.*

Joint. "Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate."[6] *While readers with military backgrounds will understand the definition as written, for those without military experience the term "joint" means the action or organization is multi-service, meaning it has elements from a single nation's Army, Navy, Air Force and/or Marine Corps.*

Joint Staff. "The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Military Department), that includes members from the several Services comprising the force."[7] *The term "joint staff" is intended to represent that a headquarters staff is multi-service, from a single nation. Within this paper the author will add the modifier "unilateral" to convey that the joint headquarters or staff is from a single nation. When "joint staff" is utilized in a multinational command context, the description of the joint staff will include a modifier to denote more than one nation is present, i.e. "joint, multinational."*

Lead Nation. "The nation with the will, capability, competence, and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a multinational operation;"[8] *JP 3-16 describes lead nation headquarters as being similar to integrated commands with multinational staffing, but whose strategic decision-making and control is exercised by a single lead nation. In some instances multinational staffing of a lead nation headquarters may not be through embedded staff, but rather through the robust use of liaisons, as UNC was for the majority of its history. JP 3-16 further explains that multinational partner interests in lead nation commands are generally represented through the contributing nation's respective government declared National Caveats, their National Command Element (NCE), and embedded staff members and liaison personnel. Furthermore, multinational partner strategic decision-making interests are usually represented through established government-to-government mechanisms, but may include special consultative measures or bodies specifically established to address the lead nation strategic guidance and direction.*

Multinational. "Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners."[9] *While JP 1-02 defines this term as involving "two or more nations or coalition partners" in terms of this research project and on the Korean Peninsula, the term generally is used to denote a partner nation environment outside the ROK / U.S. Alliance, or to denote three or more nations operating collectively. Furthermore, in this project and on the Korean Peninsula bilateral activities generally utilize the term "combined" or "bilateral" to denote two-party environments.*

Multinational Staff. "A staff composed of personnel of two or more nations within the structure of a coalition or alliance."[10] *JP 1-02 utilizes this term to describe multi-nation staffing arrangements within headquarters, whether they are integrated, of a lead nation variety, or associated with a parallel command's coordination center. However, within this paper additional clarifying language is used to describe the staffing relationship in more detail. As discussed under the terms "bilateral" and "multinational" above, this term is reserved for three or more party relationships and activities.*

Parallel. *Not a doctrinal term defined in JP 1-02.*[11] *JP 3-16 does provide an authoritative doctrinal source to frame the term "parallel" from a command structure perspective. Parallel commands do not have a single unified commander. Each multinational partner maintains separate commands and commanders, although in many cases several nations will bundle their forces together and form a lead nation or an integrated command within an overall parallel theater architecture. The respective commands unify their efforts by typically synchronizing their planning and operations through a coordination center and exchange of liaison personnel.*[12] *When the United States and ROK pursued this form of combined defense from 2006-2013, the two nations not only agreed to establish a standing coordination center to synchronize their tactical and operational efforts, but also to place their parallel commands under the strategic guidance and direction of a military committee, leveraging the proven military committee concept to provide guidance and direction to CFC since 1978.*[13]

Theater. "The geographical area for which a commander of a geographic combatant command has been assigned responsibility."[14] *While this is mostly true, there are exceptions, particularly in the ROK with CFC and the UNC. While not a term used within this paper, "theater of operations" amplifies the term "theater" and how it is used within the paper. JP 1-02 distinguishes a "theater of operations" as "an operational area defined by the geographic combatant commander for the conduct or support of specific military operations" and a "theater of war" as being "defined by the U.S. President, the Secretary of Defense or a geographical combatant commander as the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of major operations and campaigns involving combat."*[15] *For the purposes of this paper this term includes the equivalent authorities within the ROK Government, the ROK / U.S. Alliance, and the 1950-era United Nations Security Council Resolutions which defined the overarching scope of the UNC mission in the ROK. As an example, UNC's geographic area is defined through instructions by the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS), on behalf of the U.S. Secretary of Defense.*[16]

Theater Command. *Not a doctrinal term defined in JP 1-02. For the purposes of this paper the term represents a joint or multinational command with a defined geographic operational area of responsibility (AOR) that may become a designated theater of war as articulated above. The author used this term in lieu of "unified command" to describe CFC, ROK JCS, UNC, and USFK because of the geographically contained features that would denote a Korean Theater of Operations.*

Unified Command. "A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[17] *Contemporary use of this term within the U.S. military generally associates unified commands with combatant commands or sub-unified commands. While UNC was established in 1950 as the Unified Command for that theater of war, and still technically is defined as one by the U.S. military, for the purposes of this paper UNC is articulated as a Theater Command for the reasons described above.*

Acknowledgments.

The genesis of this research project originated while serving as a member of the ROK / U.S. CFC and UNC staffs from 2014-2016. The "Theater-level Command and Alliance Decision-Making Architecture in Korea" paper that this research project is a companion piece to was then in draft. A colleague within CFC and UNC, Colonel Craig Harmon (U.S. Air Force), was negotiating his way through manpower documents in an attempt to understand and improve the USFK Joint Table of Manning and Distribution (JTMD) and Exercise Manning Document (EMD) supporting the USFK J5, CFC C5, and UNC U5 directorates. It intrigued me at the time how little the staff even understood how manpower activities functioned within these headquarters.[18]

Prior to Colonel Harmon departing the commands for his follow-on assignment, I engaged him on what he learned. I gathered through our conversations that his efforts at understanding the headquarters had wider utility beyond the manpower realm, in particular as the U.S. and ROK were discussing future headquarters concepts. Once I completed the aforementioned Theater Command paper and several other research projects for the U.S. Army I started on this particular project in the spring of 2017 since it seemed to be the next logical extension of my research efforts at the time. Work continued through the summer of 2018, when it was tabled to let the assessments mature. I resumed work in the late summer of 2019.

Throughout this project's development, there have been several individuals who proved invaluable to its content, review, and editing process. Without their collective efforts, this research project would be of much lesser quality and value to Alliance managers.

Lieutenant Colonel's Heather Reed and Timothy Leitch, former Force Managers at USFK J8, were both instrumental in describing the manpower process for me, offering their assessments, and making sure that I stayed doctrinally true in the world of manpower activities.

Mr. Michael Keefe, former International Relations Analyst at CFC, and Mr. Carl McGowan, former International Relations Analyst at UNC, provided indispensable analysis and background on the history

and inner workings of USFK, UNC, CFC and Northeast Asia. Their depth of knowledge on the ROK / U.S. Alliance was matchless. Unfortunately, Mr. McGowan passed unexpectedly in early 2019. My writing efforts on Korea and the Alliance are directly attributable to their encouragement and sound advice.

Mr. Robert Collins, former Chief of Strategy at USFK, UNC and CFC, likewise provided significant analysis and background on the history and inner workings of USFK, UNC and CFC. His time, both in email and in person, were irreplaceable to capturing the essence of the commands during the critical transitions after 1978.

Lastly, I am especially thankful to Lieutenant General (Retired) In-Bum Chun from the ROK Army and Dr. Baek from the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) Institute of Military History for reviewing the ROK JCS history and providing a Korean perspective to the research project's description of not only ROK JCS, but also CFC, UNC and USFK.

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Introduction.

Individual Military Department and joint manpower management activities are multifaceted, highly bureaucratic processes that often prove difficult for the majority of operational leaders to fully comprehend. Moreover, integrating and synchronizing national manpower management activities into a multinational setting significantly adds to the complexity of what is already an involved, intricate process. One of the most challenging manpower activity environments faced by the U.S. Armed Forces are balancing its national interests with its Alliance and its multinational obligations on the Korean Peninsula and the region.

In addition to the United States and ROK interests, legacy Cold War interests remain active on the Korean Peninsula. During the 1950-1953 Korean War, twenty UN member states provided combat and humanitarian forces under a U.S. led Unified Command (UNC) to support the ROK in repelling the attack by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).[19] Sixteen of those historical friendly powers, collectively known as the Sending States, remain active with the UNC.[20]

There are four theater-level commands operational in the ROK:

1 - USFK, a U.S. unilateral, joint command;

2 - ROK JCS, a ROK unilateral, joint command;

3 - CFC, a ROK / U.S. bilateral, integrated command, also the designated warfighter; and

4 - UNC, a U.S. led multinational, lead nation command, which incorporates both ROK and Sending State personnel and token forces.[21]

This document includes a historical summary of the command landscape (Part I), a depiction of the theater headquarters organization and structure in 2016 (Part II), and also an illustration of the manpower management processes in place in 2016 (Part III), revealing how the interested nations support their respective command equities during Armistice conditions (i.e. peacetime), a crisis period, and during a resumption of active hostilities.[22] In particular, this project provides specifics on how the United States and ROK have employed multi-hatting (simultaneous appointment of personnel to multiple commands) over the years to mitigate the numerous administrative and logistical challenges of managing such a

complex command environment.[23] Lastly, this piece attempts to negotiate through the Alliance and the respective national rhetoric, to provide a more accurate portrayal of the theater command architecture present on the Korean Peninsula.

PART I:

Theater Headquarters
Historical Summary

Organizational Structure Background.

Historic Cold War legacies, competing international demands, domestic politics, and the evolution of the ROK / U.S. security relationship continue to play an outsized role in influencing how the United States and ROK organize the common defense at the theater level on the Korean Peninsula. While there is still a significant power disparity between the two allies, their affiliation has progressed from a very unequal patron – client relationship in the early 1950s to a partnership approaching the strategic relationship the United States maintains with the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada.

The ROK has fundamentally transformed itself politically and economically over the course of its 70-plus year existence, now a thriving democratic republic with the world's twelfth ranked economy in terms of gross domestic product (GDP).[24] For at least the last 40 years, the United States has expected more from its ally while at the same time the ROK Government has sought a much larger participatory role within the relationship. Clear understanding of the foundational ties that bind the two countries, appreciation of why and how the relationship evolved, along with a firm grasp of the shared values that sustain them today are key to comprehending why the theater command landscape is organized the way it is.

The Korean people regained their sovereignty in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula in 1948 following their liberation from the Imperial Japanese Empire and three years of Allied Power occupation at the end of the Second World War. The United States Military Government formed a Constabulary and a Coast Guard within its occupied Korean zone on January 14, 1946, forces which were later to form the foundation of the ROK Armed Forces.[25]

Following the formation of the ROK state on August 15, 1948, the existing security forces were reconfigured loosely into the Armed Forces by Article 6 of the ROK Constitution. The Constabulary was redesignated as the ROK Army, while the Coast Guard was redesignated as the ROK Navy, operating under the newly established Ministry of National Defense. The ROK Armed Forces were more formally organized on November 30, 1948 under the Armed Forces Organization Act, which established the Combined Chiefs of Staff Council, the precursor to the ROK JCS. While the Armed Forces Organization

Act more formally codified the legal position of the Armed Forces, it established the Combined Chiefs of Staff Council as a non-permanent organization.[26]

The ROK Army dominated the security affairs within the new Korean state, with the Navy, and later the Air Force, occupying diminutive positions.[27] Army leadership occupied the Chief of the General Staff position, the designated chairman role within the Combined Chiefs of Staff Council. Per the authorities granted by the Armed Forces Organization Act, the Chief of the General Staff exercised command authority over the ROK Armed Forces under the direction of the Minister of National Defense and the ROK President. Under the Combined Chiefs of Staff Council system the Chief of the General Staff exercised its command authority through the general staff and special staff offices within the service headquarters.[28] Unlike today, where ROK JCS is organized as a stand-alone operational command, from 1948 through early July 1950 the ROK Army Chief of Staff (dual-hatted as the Chief of the General Staff) and his Army headquarters exercised the equivalent of what constituted joint operational command of the ROK Armed Forces.

While command authority lines for the newly founded ROK Armed Forces were being instituted following the establishment of the ROK Government, operational control of the ROK Armed Forces and National Police were retained by the U.S. An executive agreement between the ROK President and the Commander of U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) was reached on August 24, 1948 on interim military and security matters during the transitional period of ROK sovereignty and the planned U.S. forces departure from the Korean Peninsula. This military agreement was the first instance of the ROK Government not only delegating operational control over its Armed Forces, but also granting extraterritoriality from Korean laws to U.S. service members, U.S. Government civilians and their dependents. Both parties agreed that the period for the delegation of operational control and extraterritoriality would be fixed to end once USAFIK forces departed. This interim agreement expired on June 30, 1949 when the last U.S. forces departed the ROK and USAFIK was deactivated. Thereafter, all U.S. military service members remaining in the ROK were assigned to the Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG), which operated under the U.S. diplomatic mission to Korea.[29]

The U.S. Far East Command (FECOM) initially served as the unified command for United States and United Nations (UN) military support to the ROK Government in June and July 1950. The FECOM was replaced as the designated warfighter by the newly established UNC in late July 1950.[30] At the direction of the ROK President and Commander-in-Chief, operational control of the ROK Armed Forces were transferred to the Unified Command (UNC) led by the United States for the duration of the conflict.[31] The ROK Government reaffirmed the practice of placing its Armed Forces under UNC's operational control shortly after active hostilities were suspended by the July 1953 Armistice Agreement.[32]

As expectations turned from a real danger of Communist victory on the Korean Peninsula, to what seemed like perpetual fighting, to increased prospects that an Armistice might actually halt active hostilities, the ROK Government turned to not just rebuilding, but improving their Armed Forces. These force improvements, financed by the U.S. Government, were intended as a hedge to both improve its fighting capability should an Armistice fail, and to mitigate the anticipated withdrawal of U.S. and other UN forces from the Korean Peninsula at some future point. At the top, the ROK Government reorganized and redesignated the Combined Staff Council to become the Joint Chiefs of Staff Council in 1954.[33] Two Army level headquarters, First ROK Army (FROKA) and Second ROK Army (SROKA), were established in early 1953 and 1954 respectively.[34] Eight active divisions were added to the ROK Army force structure in 1953, and ten reserve divisions and one active marine division were added in 1954-1955.[35]

Moreover, not satisfied with only changes to its own Armed Forces, the ROK Government began seeking a more active role and participation in the operational direction of the ROK / U.S. security relationship. The effort to be more involved began during the conflict, when the ROK Armed Forces attached a liaison group, similar to the UNC Sending State's liaison groups, to the UNC headquarters in December 1952.[36] In 1955 and again in 1956, the ROK Government submitted proposals to add its service members to the UNC headquarters staff. Both requests were ultimately denied. The U.S. denial of the ROK request was officially due to the U.S. assessment that it was outside the UN mandate to appoint personnel from the ROK to the command since the ROK was not a UN member state. The

thinking at the time was, absent UN membership, the ROK or its service members could not legally participate in the operation of the UNC headquarters.[37]

In conjunction with the ROK Government proposal for its service members to join the UNC headquarters, they also proposed to U.S. officials in 1955 that the two countries negotiate an Administrative Agreement on behalf of the Unified Command in order to address UNC service member's privileges and immunities.[38] The term "Administrative Agreement" was the vernacular of the time for what we now call Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA). While the U.S. and ROK did negotiate two separate agreements for privileges and immunities during the Korean conflict, one for U.S. and the other for the UNC service members, the ROK Government hoped to renegotiate more favorable terms now that active hostilities were suspended.[39] Ultimately, the U.S. Government did not pursue an Administrative Agreement with the ROK Government until the mid-1960s, when it formally concluded a SOFA in 1966.

USFK was established as a subordinate unified command under U.S. Pacific Command (hereafter referred by its contemporary designation, United States Indo-Pacific Command, or USINDOPACOM) to handle administrative and logistical affairs on the Korean Peninsula as part of the 1957 Unified Command Plan.[40] The FECOM was disestablished and its geographic AOR was integrated into USINDOPACOM. UNC was retained and displaced from Japan to Korea, retaining a residual command in Japan and a carved out AOR on the Korean Peninsula, included in, but operationally distinct from USINDOPACOM.[41]

The majority of the Sending State forces departed the Korean Peninsula in 1954 and 1955. The United Kingdom was one of the last countries to withdraw a sizable contingent of combat forces, with a battalion battle group departing in 1957. This UK departure left four nations in Korea with residual, company-sized detachments. Turkey, Ethiopia, and France retained forces into the 1960s, with Thailand keeping a company in place until 1971.[42] Three nations (United Kingdom, Thailand and the Philippines) retained token platoon-sized and smaller contingents in UNC's Honor Guard company, with the UK finally stopping this particular activity in the late 1990s after Hong Kong was formally handed back over to the People's Republic of China (PRC).[43] By the mid-1970s, about half of the original Sending States

had ceased active participation with the UNC. Those that did remain largely did so through their linkages to the designated UN bases and UNC Rear headquarters in Japan.[44]

The early 1960s were an extremely turbulent political time in the ROK. Two years in particular, 1960-1961, saw the Korean state evolve from a de facto dictatorship under Syngman Rhee, to a short-lived democratic republic, and finally to a military dictatorship. Military domination of the state led to numerous changes within the government's structure and its Armed Forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Council transformed, first to the Combined Chief of Staff Bureau in 1961, followed in 1963 with a reorganization to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, its present form. This 1963 reorganization most importantly elevated the Joint Chiefs of Staff to that of a permanent organization within the ROK defense architecture.[45]

United States military leaders, both within the UNC and those off the Korean Peninsula were incensed over the use of several Korean units under UNC's operational control being moved and used without UNC's authority to overthrow the democratic government in 1961. The new ROK military regime, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), reaffirmed UNC's operational control authority over ROK forces ten days after the May 1961 military coup took place.[46] Periodic tension between the inherent national command authority exercised by the ROK Government and its delegated operational control exercised to UNC and later CFC continued to plague the ROK / U.S. security relationship into the 1980s.

Beginning in the latter half of the 1960s the two allies embarked on an evolutionary pathway for their security relationship. A series of independent, yet ultimately iterative efforts ranging from combined planning forums (the ROK / U.S. Operational Planning Staff), senior consultative bodies (the Security Consultative Meeting), ROK JCS assumption of operational mission tasks (counter-infiltration mission), establishing of combined formations (the I Corps (ROK / U.S.) Group), establishment of Third ROK Army (TROKA) to increase ROK military involvement in the combined defense, formation of the Combined Battle Staff test concept, and combined exercises (merging of the ROK ULCHI and UNC FOCUS LENS exercises) in the end fundamentally transformed the concept of the relationship from

patron-client and into something more equal.[47] This evolving partnership eventually manifested itself first in 1977 with the establishment of a Military Committee, followed in late 1978 with the establishment of CFC.[48]

Organizationally, the lead warfighting theater headquarters for ROK / U.S. operations on the Korean Peninsula has never been a stand-alone headquarters and for the most part has been dominated by Army personnel. The theater headquarters staff has always been associated in some fashion from a manpower perspective to another legally distinct command. When the UNC was established in July 1950, its staff was exclusively drawn from (and shared with) the U.S. Army dominated and co-located FECOM / Supreme Command for Allied Powers (SCAP).[49] The UNC / FECOM / SCAP staffing arrangement remained in place until SCAP dissolved in 1952, at which point a UNC / FECOM co-command remained in place until the FECOM was dissolved in 1957. However, while the UNC staff's FECOM duties were relinquished in 1957, the UNC staff assumed USFK duties in their place. The USFK and UNC headquarters were conjoined, sharing much of the same staff from 1957 through 1978.

In addition, while the lead theater headquarters directing U.S. and ROK operations in Korea maintained separate and distinct subordinate air and naval component commands, it did not maintain a separate ground / land component command for more than two-thirds of the time since 1950. Instead, the theater headquarters commander and his staff also served as the ground / land component command for all but the late 1954 through 1974 period.[50] From 1974 until 1978, the co-located USFK and UNC headquarters incorporated Eighth Army, serving as a tri-command headquarters for about four years with the staff simultaneously performing all duties.[51]

When CFC was established, the United States and the ROK made a deliberate decision, based on manpower shortfalls, to not establish a standalone Ground Component Command (GCC) headquarters. Instead, the CFC staff would simultaneously serve as the CFC GCC, replicating the FECOM / UNC and Army Forces Far East (AFFE) relationship of the Korean War.[52] The added burden of centralizing planning and exercising control over ground forces within the CFC staff was mitigated partially by the concurrent efforts to build out the forward Field Army structure.[53] After 1978, Eighth Army remained

designated as the UNC GCC and the USFK Army Forces command, however it had no direct component role within CFC. In addition to Eighth Army's continued designation as the UNC ground component, UNC continued to leverage the other USFK service components in performing its limited component command functions.[54]

In conjunction with the CFC to UNC mission transition, physical headquarters consolidation, and staff amalgamation in 1978, Eighth Army and USFK were officially split off geographically from CFC / UNC, and conjoined. Despite the splitting of the commands into CFC / UNC and USFK / Eighth Army, in practice, U.S. service members within CFC, UNC, USFK and Eighth Army remained intrinsically linked for two main reasons. First and foremost, the Senior U.S. Military Officer Assigned to Korea (SUSMOAK) was appointed to all four command positions, resulting in all four staffs simultaneously supporting his priorities. Secondly, and likely just as important, manpower shortages necessitated U.S. service member quad-hatting across the staffs, particularly the senior officers.[55]

Both before and after 1978, the majority of U.S. interests within theater-level headquarters activities centered on ground operations and units of the Eighth Army, with varying degrees of interest after 1978 on CFC GCC operations. This headquarters focus was principally due to U.S. Army domination of headquarters priorities within the USFK and CFC headquarters. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps presence on the peninsula was limited to their joint representation on theater headquarters staffs and their small service component command headquarters. The U.S. Air Force on the other hand was pulled in two directions – USFK and CFC priorities in Korea on the one hand, all the while the 314th Air Division (7th Air Force predecessor) was directly linked operationally to 5th Air Force in Japan (until September 8, 1986) and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) in Hawaii.[56]

ROK interests were also centered on ground operations, because their Armed Forces were likewise also Army-dominated. The ROK Air Force and ROK Navy (and by extension the ROK Marine Corps), though growing in both size and capability, were still the junior Military Departments to their Army headquarters. Combined activities within the CFC headquarters focused on planning, although U.S.

perceptions of ROK service member's skills and experience in operational and strategic planning limited their role.[57]

As time went on, U.S. joint activities began to take on greater importance, particularly after the 1986 Goldwater Nichols Act was enacted. USFK encroached, then fully replaced Eighth Army as the U.S. vehicle for the management and direction of U.S. theater headquarters activities in Korea. While the U.S. interests within CFC began to incorporate more joint qualities, the ROK Army continued to dominate ROK military interests within its Armed Forces into the 2000s. This Army (Eighth Army) to joint (USFK) management and direction transition was formally codified at the end of 1992, when USFK and Eighth Army were officially separated through a series of inter-related force structure reorganizations on the Korean Peninsula.

In 1992 the SUSMOAK was relieved of his command appointment to Eighth Army when the command was downgraded from an O-10 (four star) General Officer / Flag Officer (GO/FO) command to a O-9 (three star) GO/FO command. The Combined Field Army (CFA) was also disestablished, with its U.S. Army service members, including its Army O-9 GO/FO commander, forming the foundation of the new stand-alone Eighth Army headquarters.[58] The USFK headquarters was absorbed into the CFC and UNC headquarters footprint, although many of these joint officers were already appointed to CFC positions (and in some cases UNC).

Changes to USFK, Eighth Army, and the disestablishment of the CFA set in motion several cascading modifications within CFC as well. The SUSMOAK, in his CFC Commander capacity, was relieved of his CFC GCC Commander obligations. Command responsibility of CFC GCC was transferred to the ROK CFC Deputy Commander.[59] The U.S. Army O-9 GO/FO commanding Eighth Army was appointed as the new CFC GCC Deputy Commander, as well as to the CFC, UNC and USFK Chief of Staff positions.[60]

Moreover, while definitive sources have thus far remained elusive on the exact date the ROK Government began independently providing manpower to the CFC GCC in addition to the dual-hatted CFC staff, available evidence points to an independent ROK CFC GCC cadre being resourced following

the 1992 changes to CFC GCC leadership. This full time ROK CFC GCC cadre assumed a greater burden for operational ground planning and synchronization of the forward Field Armies, often with limited or no U.S. service member involvement.

From 1950 until 1994, the ROK JCS headquarters was predominantly a supporting command to either UNC or CFC, despite assuming small operational mission sets and resuming operational control over some forces beginning in the late 1960s.[61] One often overlooked facet of the 1978 establishment of CFC, was the dramatic influence it had on ROK JCS. The bilateral Alliance framework fundamentally altered the outlook of ROK JCS. Prior to 1978 the ROK JCS headquarters and the ROK CJCS had been primarily focused on man, train, equip, mobilization and marshal law functions. The formation of the Military Committee with the ROK CJCS roles within the Plenary and Permanent sessions fundamentally altered ROK JCS' outlook, giving it newfound independence, and confidence that it had not previously experienced. In particular, the ROK CJCS, in conjunction with his SUSMOAK counterpart on the Permanent Session, now had a directive authority over the management of theater-level operational plans and operations. ROK JCS continued to grow and develop into this new role throughout the 1980s, giving ROK national authority increased confidence that they had developed the skills and experience to resume full time operational control over their Armed Forces.[62]

The ROK Government set the groundwork in 1990 for resuming operational control of its Armed Forces by instituting the 818 Plan, which modified the roles and responsibilities within the ROK Armed Forces. Most importantly, under the 818 Plan the ROK JCS was transformed into "a unified, joint command structure" and the ROK Army Chief of Staff transferred command authority of ROK forces to the ROK CJCS.[63] Recognizing there was a paradigm shift within the Alliance on the horizon, developments by the allies in the early 1990's reflected an acceptance of change, and moreover set the conditions for the ROK to resume control of its forces.[64]

In late 1994 the ROK Government withdrew operational control of their designated Alliance forces from CFC during the Armistice period. New agreements were instituted to codify U.S. and ROK operational control procedures for designated forces to be placed under CFC during crisis and hostilities.

While these forces had remained under the command of ROK the entire time since 1950, they were now officially under the control of the ROK Government during Armistice, minus the Combined Delegated Authority (CODA) linkages to designated ROK forces retained by CFC.[65] Thereafter, ROK JCS was responsible for the day-to-day security of the ROK. CFC was now in overwatch, prepared to assume the combined defense mission should the need arise.

The control over ROK forces by other than ROK Government national entities became an emotionally charged political issue by the late 1980s due to whipped up public perceptions of continued foreign domination by the U.S. with its appointed Commander of CFC. While the Korean domestic political rhetoric asserted the ROK was not fully sovereign, the actual control exercised by CFC and U.S. officers working on the CFC staff over ROK forces by the late 1980s and early 1990s was rather limited to senior ROK FO/GOs down to the Corps level, and relied more on ROK acceptance and compliance, than compulsion.[66] Anyone that has functioned in a multinational command setting understands that operational control is vastly more limited over foreign forces than one's own national forces. An undated, internal CFC staff document from the period explained the genesis of CODA and how the actual control exercised over ROK forces by CFC in the early 1990s was just rebranded under the CODA rubric to accommodate ROK political sensitivities.[67]

For most of ROK JCS' existence and since USFK's inception, both have been supporting commands to either UNC or CFC. However, starting in late 2002 the Alliance pursued alternative defense concepts. Agreement was reached in 2006 to modify the post-1978 foundational concept of an integrated, combined defense under CFC to a parallel, combined defense with a ROK JCS supported command and a redesignated USFK, Korea Command (KORCOM) supporting command. An implementation target date was set for 2012, then later adjusted to 2015.[68]

To get ROK JCS and USFK prepared to perform their operational theater-level warfighting headquarters missions, they were empowered incrementally at the expense of CFC.[69] However, due to several factors the Alliance reversed course in 2013, returning to an integrated, combined defense transformational concept.[70] It was agreed that an improved CFC-like command would be formed

sometime in the middle 2020s, but with an increased ROK role than is present in today's CFC. Despite the fundamental concept change in 2013 and major slippage in the expected implementation date, the ROK JCS and USFK modifications had not been reversed, at least as of 2016.[71]

Evolution of U.S. Affiliated Theater Commands



Source: Created by Author.

FECOM / SCAP Headquarters, 1948



Source: Recreation by Author from Organization of General Headquarters, Far East Command and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.[72]

FECOM / SCAP Organizational Structure, June 25, 1950



Source: Headquarters Army Forces Far East / Eighth Army (Rear), ***The Far East Command, 1 January 1947 – 30 June 1957,*** **(Camp Zama, Japan: Office of Military History, Headquarters AFFE / Eighth Army (Rear), June 30, 1957), 14.**

UNC Organizational Structure, August 31, 1950



Source: Adapted by author from multiple sources.[73]

General Headquarters, UNC, September 15, 1950



Source: Adapted by author from UNC General Order 14, October 11, 1950.

FECOM / UNC Headquarters, January 1951



* CINC FECOM retained command of AFFE, while CINC UNC designated Eighth Army as its ARFOR in Korea; FECOM (and UNC) staff served as AFFE staff. For about five months in late 1950, early 1951 X Corps operated separately from Eighth Army, reporting directly to UNC (FECOM & AFFE).

Source: Created by Author using diagram in Evolution of a Theater of Operations Headquarters, 1941-1967, Combat Operations Research Group Memorandum 318 as a model.[74]

FECOM / UNC Headquarters, January 1953



* CINC FECOM retained command of AFFE, while Eighth Army continued to act as the ARFOR in Korea for CINC UNC; the COMMZ relieved Eighth Army of its rear area responsibilities on the Korean Peninsula, but still nominally served under Eighth Army.

Source: Recreation by Author from diagram in Evolution of a Theater of Operations Headquarters, 1941-1967, Combat Operations Research Group Memorandum 318.[75]

FECOM / UNC Headquarters, November 1954



Source: Created by Author using diagram in Evolution of a Theater of Operations Headquarters, 1941-1967, Combat Operations Research Group Memorandum 318 as a model.[76]

FECOM / UNC Organizational Structure, 1957



Source: HQ AFFE / Eighth Army (Rear), ***The Far East Command, 1947-1957*****, 58.**

UNC / USFK / Eighth Army Tri-Command Headquarters, 1974



Source: UNC, USFK & Eighth Army Annual Historical Report, 1974.

USFK / Eighth Army Headquarters, 1979



Source: USFK & Eighth Army Annual Historical Report, 1979.[77]

CFC / UNC Headquarters, 1979



Source: Created by Author from multiple sources.[78]

CFC / UNC / USFK Headquarters, 1995



Source: Created by Author from multiple sources.[79]

Manpower Management Background.

Manpower, rather than operational requirements, drive force structure. Manpower availability is perhaps the greatest single influence on how force structure planners design and refine headquarters organizational design over time. Planners are resourced informed when establishing new organizations, which guides how they conceptualize the arrangement of resources to operational requirements. Requirements without the requisite resources are mitigated, economized, curtailed, deferred, or dropped based on their importance to the overall mission. Manpower's sway on the organization and design of a headquarters is best viewed over time as manpower budgeteers and operators clash whether efficiency or effectiveness is the more important quality. Manpower management on the Korean Peninsula since 1950 offers matchless insights to future planners for the influence of manpower resources on theater-level headquarters organization over time.

From 1950-1978 manpower management was a national task. U.S. manpower challenges were internal, and for the most part ROK manpower challenges were up to the Koreans to address.[80] United States involvement in ROK manpower decisions was two-fold. First, and perhaps most importantly, the ROK Government allowed the United States to approve the overall ROK force structure in exchange for continued U.S. Government financing of military aid. Secondly, the U.S. military leadership in Korea approved the senior officer assignment slate as part of the operational control arrangement with the ROK Government. The United States maintained its theater-level structure (USFK and UNC) distinct from the ROK (ROK JCS).[81] The ROK theater headquarters provided forces to the U.S. led UNC. ROK JCS focus through 1978 was predominantly on its man, train, equipping, mobilization and marshal law function responsibilities for the ROK Armed Forces. On the whole, manpower resources were insufficient to accommodate the operational requirements of the theater commands.

For the United States, the solution to its manpower shortfalls was to merge theater headquarters (UNC with FECOM and later UNC with USFK), and multi-hat personnel across the commands. When manpower shortfalls proved insurmountable, which was often, the solution required for the theater headquarters to absorb the ground / land component and its responsibilities. Air and naval components

remained relatively immune to this economizing measure because these components have historically leveraged the numbered air forces and fleets.

ROK manpower shortfalls from 1950 onwards were less influenced by aggregate manpower shortfalls than by resourcing its higher headquarters with trained manpower. For most of its history the ROK Armed Forces struggled to resource its Division and higher headquarters with skilled and experienced manpower to perform both command and staff functions. During the Korean War, the ROK Army first had to reconstitute its losses from the early days of the war and subsequent combat operations, then it had to expand to ten divisions, then twelve, and finally by 1956 to twenty active Army divisions, one Marine division, and ten reserve divisions. Such a rapid force structure expansion over such a short period of time severely strained ROK manpower capacity, but was further exacerbated by the addition of Corps and Field Army level headquarters to the force structure. Experience was a commodity in short supply for the ROK Army well into the 1960s.

However, ROK expeditionary deployments to the Republic of Vietnam from 1964-1973, combined with the significant border skirmishes along the Demilitarized Zone in 1966-1969, and the evolution of the ROK / U.S. security relationship after 1968 dramatically increased the skills, experience and proficiency level of leaders within the ROK Armed Forces.[82] While operational and strategic planning shortfalls remained a major shortcoming in the 1970s, ROK service members assigned to CFC after 1978 gradually addressed this over time.

The Sending States manpower challenges were negligible following their large-scale departure after the Armistice. Many Sending State Governments were strongly influenced by both competing demands elsewhere and lack of interest. As discussed previously, the Sending States forces were largely withdrawn by 1957, with only residual forces retained by a handful of countries. By 1979 only five of the original twenty Sending States remained active with the UNC.[83] Furthermore, Sending State personnel were no longer a part of the UNC headquarters staff after 1956, and even then it was only the one GO/FO from the United Kingdom representing the British Commonwealth.[84] The Sending State sum total involvement in the UNC headquarters being their accredited liaison detachments and rotational senior

liaison representative support to the UNC Military Armistice Commission (MAC) delegation.[85] These liaison detachments were, as a rule, drawn from the military delegations assigned to their in-country embassy, so there was little issue of liaison detachments being a significant manpower challenge for Sending States to overcome.

After 1978, manpower management challenges increased for the United States and the ROK. Both parties now had to synchronize their manpower activities in support of CFC, in addition to supporting their national requirements. CFC was to be a partnership. Therefore, CFC force structure was constrained by a roughly 50-50 manpower performance parameter, meaning that force structure was limited by both nations being able to provide near equal manpower resources.[86] If one party could not provide the requisite people, then the effort was mitigated, economized, curtailed, deferred, or dropped.

A clear example of this occurred in 1978 as both the United States and ROK possessed insufficient manpower to resource a stand-alone CFC GCC. The solution was to economize, mitigate and defer the requirement. A stand-alone CFC GCC would be deferred until such time it could be properly resourced. The decision was mitigated by leveraging the capabilities inherent in the I Corps (ROK / U.S.) Group and FROKA to perform lower spectrum GCC duties.[87] The decision not to resource a stand-alone GCC was further mitigated at the Theater level by economizing available manpower by dual-hatting the CFC staff to simultaneously perform GCC duties, and having the CFC staff focus on higher spectrum GCC duties incapable of being performed by the I Corps (ROK / U.S.) Group and FROKA. These higher spectrum duties included the very important task of providing unity of command by directing, prioritizing, and synchronizing the land campaign, thereby avoiding a repeat of the fall 1950 Eighth Army – X Corps unity of command issue.

In 1978 U.S. staffing of CFC headquarters largely resulted from re-designating personnel from the UNC to the CFC. ROK CFC staffing was pulled in from across their Armed Forces and from redesignating the ROK detachment in the ROK / U.S. Operational Planning Staff.[88] UNC missions and functions were retained in their entirety, reduced in scope, or transferred completely to CFC. A deliberate decision was made in 1978 not to provide a dedicated staff to the UNC, outside the UNC MAC

delegation, its supporting Secretariat, and the UNC Rear headquarters in Japan.[89] Instead, the thinking was to designate select key leaders from CFC to serve as a pool of experts to the UNC Commander, so that as the key leadership within CFC conducted their Alliance duties they would simultaneously incorporate UNC interests into decision-making and operations.[90] U.S. service members within CFC also retained assigned and informal duties within the co-located USFK and/or Eighth Army headquarters.

Moreover, as part of CFC's development and establishment process, the United States and ROK bilaterally developed an Organization and Functions Manual (O&FM) to define the command's structure, staff functions, along with their respective responsibilities. The document was combined with the UNC O&FM after 1979.[91] The collective CFC and UNC O&FM was bilaterally refined periodically throughout the first two decades following the 1978 UNC to CFC defense responsibility transition.[92] However, the information on the UNC staff within these O&FM documents was sparse up until the last published iteration of the document in 1997.[93] The earlier, pre-1997 O&FM versions sparse contents on UNC visibly underscores just how little emphasis the designated UNC headquarters staff members placed on UNC matters over this nearly 20 year period. This most recent version of the combined CFC and UNC O&FM is outdated, however it serves as an important record for how the two commands were organized in the late 1990s.

A combined manning document was also bilaterally developed by the United States and ROK for the staffing of the CFC headquarters.[94] It is important to highlight that the combined manning document was not authoritative as a resourcing document on both parties as a manpower document typically is. Instead, it served as a useful tool for the two countries to collectively agree upon, and document, what each nation contributed to the CFC headquarters. Ultimately, each nation maintained separate resourcing mechanisms to provide their manpower to the CFC.

The combined manning document was officially maintained by the United States as part of its manpower activities, serving as an authorization document for U.S. personnel, while coding ROK personnel within the CFC staff as unfunded positions.[95] The ROK maintained a separate authorization

document for their use in assigning personnel to the CFC, however this ROK document was matched to the combined manning document maintained by the United States.

The ROK Government began to seriously reconsider its long-standing policy of delegating operational control over its forces after 1987.[96] In particular, the security umbrella for the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics was provided by CFC, which publicly highlighted the issue of operational control over the majority of the ROK Armed Forces as both a political and military issue for the country. Discussions intensified between the two Alliance partners, amplified by the ROK media, public opinion and internal ROK politics. Preparations began, which set in motion the conditions for the eventual ROK Government decision to fully withdraw bilateral CFC control over the majority of the ROK Armed Forces during Armistice. By leveraging the experience gained in more than a decade of manning CFC, plans and operations within ROK JCS were strengthened leading up to the 1994 resumption of operational control during the Armistice period.

After 1992, U.S. service members were for the most part double, triple and quadruple-hatted amongst CFC, CFC GCC, UNC and USFK. On paper some U.S. service members retained stand-alone duties to only USFK or to CFC, however in practice their triple or quadruple-hatted GO/FO bosses used their personnel as needed. So it was not uncommon for USFK-only staff to work CFC Alliance issues, nor for CFC-only U.S. service members to be pulled into USFK work. Eighth Army manpower was on the whole separate and distinct from direct duty linkages to theater level headquarters, outside of the Eighth Army Commander and some special staff.

There was little change in how ROK manpower was organized after 1992. ROK JCS and CFC remained separate, geographically and with regard to manpower. ROK dual and triple-hatting remained restricted to the handful of CFC officers appointed to UNC and the dual-hatted CFC / CFC GCC service members. Although, after 1992, ROK CFC service member interest did shift to providing more focus on CFC GCC affairs. This shift in added focus was a direct result of CFC GCC having a ROK O-10 GO/FO now in command. In contrast, U.S. service member interest in CFC GCC duties declined now that their U.S. O-10 FO/GO boss no longer was directly involved in the command's day-to-day management.

Following the UNC Sending State exodus in the 1970s a few UN member nations started returning to active involvement in the mid-1980s when they began re-accrediting their liaison delegations to the UNC headquarters.[97] By 1990 eight UNC Sending States were active in the UNC headquarters on the Korean Peninsula, while there were ten Sending States active in Japan with the UNC Rear headquarters.[98] Sending States continued to return to the UNC headquarters in the ROK throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, with not just the re-accrediting of liaison delegations, but also their participation in regular meetings with the UNC by both the liaison delegations and their resident Ambassadors. The last Sending State to return to active involvement, which was Italy, occurred in 2013.[99] While the reasons for the return of Sending State interest are multi-faceted, the impressive economic growth by the ROK is likely to have spurred individual and collective Sending State interest in becoming more involved on the Korean Peninsula. Collectively the United States and ROK have accommodated renewed interest by the Sending States, however, progress has been slow and incremental.

The United States has been inclined to be more open to increased Sending State involvement in UNC matters and to broaden the collective Sending State's working relationship with CFC and ROK / U.S. Alliance affairs based on its far ranging multinational experiences. The ROK on the other hand is somewhat more cautious, preferring to bilaterally develop relations with the individual Sending States, vice embracing them as a group. Some Alliance managers have suggested that the ROK approach is driven out of a concern that ROK interests will be more difficult to protect in a wider multilateral (UNC) forum, while other Alliance managers have pointed out that the ROK Government has varying degrees of trust in some of the Sending States due to their diplomatic and economic relationships with the DPRK. For the most part, Sending State involvement through UNC in CFC Alliance affairs have remained limited.[100]

It must also be stated that the renewed Sending State interest had self-imposed limitations, which directly affected their prospects for increased involvement on the Korean Peninsula. For example, beyond rhetorical platitudes, no Sending State is known to have approached the United States or the ROK Governments with a standing force list that UNC or Alliance planners could count on in crisis or

hostilities. Sending State personnel support and manpower requirements largely remained limited to the liaison delegations, although there were exceptions. Some Sending States (New Zealand, Canada, etc) began providing embedded liaison support to the UNC MAC Secretariat after 2004, with one (Canada) providing an embedded liaison team within the UNC headquarters after 2011. It wasn't until after 2015 that two Sending States concluded agreements with the United States to provide exchange officers to the UNC headquarters staff, replicating the 1952-1956 arrangement of a FO/GO from the United Kingdom being incorporated into the staff. Additional details on the contemporary Sending State augmentation of UNC is addressed in Part II, within the UNC Headquarters section.

Starting in late 2002, first under the Future of the Alliance (FOTA) and then later under the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) rubrics, the United States and ROK embarked on a pathway to jointly develop a common framework to "modernize, strengthen and transform" the Alliance.[101] By 2007-2008 a fairly well constructed future was bilaterally underway whereby the Alliance would transition from an integrated, combined defense to a parallel, combined defense operating construct.[102] From all available evidence the U.S. force developers were making the requisite synchronized adjustments to see this change through. A part of this transition required the abandonment of a combined manning document for the CFC headquarters, since CFC was projected to be dissolved within the next several years. The United States then began the process of realigning its manpower from CFC to its unilateral operational command, as part of the USFK to KORCOM transition, which is discussed in more detail later.

Throughout all these institutional and operational construct changes, manpower management activities largely kept pace until the 2008-2009 timeframe. Multiple, serious crisis events in 2010 and afterward have resulted in both delays and bold shifts in the planned operating construct. The force development community was not able to keep pace with the delays and post-2010 changes, resulting in an ad hoc and unsynchronized personnel activity environment present in 2016.

In early 2016 the CFC and UNC leadership made a collective decision to separately update their O&FMs, ceasing the historical practice of combining the documents. The UNC leadership initiated a cross-staff effort to immediately update the UNC O&FM with a final draft completed by mid-2017. The

CFC leadership however deferred the decision to update the CFC O&FM for the present, and focus efforts on other initiatives, including the ongoing Alliance Transformation efforts. A CFC O&FM may be developed in the future, however there are indications that the CFC leadership may defer this CFC O&FM update as it may be more prudent to dedicate the staff's organizational energy toward Alliance transformational work in lieu of updating the CFC O&FM.[103]

The manpower system has struggled to remain synchronized with operationally supporting the theater level architecture in the last decade, because requirement and authorization document changes require a significant amount of work and verity to execute. Small changes require more than a year to enact. Bold shifts involve dedicated, multi-year commitments.[104] When faced with an uncertain future, force developers will pause and wait for fidelity before embarking on major projects. Personnel and leadership turn-over within the U.S. and ROK staff has exacerbated continuity of effort to see changes through.[105]

PART II:

Theater Headquarters Organization

Theater Headquarters Staff Organization

The four theater commands in Korea are organized along the lines of the cross-functional Joint Force Headquarters organization outlined in U.S. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*. USFK and ROK JCS refer to their functional staff directorates using the "J-staff" nomenclature to denote their unilateral joint (multi-service) composition. The CFC headquarters refers to its staff sections by a "C-staff" designation to indicate it is a combined (integrated, bi-national) staff. The UNC refers to its staff sections as the "U-staff" to convey the UNC's nominal linkages to the UN and the UN Security Council Resolutions which led the United States to establish the command. While labeled a U-staff, it is largely configured structurally to the CFC C-staff where it draws the majority of its manpower. However, in spite of its linkages to C-staff structure and manpower, in practice the U-staff is largely a U.S. J-staff. The UNC headquarters almost exclusively relies on the U.S. provided manpower in the daily execution of its mission even though there is a sizable multinational presence. Additional details are addressed later in Part II, within the UNC Headquarters section.

All four commands are roughly organized similarly with only the J / C / U designation to distinguish them.[106] So for example, the respective J1, C1 and U1 of the four commands signify they perform "manpower and personnel" functions, while the respective J4, C4 and U4 perform "logistics" or "sustainment" functions. ROK JCS has been consistent in utilizing the J-staff designation, while the J / C / U designations within USFK, CFC and UNC were not always so clean, and are a relatively recent phenomenon. For example, the UNC staff used to refer to themselves by J-staff designations from the early 1950s through 1978. After 1978, the CFC staff used C-staff designations when performing both CFC and UNC work, with only the UNC Commander continuing to use a UNC title, where appropriate. The single USFK and Eighth Army headquarters staff used J-staff designations from 1978 through 1992. A J and C staff designation breakout was utilized after 1992 within the CFC, UNC, and USFK footprint to denote USFK staff actions from CFC and UNC staff actions. The contemporary J / C / U staff designations common in 2016 did not come about until after 1999, when the UNC staff started being

assigned to specific UNC positions, necessitating additional distinctions within the CFC, UNC, and USFK workplace.

In 2016, three of the theater commands were co-located – USFK, CFC and UNC. The fourth, ROK JCS, operated independently nearby. On the whole, USFK, CFC and UNC share the same office space, with some national compartmentalization space retained for the respective NCEs.[107] The co-location of CFC, UNC and USFK was driven by the need to economize manpower resources. Manpower activities were economized by appointing large numbers of personnel to simultaneously perform duty to more than one command. Regardless of the frequency with which multi-hatting occurs, each command retains varying levels of independent staffing. While USFK, CFC and UNC are co-located and in many cases share the same staff, they remain legally distinct, independent commands with clear responsibilities, authorities, and communications channels.

Within the co-located USFK, CFC and UNC headquarters footprint, usage of a J / C / U lexicon comes into greater use by the co-located and shared staff. The J / C / U distinction, either separately or in some form of combination, indicates the respective command roles an office or individual represents. For example, a single workspace might include staff members from the UNC, CFC, USFK and CFC GCC. Not everyone in the shared office is assigned or appointed for duty to all of the commands. Furthermore, leaders within the shared office space might be assigned or appointed to different leadership positions within those commands, or the chain of command within an office space might be relatively uniform.

As an example, the Assistant Chief of Staff (ACoS) / Director, or senior officer, within the USFK J4 is a U.S. O-7 (one star) GO/FO.[108] Meanwhile, the ACoS within the CFC C4 and the UNC U4 is a ROK O-8 (two star) GO/FO, with the aforementioned U.S. O-7 GO/FO appointed as the Deputy ACoS to both commands. One can clearly visualize how this operating environment will, at times, result in confusion by elements within the staff as to who is in charge throughout the routine work day or during a crisis as the respective command's roles and missions begin to overlap and intersect. While a bifurcated operating construct is in place across a number of USFK, CFC and UNC primary staff sections and subordinate directorates within the theater command environment, there are a number of staff sections with relatively

uniform hierarchical structures within the consolidated footprint, such as the J3 / C3 / U3 and the J5 / C5 / U5. In these two groupings of staff sections, they both have a single individual that is either assigned or appointed to the ACoS position, resulting in more central direction and unity of effort.[109]

ROK JCS headquarters is in many regards an outlier to the other three theater commands when examining the theater command landscape on the Korean Peninsula. It possesses similar structural lines and familiarity to USFK, CFC and UNC, yet it is in many aspects is uniquely organized to reflect its national-level responsibilities. In particular, the ROK JCS retains far more robust force development, mobilization and martial law structure to enable the ROK Government to convert its latent national strength into hard military power should the need arise. ROK JCS structure becomes important to understand in its present form, as the United States and ROK are undergoing transformational discussions to replace CFC. Admittedly, additional scholarship is required to better understand ROK JCS' organizational design and structure, internal staffing mechanisms (particularly in crisis), systemic leadership dynamics, and how it synchronizes efforts within the headquarters across its disparate mission set. This will be critically important when any future Alliance control and command node is being developed, particularly as ROK JCS is likely to significantly increase its Alliance and multinational responsibilities all the while it continues to manages its existing large mission portfolio.[110]

The CFC Headquarters.

CFC serves as the operational, theater-level headquarters for the ROK / U.S. Alliance. CFC has standing component and functional commands assigned, but presently does not have any forces under its operational control during the Armistice period. The headquarters is organized along the lines of the cross-functional Joint Force Headquarters organization system, with separate directorates for personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, etc. In addition, the headquarters also maintains personal and special staff in support of the command group.

The headquarters is structurally designed as an integrated command as outlined in U.S. JP 3-16, staffed near-equally by personnel from the United States and the ROK. For the most part, most staff sections within CFC are near-equally staffed. While both nations aspire to resource CFC directorates to the same degree, there are some areas within the command where one nation provides disproportionately more manpower than the other. Perhaps the best example of this is in the Engineer Directorate, which is predominantly staffed by ROK service members, with only token U.S. presence. Unbalanced staffing, where it occurs, does result in some negative downstream effects over time, namely lack of visibility by the CFC leadership into some core command functions.

It is important to note that unless both nations furnish service members to a staff entity, it cannot be considered an element within CFC. There are some isolated cases in which USFK staff have been utilized in an Alliance capacity. However, without bona fide ROK staff within a section, they are not CFC, despite what service members within the USFK staff may think. A clear example of this is the USFK Commander's Initiatives Group (CIG). The USFK CIG has routinely provided support to the CFC Commander as an extension of providing support to the SUSMOAK. In spite of this, the CIG remains part of USFK due to the absence of assigned Korean military personnel.

Leadership positions are designated throughout the staff in an alternating manner to reflect the binational character of the command, meaning that a commander, director, or chief position is appointed by one nation, while the deputy position is appointed by the other nation. This alternating staffing arrangement is purposeful to ensure that both nation's interests are represented in staff actions and

command decisions. There is, however, one limitation of the alternating staffing arrangement. Under certain circumstances, mostly due to leadership failures, the alternating staffing arrangement allows for an easy pathway for the staff to default along national lines.

CFC Headquarters Staff Diagram



Source: Created by Author from multiple sources.[111]

The CFC headquarters structure has not remained static since it was created, having been modified several times over the years. Lessons learned, individual agency by senior leaders, and the integration of the USFK staff into the CFC headquarters footprint have driven many of the structural changes. For the most part structure has been added along the margins, with the basic functional structure retained since 1978. Examples of structure growth over the years include the addition of a surgeon's office, a provost marshal office, and a strategic communications division. [112]

Some structural changes involved moving divisions around within the directorates or breaking apart divisions. Examples of these cross-staff changes include the transfer of the civil affairs division from the C5 to the C3, and the splitting of the policy and strategy division into separate policy and strategy divisions. However, in a few isolated cases structure was divested from CFC structure and returned to the national commands, such as the Financial Management section, which was maintained within the C5 for over 20 years.[113]

Some functions typically resident within theater level headquarters are not present in CFC structure, such as force development, resourcing, or extended deterrence capabilities. Instead, these functions are maintained within the respective national level architectures (ROK JCS and USFK with reach-back to United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and the U.S. functional combatant commands), which CFC leverages as required. A prime example is CFC does not maintain a C8 to perform force structure support, instead relying on the USFK J8 and the ROK JCS Strategic Planning Directorate and Combined Defense Transformation Group (CDTG) for support.

The CFC, UNC, USFK and CFC GCC headquarters are co-located together, sharing much of the same staff. The UNC and CFC GCC headquarters were co-located within the CFC headquarters footprint by design when CFC was established in 1978. Later, in 1992, the USFK headquarters was formally incorporated into the CFC footprint when the United States reorganized its forces in Korea. The arrangement has functioned adequately, however there are challenges that do manifest periodically, particularly in times of tension when the organizational design is stressed.

Manpower shortfalls necessitated the combining of the CFC and CFC GCC headquarters staffs in 1978. Multiple attempts have been made in the decades since to resource a standalone CFC GCC, however these attempts have repeatedly failed.[114] That being said, the ROK military has been able to resource the CFC GCC with additional full-time cadre, operating both independent of and in concert with the dual-hatted CFC / GCC staff.

The majority of the UNC staff is appointed for duty from the CFC staff per the CFC Activation Committee recommendations and a 1979 exchange of letters between the members of the Military Committee's Permanent Session. Although manpower shortfalls in 1978 were a significant driver of the staffing arrangement during the UNC / CFC mission transfer, there were other factors which also shaped this decision. Additional clarifying details on the CFC / UNC staffing arrangement are included within the Part II UNC Headquarters section.

U.S. staffing of CFC can be generally characterized as fluid, in that it involves many ad hoc practices during the manpower to personnel activities transition. By contemporary design, virtually all U.S. personnel assigned to perform duties at the theater level are assigned to USFK. U.S. interests within CFC are met by detaching select personnel for duty to CFC.[115] However, in practice the U.S. methodology for personnel staffing at the theater-level is USFK = CFC = UNC. For whether one is exclusively assigned to a USFK-coded position or they are detached for duty to CFC and/or UNC, all U.S. personnel support whichever headquarters requires U.S. interests to be represented. This methodology manifests itself because senior U.S. leaders are for the most part simultaneously appointed to all three of these commands. Now and again, this methodology can cause confusion in that service members on the staff may not fully grasp, or they become confused, as to what their exact duties are at a given moment.[116] Additional details on how this staffing arrangement operated can be found in Part III.

While this economizing of manpower resources is beneficial for surging skills and experience to a specific command, it can be problematic. Difficulties arise when one command's authorities, imperatives, and communication channels bleed into another command's domain. When this does occur, it is inappropriate, for a command lacks the authority for actions it is commissioning. This commingling of

command authorities also results in confusion by allies and partners, such as the ROK service members in CFC and those in ROK JCS. These difficulties can also extend into U.S. channels off the Korean Peninsula to USINDOPACOM, U.S. Joint Staff and into the Department of Defense. In some cases these off-peninsula organizations find it difficult to distinguish which command capacity a U.S. service member is performing at the time, or they commingle USFK, CFC, and UNC by not treating them as legally separate commands.[117] Furthermore, in certain crisis situations the CFC staff can be collectively surged to support one command's imperatives, at the expense of the others. When done, it leaves gaps between the respective theater level commands and the common goal to achieve unity of effort and synchronization.

The core of the issue comes down to one viewing the SUSMOAK (or his staff) and his appointed commands through the lens of him as an individual, instead of considering the SUSMOAK through his appointed positions. When viewed as an individual, "I'm going to send a note to General X," leaders and organizations begin heading down the slippery slope of commingling the SUSMOAK's command authorities, and by default, putting the onus on him and his staff to negotiate and bin the dispatch's contents into guidance or communication. When authorized communication channels are circumvented, "guidance" is without authority, becoming nothing more than an "exchange of ideas". One example is the U.S. geographical combatant command, USINDOPACOM, which has direct liaison authority with both UNC and CFC, but command authority over USFK. Despite the USINDOPACOM Commander's Combatant Command and Military Committee capacities, any USINDOPACOM "guidance" issued to the SUSMOAK is authoritative only within his USFK command capacity. Likewise, any direct U.S. or ROK national authority communication to the CFC Commander lacks authority unless the communication is bilateral and is passed through the Military Committee.

On the other hand ROK staffing of CFC is relatively static, in that personnel are for the most part singularly focused on performing their CFC functions. While these ROK CFC personnel do place some attention on their CFC GCC duties, there are several reasons why they are able to focus on CFC vice GCC duties. These include the fact that both CFC and GCC do not have forces assigned during

Armistice, the ROK has resourced a separate stand-alone cadre for the GCC staff, and the burden of detailed operational ground planning (during Armistice) mostly resides with the forward ROK Field Armies.[118] The ROK CFC staff also suffers the same affliction as their U.S. counterparts, in that they sometimes default along national lines within the headquarters, and defer to (or are slide-lined by) their counterparts within ROK JCS and the ROK Ministry of National Defense.[119]

In theory, integrated commands such as CFC operate cohesively with all staff work conducted in a combined fashion. In practice they do not. Typically, multinational headquarters operate in both a co-located and in a combined approach. While this reality does not match the rhetoric typically used to describe multinational commands, this is not necessarily a malignant feature of how they operate. This facet of how multinational commands operate becomes harmful when the leadership allows the staff to demarcate too much along national lines.[120] Plans and operations are the core functions performed by military headquarters. Therefore, it is predominantly within these realms that bilaterally-developed, combined activities are created, promulgated and executed within multinational headquarters such as CFC. Combined labor does occur amongst the rest of the staff, however it is the exception more than a rule.

Most of the CFC headquarters operates co-located vice in a combined fashion. This is because the majority of the staff as outlined above performs inherently national level activities such as personnel service support, national level intelligence functions, logistics, communications, legal affairs, resourcing (fiscal management), etc. Co-located staff achieve a combined effect for the command by performing their respective national activities, sharing information, and synchronizing / fusing their separate efforts together. As an example, while great strides in binational intelligence fusion have occurred within CFC since it was established, the intelligence domain is still largely shrouded behind nationally compartmentalized firewalls. Even exclusively unilateral functions with little relevance to the other multinational partner(s) can contribute to the proper functioning of an integrated command as it might be a niche capability that only one partner possesses or the action performed allows one member nation's staff to optimally operate.

To be fair, some of CFC's mission and functions have been reduced over the last 20 years and assumed by ROK JCS. Since late 1994, day-to-day security of the ROK has been predominantly the domain of ROK JCS, with CFC in over-watch. CFC's day-to-day focus is on monitoring the security environment and preparing to assume the defense mission from ROK JCS.

Starting in the mid-2000s, the United States and ROK bilaterally agreed to transition from a combined defense under CFC to a ROK in the lead defense utilizing a parallel, combined defense construct. In this parallel construct, the ROK JCS would be the theater command directing the ROK defense throughout all phases from Armistice through hostilities, and into a post-conflict. The U.S. would support the ROK defense through a unilateral U.S. command, parallel to, but not subordinate to ROK JCS.[121] The envisioned U.S. command was a reorganized and redesignated USFK headquarters referred to as KORCOM. The KORCOM naming convention has since been abandoned in favor of retaining USFK.

It is important to note that despite the concept change from an integrated to a parallel combined defense construct, the lines between the United States and ROK forces were not so distinct as often publicly portrayed. First, despite maintaining separate theater headquarters, the two countries were still planning on maintaining combined air, amphibious and combatting weapons of mass destruction operations. These combined operations were slated to be under the control of U.S. GO/FOs.[122] Second, the proven Military Committee structure was to be retained.[123] Under the parallel command construct unified higher level operational and strategic guidance and direction to the national commands would still come from the Military Committee, while synchronization at the tactical and operational level would occur within the military coordination center.[124]

Since this effort began in 2002, ROK JCS has been empowered with additional authorities and responsibilities to prepare it for the mission transfer from CFC. The mission transfer was originally scheduled for 2012, delayed to 2015, and then abandoned in favor of pursuing an integrated, combined defense construct similar to CFC. Likewise, USFK was also empowered in preparation for an independent, supporting U.S. role in the defense of the ROK.[125] Even though the parallel pathway to an

operationally co-equal ROK JCS and USFK was abandoned, the transfer of CFC functions to ROK JCS and USFK were not revisited, nor reversed. The result, CFC duties were reduced in scope, magnitude and overall importance for more than a decade.

The USFK Headquarters.

USFK is a subordinate unified command for USINDOPACOM, which serves as the organizational foundation for U.S. forces within the ROK, including United States support to combined and lead nation activities on the Korean Peninsula. It serves in this capacity by performing all national support functions to meet U.S. interests, and provides support to U.S. bilateral CFC and multilateral UNC obligations. USFK has designated service component commands, with varying degrees of control over forces stationed and visiting the Korean Peninsula.[126]

The USFK headquarters is organized along the lines of the cross-functional Joint Force Headquarters organization. The headquarters maintains separate directorates for personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, etc. Additionally, the headquarters also maintains personal and special staff in support of the command group, which the command group leverages to support their other appointed duties.

In many regards the headquarters structure mirrors CFC's structure. This has occurred over time, particularly after USFK was absorbed into the CFC footprint since 1992. Each successive SUSMOAK since 1978 has leveraged USFK in varying capacities to support CFC and UNC. In some cases this resulted in USFK manpower being appointed duties in CFC, with CFC adding structure to accommodate the addition of USFK capabilities bleeding into CFC affairs. The United States has also been engaged in near continuous joint and combined multinational operations since the early 1990s, with multiple lessons from these experiences resulting in structure changes within both USFK, and eventually CFC.

USFK Headquarters Staff Diagram



Source: Constructed by author from information contained on the USFK Homepage, "Organization" tab, http://www.usfk.mil/Organization/ (accessed November 16, 2016).[127]

A close examination of the USFK and CFC headquarters structure will identify many similarities in how they are organized. This is primarily a result of two factors: first and foremost, U.S. joint doctrine has served as the organizational foundation of CFC since its establishment. Changes to CFC structure required bilateral concurrence, which slowed some organizational change, which leads to the second contributing factor. Since 1992, USFK and CFC have been co-located, resulting in the acceleration, largely through osmosis, of USFK force structure being adopted by CFC.

However, despite the similarities there are a few notable differences. Some of these difference are easily identifiable when comparing staff diagrams, while others are not. For example, the USFK Commander has a CIG, a SOFA Division, and a Transformation and Restationing Division assigned. Additionally, USFK maintains a J8 (Capabilities and Resources Directorate), which handles financial management and force structure functions for the command. While these directorates are not resident within CFC's structure, they do provide support, as required, to United States interests in CFC.

The overwhelming majority of U.S. personnel assigned for duties to theater commands in the ROK are assigned to the USFK J-staff.[128] Many are subsequently attached for duty to CFC C-staff (and the CFC GCC staff). Of those attached for duty to the CFC some are also appointed for duty to the UNC staff (from CFC). A few select USFK staff members are appointed directly to the UNC U-staff from USFK positions. Other USFK personnel are not detached for other duties and exclusively perform duty on the J-staff. However, despite the assigned duties, the majority of U.S. personnel assigned to theater duties devote the bulk of their energies to USFK projects.

As previously mentioned, militaries typically economize administrative and logistical shortfalls in multilateral environments by simultaneously appointing personnel, leaders in particular, to more than one duty position. The United States is no different, and in fact has become quite adept at this practice. Although, it can be argued that the United States has taken it to the extreme in certain situations where a single individual has six, seven or eight different command responsibilities assigned.[129] Some duty appointments exceed all but the truly exceptional to possess the capacity to simultaneously switch

between their duties on a daily basis, and more importantly to devote the requisite personal energy in a crisis when competing imperatives and interests collide.

There are numerous examples of how assigned or appointed duties can perhaps exceed the human capability to perform within the USFK, UNC and CFC architecture. The root of the problem lies in a single individual possessing too many responsibilities requiring his/her physical presence to suitably perform the assigned duties. Presence is exacerbated by conflicting (or deficient) authorities, multiple reporting channels, and an absence of synchronized (or confusing) priorities from the respective higher headquarters. Two rather clear examples whereby senior officers *may* have been appointed beyond the typical human capacity to adequately perform during a serious crisis environment are the two U.S. O-9 GO/FOs stationed in Korea:

o In 2016 a U.S. Army O-9 GO/FO was simultaneously appointed or designated to the following seven duties: Commanding General, Eighth Army; Commander, USFK Army Forces (ARFOR); Commander, UNC GCC; Deputy Commander CFC GCC; Chief of Staff, USFK; Chief of Staff, CFC; and Chief of Staff, UNC.[130]

o At the same time, a U.S. Air Force O-9 GO/FO was simultaneously appointed or designated to the following six duties: Commander, Seventh Air Force; Commander, USFK Air Component; Commander, UNC Air Component; Commander, CFC Air Component; Deputy Commander, USFK; and Deputy Commander, UNC.

Arguably, many of the above appointed duties incur relatively minor obligations for the majority of the time. Despite this, it is difficult to reasonably assert that due diligence can be maintained into a serious crisis or an extended campaign. Irrespective of senior leader and their supporting staff's ability to surge and economize from an organizational energy perspective during periods of increased political and military tension, geographical considerations of a senior leader being at the right place and time to be effective point to significant challenges with the operating construct of hanging too many hats on a single individual. The incredible technological advances in the information domain over the last several decades have radically influenced the ability of senior leaders and staffs to lead, transmit and receive orders, and

federate ideas. However, at the end of the day these technology aids cannot replicate physical presence, and physical presence of a leader at the schwerpunkt, is and will forever remain king in war.

While staff, senior field grade officers (O-6, Colonels and Captains) in particular, may only be appointed to one duty (i.e. Eighth Army staff, Seventh Air Force staff, etc.) or to select multiple duties (USFK, CFC, and/or UNC staffs), the fact that their bosses have other assigned or appointed duties results in them being drawn in as a byproduct of supporting them. When this occurs it may pull them from more immediate, pressing duties to the other commands. Furthermore, whereas senior leaders are probably more equipped to comprehend and separate the necessary dynamic shifts between the respective responsibilities, authorities and communication channels of the various commands and appointed duties, this is not necessarily the case when it comes to the typical staff officer.

The UNC Headquarters.

UNC is a Unified Command established by the United States at the request of the UN Security Council in July 1950.[131] In 2016 UNC still possessed a line of authority similar to a present-day U.S. Geographic Combatant Command (COCOM), although it differed slightly in that it retained Cold War, pre-Goldwater-Nichols Act reporting constructs. UNC's command authority resides with the U.S. President, and is exercised by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, through the U.S. CJCS. The UNC is the last remaining Unified Command within the U.S. Armed Forces which utilizes the CJCS as an official conduit of operational command reporting.[132]

UNC serves as the theater-level headquarters responsible for marshalling international military support from the UNC Sending States for providing military support to the ROK, and for friendly force compliance to the Armistice Agreement. UNC is for the most part a supporting command today after it transferred responsibility for the defense of the ROK to CFC in 1978. Thereafter, UNC did retain, under special circumstances, a leading response function to address DPRK aggression during crisis situations. In special, yet undetermined and unspecified cases, to be agreed on by both the United States and the ROK at a future point in time, the UNC would be temporarily granted an operational, supported command role, to include operational control over additional, select forces.

UNC has standing component commands assigned, leveraging the already designated USFK service component commands acting in a dual-hatted capacity. Since 1978, the UNC has had token forces under its operational control, although under special circumstances as articulated above, additional forces may be delegated in crisis by the United States, the ROK and/or possibly select UNC Sending States. Such a situation, to delegate additional forces to UNC's control in crisis would likely only be done to forcibly return a serious crisis situation back to Armistice conditions. During hostilities, after the Armistice had been abrogated, UNC would likely control Sending State forces throughout the Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSO) phases of Sending State force commitments. Respective Sending State national caveats, along with agreements between the United States and ROK will ultimately determine any operational role for UNC or its control of forces beyond RSO.

In 1978 the UNC headquarters organizing concept was purposely designed for the staff to operate within the CFC headquarters architecture as a legally distinct, but adjunct staff of subject matter experts. Then, during the 1999 through 2004 period, the UNC headquarters expanded both in terms of size and how it was organized. Thereafter, UNC was for the most part functionally mirrored to the CFC headquarters structure, where it continued to draw the majority of its manpower. UNC also possessed some structural similarities to the USFK headquarters within the personal and special staff realms. UNC's unique structural design features are largely inspired by its Cold War legacy UNC organizational (Liaison Group and UNC Rear headquarters) and Armistice Agreement (UNC MAC and Secretariat) responsibilities.

In 2016 the UNC headquarters was staffed by the United States, the ROK and two UNC Sending States. Additionally, the UNC headquarters was supported by an embedded liaison team from a third Sending State, and a liaison group with accredited liaison personnel from all sixteen active Sending States. The UNC MAC delegation was staffed by representatives from the United States, the ROK, the UK, and on a rotational basis, a senior member from one of the Sending States' liaison group delegations. The UNC MAC Secretariat is staffed by the United States and supported by embedded liaison personnel from several Sending States and the ROK. The UNC Rear headquarters is staffed by the United States and two Sending States.

UNC Command and Staff Organization (Armistice), 2016



Source: Adapted from UNC Organization and Functions Manual (Final Draft), July 6, 2017.

Perhaps one of the most under-appreciated, but significant factors that shaped CFC's ability in 1978 to compensate for a much diminished UNC capability to perform its responsibilities was that one individual was simultaneously appointed to the command position at CFC and UNC. This single "commander" over the two commands was issued clear instructions and vested with the requisite authorities to both ensure friendly forces complied with the Armistice, but also had the powers to control friendly force contingency planning and day-to-day security measures. These controls were further strengthened in that the majority of the combat forces located in the ROK were placed under the CFC commander's operational control. The intertwining of UNC with CFC command leadership allowed for senior level synchronization and deconfliction between the two commands, at least as long as the two Alliance governments political and military goals remained unified.

The CFC / UNC linkage and CFC headquarters architecture foundation for the staffs was intentional and a key part of the UNC to CFC transformation in 1978.[133] Capitalizing on the single CFC and UNC commander, the two headquarters were co-located with the UNC staff operating within the CFC staff architecture.[134] The UNC MAC delegation, UNC MAC Secretariat, the Sending State Liaison Group, and the UNC Rear headquarters continued to operating separately, both functionally and geographically from the CFC staff.

Near simultaneous with the 1978 establishment of CFC, select ROK and U.S. members of the CFC staff were appointed to the UNC staff. The original post-1978 staff cadre for UNC consisted of nine individuals, including three ROK officers (CFC C2, Deputy C3 & the Deputy C5).[135] These nine CFC officers in the early post-1978 era were not aligned to a specific U-staff position. Instead, the appointments were conceived as being a pool of experts. The appointed UNC pool of experts were given the authority to utilize the CFC staff, as required, to assist the UNC Commander in fulfilling his Armistice and Unified Command duties. In concept, this methodology would ensure UNC Armistice affairs were synchronized into CFC plans and operations. In practice, this concept was problematic for after 1978 there was little interest anymore in the UNC. UNC "work" for the most part was pushed onto

the UNC MAC's supporting Secretariat, with appointed UNC headquarters staff members focused almost exclusively on their CFC duties.[136]

Since 1978, UNC as a command has been low key, often operating below the radar, and sometimes not on the radar at all. At times the UNC staff resembled more of a paper headquarters of titles than a functioning, legally separate and distinct command.[137] The UNC's supporting command mission set was also hampered by low levels of interest by the UNC Sending States well into the 1990s. Perpetual aggression by the DPRK against the ROK, and crises that followed, preserved UNC as an institution. Had it been moderately peaceful on the Korean Peninsula throughout the 1980s UNC likely would have had its colors cased.

Successive UNC Commanders since 1978 have eventually come to the realization that the UNC mission and functions both lacked focus and were under-resourced. Small, incremental staff increases occurred over time (1987, 1992, 1999 and 2004), however the UNC's staff operating concept within the CFC architecture remained the same.[138] The 1978 UNC staff appointment letter was clarified in February 1979 to include several members of the SUSMOAK's personal staff (Judge Advocate, Special Advisor, Executive Officers and Aide-de-Camp).[139] The 1987 UNC staff appointment letter revision added one officer to the UNC staff and formally codified the addition of the SUSMOAK personal staff.[140] The 1992 UNC staff appointment letter revision, for the first time specifically added two members of the USFK staff, the USFK Deputy Commander and the USFK Deputy Chief of Staff.[141] No attempt was made to separate the UNC staff from the CFC architecture.

However, the aforementioned CFC and UNC control paradigm fundamentally changed in 1994, when the ROK Government withdrew operational control of its designated forces from the CFC Commander during Armistice and placed them under their joint operational command, ROK JCS.[142] Thereafter, the single commander of UNC and CFC was left with the same responsibilities as the 1978-1994 period, but lacked the full authority within CFC to control friendly forces and comply with UNC Armistice directives. While certain measures were put in place in 1994 to mitigate the operational control change,

over time the interpretation of those mitigation measures has eroded, leaving a potentially major seam between the two Alliance partners in a serious crisis.[143]

This control seam compounds a pre-existing organizational issue within the UNC headquarters, namely that the UNC's multinational staffing arrangements are for the most part founded on informal, non-binding agreements. Reliance on liaison and appointed service members to execute directives from the U.S. Government, by staff whose loyalty legally resides with their Home Government, is problematic when U.S. interests conflict with their parent nation's interests. One only needs to ask the rhetorical question, if the UNC Commander gives one order, and the ROK or a Sending State Government another, which one does the multinational officer follow?[144] Furthermore, the absence of bona fide agreements addressing the non-foreign exchange officer (FEO) multinational staffing arrangement, also leads to issues of lack of authority for the multinational staff to perform basic staff transactions such as the "obligation and expenditure of funds; contracting for goods and services; incurring damages through negligence (in the course of official duties); entering into forces to forces agreements and committing US forces to armed conflict..."[145] Ultimately, as a result of these core issues, despite their appointed positions, the multinational staff are given limited duties to perform. While the present staffing arrangements have not significantly impacted UNC operations to date, they also have not been seriously tested.

Since the late 1990s UNC Sending State interest in UNC matters have grown appreciably. Sixteen of the twenty UN member states that provided combat and humanitarian forces during the Korean War are presently active. Active Sending States continue to accredit personnel to the UNC Liaison Group in the ROK and rotate their senior member to perform duties on the UNC MAC delegation. Sending States that are a party to the 1954-era "Agreement Regarding the Status of United Nations Forces in Japan," more commonly referred to as the UN-Government of Japan (GOJ) SOFA, also maintain accredited liaisons with the UNC Rear headquarters in Japan. Sending State resident Ambassadors to the ROK also meet monthly with the UNC Commander or his designated representative to share information, and discuss UNC and Sending State affairs.

The renewed interest by Sending States in the last two decades has generated an effort by the United States, through UNC, to better operationalize the international military support to the ROK and the ROK / U.S. Alliance. Leveraging the Sending States' latent, niche military capabilities, in addition to their diplomatic, informational and economic influence, has been recognized as an extremely valuable untapped resource. Tapping into this resource could significantly shape or alter the outcome of a major crisis, not to mention prove invaluable in a conflict and post-conflict Korean Peninsula landscape. Perhaps the most important visible metric of renewed Sending State interest has been the integration of military forces into CFC training and exercises, notably the twice yearly CFC theater-level command post exercises which were held in the late winter (Exercise KEY RESOLVE) and late summer (Exercise ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN).

A preliminary step toward operationalizing the UNC occurred in 1999, when the UNC Commander diverged from his predecessors and appointed his designated CFC and USFK officers directly to specific U-staff positions (i.e. U-1, U-2, etc), and charged them to perform functionally comparable duties. Previously they had served in a general, unspecified expert capacity. The 1999 UNC staff change also brought the UNC staff strength up to twenty-seven appointed officers from the nine original appointees in 1978.[146]

The 1999 modifications were followed up much more boldly in 2004, when the UNC Commander decided it was necessary to significantly increase the staffing of the headquarters. The UNC Commander first appointed 128 CFC and USFK staff members to the UNC staff. Of the 128 appointed service members to the UNC staff, 47 were ROK military personnel assigned for duty to CFC and two were Korean National Government Service civilians working for the U.S. military at CFC and USFK.[147] For its part, the ROK Ministry of National Defense has continued to support the practice of sourcing the UNC staff from CFC through periodic affirmations.[148]

Near simultaneous with this 2004 UNC headquarters staff expansion, the UNC also began to augment the UNC MAC Secretariat from both the UNC Sending States Liaison Group delegations and the ROK Armed Forces. By 2006 four Sending States were providing personnel to support the UNC MAC

Secretariat, with sixteen Secretariat positions opened up for Sending State sourcing.[149] The mid-2000 era embedded liaisons in support of the UNC MAC Secretariat were viewed positively by both the United States and the Sending States that participated.

In 2011, a pilot program was instituted, referred in some documents as the Canadian Force Initiative (CFI), whereby the Canadian Armed Forces embedded three officers full time into the UNC headquarters staff and one officer into the UNC Rear headquarters detachment.[150] The United States and Canada did not pursue a formal FEO arrangement at the time, instead opting for embedded liaisons. UNC staff members from this period have asserted that the decision to not pursue a FEO agreement was largely due to time considerations required to negotiate a FEO agreement, and the desire by the UNC leadership to rapidly implement CFI.

Yet, regardless of the UNC staff expansion from 1978 through 2011, UNC "work" over the period remained limited in scope. UNC headquarters staff appointed from the USFK and CFC's rolls tended to focus on their USFK and CFC duties, and are often described by those serving in the command at the time as having little interest in UNC affairs. For the most part, the UNC MAC Secretariat continued to play an outsized role in UNC affairs, at least into 2015, due to their full time focus on the UNC and its mission set. The UNC headquarters staff periodically became energized on its Armistice responsibilities during crisis, and on multinational integration during CFC training and exercises when it exceeded the Secretariat's capacity to perform.[151] The UNC leadership began a deliberate effort in 2014 to change the post-1978 paradigm of who and where UNC work was conducted.

By 2014, U.S. leaders elected to pursue a more formal multinational staffing arrangement for augmenting the UNC headquarters staff based on the perceived initial success of the CFI. Since 2015, two Sending States, Australia and the United Kingdom, have formally integrated personnel into the UNC staff. These integrated service members are exchange officer staff appointments and not members of the UNC Sending State Liaison Group or the aforementioned embedded liaison personnel.[152] The CFI effort continued past 2016 alongside the FEO programs staffing of officers from Australia and the United Kingdom. Lastly, in recent years Sending States that are a party to the UN-GOJ SOFA do rotate forces

on a more frequent basis through the seven designated UN bases in Japan with two countries providing personnel to staff the UNC Rear headquarters at Yokota Air Base near Tokyo, Japan.[153]

The slow evolution of UNC following its 1978 transformation, from a de facto paper headquarters to something less by the late 2000s awakened a realization amongst some senior U.S. leaders of the tremendous untapped strategic potential that was resident within UNC. By 2013 senior leaders within UNC started to utilize the appointed primary staff much more than any time since 1978, duties that had largely been performed by the UNC MAC Secretariat for the last 30 years. Momentum within the UNC staff continued, a little haphazardly, until the UNC Commander formally initiated the revitalization effort in 2015.

The United States effort to revitalize UNC and re-establish the U-staff as a supporting, but independent agency within the theater headquarters landscape was made with the intent of ensuring its continued relevancy and harnessing the command's latent and untapped potential. The initiation of the UNC revitalization effort ultimately resulted in U.S. members of the UNC staff now being held accountable for routinely and consistently performing their appointed duties. However, while great progress was made on the U.S. side, the "revitalization" endeavor was greeted with circumspection by ROK Government officials, likely due to a combination of several factors, explained below.

First and foremost, ROK Government officials (and the ROK public) are highly sensitive to issues perceived to impact their sovereignty. The UNC, despite its critical role in the survival of the ROK state in 1950, has been viewed somewhat negatively since. This negative reaction largely emanates from deep, intense feelings of shame and vulnerability, which are projected onto UNC as a continued representation of foreign control (i.e. loss of sovereignty) over Korean domestic and foreign affairs. This perception of Korean affairs being overlooked or ignored is deep-seated within the Korea consciousness, and is referred today as "Korea Passing."[154]

What is often lost on the ROK public is the fact that the stability and security provided by the UNC and the United States, set the strategic conditions for unprecedented economic growth during the first three decades after the war. Some progressive ROK politicians deflect this reality for personal political

gain, even disparaging the 1978 UNC to CFC transition as an incomplete step forward for the Korean people. These politicians whip up the narrative that the ROK is still not fully sovereign, since the state still has to disproportionately rely on the United States for its security.[155] Passionate historical and domestic political factors more than anything contribute to why ROK Government officials are so sensitive to any discussions of what they perceive as potential back-sliding in the advances they've made in the security domain since 1978.

Secondly, Alliance managers have reported that the ROK Government position toward UNC hardened following the March 2010 sinking of the ROKN Choenan, and then considerably took a turn toward the negative following the November 2010 artillery bombardment of Yeongpyeong-do.[156] The tepid response in 2010, first by the ROK and then by the Alliance, continued a long line of ineffectual responses to the DPRK's long history of premeditated violence against the ROK and U.S.[157] Feeling let down again, disappointment turned to anger.

The ROK domestic audience was incensed particularly over the civilian casualties at Yeongpyeong-do. Fingers were ultimately pointed, aided by ROK Government officials, in the direction of UNC and its hampering of an effective response by the ROK Armed Forces. The ROK media fueled this reaction through its near constant coverage and detailed exposés on the victim's families, their grief, funerals, etc.[158] By early 2011 a decidedly negative narrative toward the UNC became inculcated within the ROK public, followed by far less enthusiasm by the ROK Government to anything UNC.

Lastly, the term "revitalization" carries emotional baggage with it as the term has been associated in its past with the Korean word "yusin," which has double meaning for Koreans. While "yusin" has connections to the seventh century Silla Dynasty with a "deep meaning in the 'creation of new history'," in contemporary times "yusin" is associated with darker chapters in Korean history.[159] President Park's "Yusin reforms" were widely reported to have been greatly inspired by the Japanese Meiji Restoration of 1868, with Park often referred to as a "Meiji Revolutionary" by some supporters associated with the regime. Imperial Japanese linkages are obviously none too popular with wide swaths in the Korean domestic audience. "Yusin" is the Korean translation of the Japanese "iishin" or "revitalization," the

same word used by the Japanese to describe their Meiji Restoration, which ultimately led the Japanese to become strong enough to dominate the Korean Peninsula from 1895 until 1945.[160] Therefore, the word choice by U.S. officers for this UNC initiative quite possibly also generated deeply held emotional anti-Japanese / anti-Park feelings amongst some ROK Government officials.

In particular, the UNC revitalization initiative also incurred a "risk of exposing the many anachronisms and inconsistencies associated" with the command, including on the one hand, lack of ROK interest in a command stationed in their country that they had limited ability to influence, which could provide a platform for international military operations inconsistent with ROK strategic goals and plans. On the other hand the initiative was pursued while unable to pre-address Sending State discomfort with two prominent facts: first, unilateral U.S. control over UNC vice UN mechanisms; and second, the United States bilateral commitment to the ROK / U.S. Alliance, essentially relegating UNC to a role of multi-national force provider to the bilateral warfighter, CFC. In effect, UNC has become a "coalition in support of an Alliance."[161]

The U-5 led most of the pre-2015 revitalized UNC staff efforts, followed increasingly by more active roles by the U-3 and U-4 after 2015. One particularly important feature of recent years was the organizational energy dedicated to bolstering the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) within the U-3. While the MNCC was traditionally active during exercise periods, it had become by 2016, a key facilitator of multinational planning and coordination for UNC outside of exercises.

However, despite the renewed Sending State interest no Home Government is known to have offered a standing commitment of dedicated forces that UNC (or CFC) could plan for in crisis or a resumption of hostilities. In addition, efforts to improve information sharing between the bilateral ROK / U.S. Alliance and the multinational UNC has been a major impediment to an increased Sending State role within UNC or their performing a more active part in the defense of the Korean Peninsula. While these challenges do act as a barrier to realizing greater UNC support to the defense of Korea and the ROK / U.S. Alliance, they should in no way diminish the recent positive changes made.

While outside the immediate scope of this document, the evolution of the MAC from 1953 through 2016 is important for Alliance managers to understand in terms of the one standing forum to settlement of disagreements by the opposing sides, particularly while diplomatic relations between the core belligerents has, outside of the U.S. / PRC rapprochement in the 1970s, been decidedly hostile since 1953. Rather than regurgitate scholarship already documented, interested parties should study the extract to this research project, "The United Nations Command and the Sending States" published by the International Journal of Korean Studies in the fall/winter of 2018.

The ROK JCS Headquarters.

The ROK JCS headquarters serves the ROK Government in multiple capacities as addressed in the base article, "Theater-level Command and Alliance Decision-Making Architecture in Korea."[162] This section of the manuscript will expand on the functions ROK JCS performs for the ROK Government and the ROK / U.S. Alliance. ROK JCS's structure reflects the dichotomy of a single headquarters staff performing national-level man, train and equip functions, significant mobilization and martial law functions, and the operational command functions of directly managing the daily security of their country.[163] In addition, the ROK JCS headquarters staff also supports its representatives to the Permanent and Plenary sessions of the ROK / U.S. Alliance's Military Committee. The breadth and depth of ROK JCS' man, train, equip, mobilization and martial law functions are one major difference in terms of focus and responsibility that the other theater commands and staffs do not have to contend with. The demands these national-level activities place on the ROK JCS staff during a routine, Armistice period can be quite taxing and strain the organization's attention from operational security matters, depending on the particular business cycle within the ROK Government.

ROK JCS has authoritative, synchronizing U.S. Code Title 10-like relationships with the ROK Armed Forces Military Departments (Army, Navy and Air Force) regarding its man, train and equip responsibilities. ROK JCS retained authoritative command relationships directly over the two forward Field Armies, the Naval Operations Command, and Air Force Operations Command which protect the ROK territory and sovereignty on a daily basis. Moreover, ROK JCS also maintains command authority over the operational commands responsible for security and defense of the five northwest islands (Northwest Islands Defense Command) and rear area security and marshal law implementation (Second Operational Command).[164] A U.S. audience can better understand the mission and functions of ROK JCS through the analogy that this headquarters simultaneously performs functions similar to the U.S. JCS, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) for Homeland Defense, and the previous U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) force provider role.

The ROK JCS J-staff is also structured slightly different than its theater command counterparts, in that the ROK JCS headquarters is organized more by function than planning horizon as is the case in more traditional J-Staff Model headquarters. For example, in lieu of a traditional G or J-staff model, where the Personnel (1), Logistics (4), and Communications (6) functions are separate and distinct, in the ROK JCS, they are consolidated into a single, overarching Military Support Directorate, although they are maintained in separate sub-divisions retaining the J1, J4 and J6 designations.[165] Furthermore, in a more traditional J-Staff Model, a J3 would organize itself by current operations and future operations, with plans and policy residing in a J5. For the ROK, they have organized their Operations Directorate (J3-equivalent) by function, with separate Operations Division branches (not depicted below) to address Joint ground operations,[166] Joint naval and special weapons operations,[167] and Joint effects.[168] Lastly, unlike its theater command counterparts, ROK JCS utilizes is Vice Chairman (Deputy Commander equivalent) in a Chief of Staff capacity to oversee staff synchronization.

ROK JCS Headquarters Staff Diagram



Source: Created by Author from multiple sources.[169]

The ROK JCS headquarters J-staff is maintained separate and distinct from the co-located USFK, CFC, and UNC architecture, except for two cases where ROK JCS personnel were assigned duties within the CFC command framework. The first case involved the ROK JCS Engineer officer, an O-7 FO/GO, who is also dual-hatted as the Chief of Engineers at CFC.[170] The second case, although reportedly discontinued since mid-2016, involved some members of the fire support element on the ROK CFC GCC G-staff also having assigned duties with the ROK JCS J-staff.[171]

The four commands maintain an interoperable Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) network, referred to as the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System – Korea (CENTRIXS-K), which facilitated sharing, coordination and communication. While CENTRIXS-K is the C4I system used by all four commands, the level of permissions and use by the commands is uneven. CENTRIXS-K was instituted as the ROK / U.S. Alliance's digital warfighting network, so Sending State partners within UNC possess less access due to differences in intelligence sharing agreements between the 18 parties (U.S., ROK and the 16 Sending States). Moreover, the ROK and the U.S. also naturally use their national C4I networks more on a daily basis for obvious reasons. Of the two, the ROK invests less in CENTRIXS-K due to the resources and costs associated with trying to maintain multiple C4I networks. The ROK Armed Forces invested the majority of its resources into continued development of its national classified C4I network, called the Korean Joint Command and Control System (KJCCS), for obvious reasons. While the ROK did invest in the U.S. CENTRIXS-K, it viewed the U.S. developed system as more of a bridging solution while it developed its own Alliance C4I network, called the Allied Korean Joint Command and Control System (AKJCCS), which they designed to be interoperable with CENTRIXS-K. The ROK shift away from CENTRIXS-K to domestically developed systems was, from their point of view, a combination of leveraging and supporting their own telecommunications and technology industries, and the fact that ROK JCS was, by bilateral agreement during most of the 2000s, the lead, supported warfighter under Alliance Transformation Plans.

Despite ROK JCS's geographical separation from the co-located CFC, UNC and USFK headquarters for most of their collective existence through 2016, the two command nodes were within walking distance

from each other during Armistice. Therefore, it was no surprise that due to the four command's close proximity, face-to-face meetings were both conducted on a routine basis, and often a preferred method for coordination between the headquarters. However, up until the mid-2010's, should a major crisis and or hostilities have resumed, the command and control nodes would have been geographically separated, and would have precluded routine personal contact, and served as a forcing function for the two allies to develop and maintain a common C4I network. Since the mid-2000s, the two allies had to plan for the eventual U.S. force reposturing from the northern corridor and Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area to the south of the capital region centered on their base in Pyeongtaek, which as that timeline approach generated a sense of urgency to field an interoperable AKJCCS or force heavier reliance on the CENTRIXS-K network to maintain communication between the allies, and the supporting Sending States.

Korean is obviously the working business language within ROK JCS, just as English is the language used within USFK. CFC authorizes both Korean and English to be used in staff work based on convenience, but mandates orders to be bilingual.[172] The designated lingua franca within UNC is English. For the most part coordination between ROK JCS and CFC, UNC and USFK is conducted exclusively in English, but with a large number of forums held using simultaneous translation through interpreters. Korean officers assigned to both ROK JCS and CFC bring with them a unique dual-language capability that significantly facilitates coordination amongst the commands, a capability that the U.S. unfortunately is not able to replicate.

ROK JCS is the senior power base for guidance and direction within the ROK Armed Forces. ROK staff within CFC and the CFC component commands will often seek out or defer to the ROK JCS staff for preferred policy positions. In more recent times, ROK JCS has occasionally played an outsized, micro-managing role in the affairs of ROK service members assigned to CFC to the point that CFC officers have had little authority to speak and act in their assigned Alliance capacity. ROK JCS has also, for a lack of a better term, been periodically stepped on by officials in their Ministry of National Defense, tightly controlling the ROK narrative on minor day-to-day tasks. Even though this behavior occurs, it has not

resulted in grid-lock yet. On the other hand, it has stifled the federation of ideas and slowed some transformative efforts considerably.

PART III:

Joint and Multinational Manpower Activities

Manpower Activities in Armistice.

The United States maintains two separate Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) documents for its joint (USFK), combined (CFC), and lead nation (UNC) interests in the ROK.[173] The primary document utilized is the USFK JTD. The U.S. also retains a small, legacy JTD for the UNC.[174]

The ROK maintains two manning and equipping documents, similar to a U.S. JTD, one each for its combined (primarily CFC) and joint (ROK JCS) interests. The ROK CFC "JTD" resources the ROK contingents of CFC, a CFC GCC cadre, and the UNC MAC delegation. The ROK JCS "JTD" sources its joint staff headquarters and operational command.

All personnel (U.S. and ROK) appointed for duty to CFC, regardless of military service also perform duty on the CFC GCC Staff, with one single exception. The U.S. appointed CFC Commander has been exempted from serving on the CFC GCC staff since 1992, following the appointment of the ROK CFC Deputy Commander to the GCC Commander position.[175]

The USFK JTD assigns all its personnel to the USFK staff. A portion of the staff are assigned only USFK duties and are coded in USFK-only positions. Others are appointed for duty to CFC in CFC-only billets. A sizeable contingent from the USFK JTD are simultaneously appointed to perform both USFK and CFC duties in multi-coded positions. Of the USFK JTD personnel appointed for duty to CFC, some are further sub-appointed by the UNC Commander to the UNC staff (discussed in more detail with lead nation support activities below).

The ROK CFC JTD assigns personnel directly to both the CFC and the GCC staff. ROK personnel assigned to CFC are also dual-hatted to GCC, performing both headquarters duties. ROK personnel assigned directly to GCC are not officially assigned any CFC headquarters duties, although at times the ROK GCC-only staff have been pulled into performing CFC duties as a byproduct of their senior leadership retaining duties in both commands. A very small number of ROK personnel assigned to the CFC GCC who hold key low-density skill sets, also perform duty on the ROK JCS staff. As of summer 2016 the ROK was attempting to cease this particular CFC GCC / ROK JCS cross-command activity.

The UNC JTD principally assigns personnel to the UNC staff and to the UNC MAC Secretariat.[176] In a few isolated cases personnel who arrive in the ROK on UNC JTD orders are cross-leveled for duty to the USFK and/or the CFC staffs in lieu of serving on the UNC staff. The UNC staff for the most part operates within the USFK or CFC operating construct, although it does conduct some UNC-only business in separate forums.

Per the 1979 exchange of letters between the SUSMOAK and the ROK CJCS, members of the CFC staff (both U.S. and ROK) can be appointed to the UNC staff.[177] As late as 2016, ROK and U.S. members of the CFC staff, and members of the USFK staff are appointed for duty to the UNC staff. Although ROK personnel are appointed to serve on the UNC staff, the predominance of UNC work continues to be performed by U.S. staff members despite ROK willingness per the reasons outlined in Part II's UNC Headquarters section. Until this formal agreement and integration issue is resolved, the status quo of limited ROK service member involvement in UNC will continue.

Sending State interests within the UNC headquarters are maintained through their designated and accredited liaison representatives. Each active Sending State maintains a UNC Liaison Group accredited with the UNC, largely through their military delegations assigned to their in-country diplomatic missions. National UNC Liaison Group delegations are small, normally consisting of up to five personnel from their military attaché delegations assigned to their in-country embassies.[178] The UNC JTD does maintain some unfunded positions to identify unsourced, unfunded UNC JTD Sending State equities within the UNC MAC and the Secretariat.[179] While on the JTD, these personnel are not assigned personnel. Instead they act in a robust liaison style capacity and face the same legal restrictions that the UNC's ROK service members face due to the absence of binding, international agreements governing their conduct while performing UNC duties.[180]

Furthermore, a handful of Sending States resource positions within the UNC headquarters in addition to their accredited Liaison Group delegations. The non-ROK, multinational staffing of UNC is conducted through USFK-sponsored FEO agreements, through USINDOPACOM, under the Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Personnel Exchange Program (DPEP).[181] These DPEP FEO positions were included on

the USFK JTD as unfunded positions, sourced by their Home Government. Since the DPEP is through USINDOPACOM, these foreign officers are assigned for duty to USFK, and subsequently appointed for duty to the UNC staff. Unlike the other UNC Liaison Group personnel and ROK service member counterparts performing embedded liaison or appointed duties within the UNC staff, UNC MAC or the Secretariat, these FEO's duties are supported by formal, binding agreements that allow for them to make decisions on behalf of the U.S. Government.[182]

The U.S. Army is the designated combatant command support agent for USFK.[183] In addition, the U.S. DoD has tasked its respective services with primacy in many logistical and support areas for support to other services, of which the U.S. Army has a majority of these joint tasks.[184] To meet its obligations the U.S. Army maintains several Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) and Augmentation TDA (AUGTDA) documents to support the U.S. joint, combined, and lead nation activities in the ROK.[185] In addition, the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) document supporting the USFK Army Forces component headquarters, Eighth Army, also provides support to these same joint, combined, and lead nation activities.[186] As an example, the members of the UNC Honor Guard are on a U.S. Army TDA document, while in other cases individual members from AUGTDAs are appointed for duty to augment the USFK and CFC staffs.

U.S. Army support to the joint, combined and lead nation activities are complex. Having evolved over time, the manpower landscape can be difficult to understand even by the most experienced human resources specialist.[187] The post-1992 USFK / Eighth Army headquarters separation did simplify matters some by separating U.S. Army Military Department service functions from the joint and multinational domain. However, in several low-density specialty areas, individual members and their immediate staffs sourced from these TDAs and MTOEs remained appointed for duty to all (or some) of the joint, combined, and lead nation activities, in addition to performing these same functions/duties for Eighth Army.[188]

The United States maintains designated USFK Service Component headquarters forward stationed in the ROK, namely the U.S. Seventh Air Force (7AF),[189] U.S. Marine Corps Forces – Korea

(MARFORK),[190] U.S. Navy Forces – Korea (NAVFORK),[191] and U.S. Special Operations Command – Korea (SOCKOR).[192] Similar to Eighth Army, these other USFK Service Component Commands are also designated as UNC Component Commands.[193] Only the 7AF has a designated requirement to provide substantial personnel to a bilaterally resourced CFC Component Command, the CFC Air Component Command (ACC).[194] Unlike Eighth Army, the other USFK Service Component Commands do not materially reinforce the USFK, UNC or CFC headquarters with personnel.[195]

Joint and Multinational Manpower Activities during Armistice



Source: Created by Author from multiple sources.

Manpower Activities in Crisis and Hostilities.

In 2016 the United States maintained, through USFK, two resourcing documents to support its collective joint, combined, and lead nation manpower activities during crisis and hostilities, a JTMD and an EMD.[196] The U.S. Army also maintained a Mobilization Table of Distribution and Allowances (MOBTDA) document to facilitate the rapid expansion of Eighth Army in crisis and hostilities.[197] Although outside of the immediate scope of this Theater Command research line of effort, the MOBTDA is mentioned here due to Eighth Army's unique role, particularly compared to the other USFK service component commands, in supporting the U.S. joint, combined, and lead nation activities in the ROK.

The JTMD is sourced with joint personnel from the reserve component, supporting the U.S. mission requirements across the joint, combined and lead nation commands. These designated reserve component personnel were assigned to USFK, drilled at their home station, and performed their Annual Training in Korea with the command, typically at one of the theater-level, computer-assisted, command post exercises. The JTMD can be, and has been activated, during periods of heightened escalation, providing a ready, trained source of experienced staff officers and non-commissioned officers to augment the Active Duty joint, combined, and lead nation force already in-place on the Korean Peninsula. Once activated, these personnel are in some predetermined cases detached from USFK for duty with CFC and UNC.

The EMD on the other hand was an unvalidated (unsourced), internal document maintained by USFK to support its theater level exercise program. The EMD was maintained, tested, and updated twice yearly during the aforementioned theater-level exercises.[198] It is important to note that up to 2016 the twice-yearly exercise of the EMD also served as a mechanism for maintaining a standing, desired list of skills and experience the joint, combined and lead nation mission force might need to support operational requirements during a resumption of hostilities, which would likely be an extended, large scale high intensity campaign.

Had the conditions on the Korean Peninsula degraded and warranted additional joint manpower for the theater headquarters, the EMD would have served as a foundation for a Joint Manning Document (JMD). A USFK JMD submission, once validated, would serve as an authorization document for U.S.

Joint Individual Augmentation (JIA) contingency requirements.[199] The USFK staff started work in late 2016 to convert the EMD into a Joint Manning Document (JMD), submitting it to USINDOPACOM in April 2018, where it still currently resides while U.S. forces in the ROK revise their two existing JTD documents.[200] While USFK's efforts to produce a JMD submission are beyond the timeframe of this research project, it is an important data point for readers to conceptualize how manpower activities, particularly bold shifts, require years to complete.

Since a JMD submission during the throes of a resumption of hostilities on the Peninsula would likely require time (months vice weeks) to validate, task, source, and ultimately for those JIAs to arrive, procedures were in place to provide a near-immediate joint augmentation capability via the USINDOPACOM Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) and the U.S. Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) Joint Enabling Capability Command (JECC). The DJTFAC provides USINDOPACOM a "rapidly deployable, cross-functional staff element capable of temporarily assisting newly activated Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters, to initiate crisis action planning and critical battle staff processes in order to accelerate the operational capability of designated priority Joint Task Forces."[201] The JECC's mission is to provide "mission-tailored, joint capability packages to combatant commanders in order to facilitate rapid establishment of joint force headquarters, fulfill Global Response Force execution and bridge joint operational requirements."[202] In a crisis or contingency, such as the resumption of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, a contingent from the JECC would likely deploy into theater as an expedient solution to meet operational requirements until a JMD sourcing solution could be realized.[203] However, while the DJTFAC is an option for Commander, USINDOPACOM to leverage in support of joint augmentation to the three Theater Commands in Korea (USFK, UNC and CFC), he most likely will leverage his DJTFAC for other purposes in support of a serious crisis or a resumption of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.

The ROK also maintains JMD-like documents to support its additive joint and combined mission requirements during an extended campaign. Unlike the United States, the ROK does not have the depth of resources to draw upon for its JMDs, largely due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of the

active and reserve component force within the ROK are already dedicated to specific missions and tasks. Therefore, ROK augmentation to CFC and ROK JCS largely is planned to be drawn from its institutional base, the officers and non-commissioned officers that serve as instructors or students. The ROK institutional base provides a ready, uncommitted pool of skilled and experienced individuals to serve as replacements for initial losses, and to augment the operational and theater-level staffs.[204] Similar to the United States, the ROK exercises their headquarters augmentation documents during the twice yearly CFC-led theater level exercises.

Multinational equities within the UNC during crisis are represented by their UNC Liaison Group delegations, their resident in-country Ambassador to the ROK, and the individual FEO's embedded within USFK and UNC by select Sending States. There are currently no known commitments in place for Sending State augmentation during a crisis situation. Should conditions warrant, in a serious crisis or after active hostilities resume, the respective Sending State Home Governments will individually determine their level of support and any increased military commitment to the UNC and the ROK. International law supports Sending State support to the ROK during crisis and hostilities through two internationally recognized legal pathways - Collective self-defense afforded through Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and military assistance to the ROK Government to repel an attack by the DPRK via UN Security Council Resolution 83.[205] Increased military commitment and support could come through providing combat and humanitarian support forces as they did in the 1950-1953 conflict, and/or through providing individual subject matter experts to augment the UNC staff.

Arrangements for providing forces would be handled individually via the respective Sending State Defense Ministries and Home Governments with the U.S. Government, in conjunction with the approval by the ROK Government for forces deploying to the ROK.[206] For the Sending States that are signators to the UN-GOJ SOFA, deployment of individual service members and units to the seven designated UN bases in Japan are a matter of notification to the GOJ.[207] Sending State force operations emanating from and returning to Japan, i.e. strike and return operations to the DPRK, would likely be captured within U.S. - GOJ agreements, but would not require definitive ROK Government approval.[208] However, despite the

absence of a legal requirement to receive ROK Government approval to conduct strike and return from Japan into the DPRK, as a matter of practice and mutual respect the ROK Government would likely be notified by the United States if such an action were being considered.

Joint and Multinational Manpower Activities
during Crisis and Resumption of Active Hostilities



Source: Created by Author from multiple sources.[209]

Conclusion.

The description of the theater command headquarters architecture in the ROK and the manpower management processes in place as of 2016 will hopefully aid Alliance managers and decision makers from both countries in understanding of how the respective commands were organized and resourced. Change is coming to the Korean Peninsula, in particular for how the U.S. and ROK Governments organize themselves individually and bilaterally in support of their Mutual Defense Treaty obligations. While the respective parties may understand elements, few within each adequately understand the whole process. Sufficient understanding of the history and recent contemporary practices, in particular their shortcomings, are essential as the two nations proceed with transformative initiatives so that these shortcomings are corrected and not repeated or made worse through oversight. Two major shortcomings within the theater command landscape should be addressed in future transformation efforts.

First, the two nations should strive to distinctly separate the theater commands and their components from one another, minimizing the cross-command staffing as much as possible, yet building in processes to maintain the connective tissue between them while they are geographically separated for the first time since 1957 now that U.S. forces have largely repostured south of Seoul. In past transformative efforts the two Alliance partners focused disproportionately on the theater-level architecture, leaving the component command architecture with major gaps or as unfinished business. While it does make sense for some of the theater commands, such as UNC, to leverage another's components, the component's organization, functions, and manpower documents need to clearly delineate and account for their assigned roles.

Second, the U.S. and ROK need to develop a common, mutually supported framework for better integrating multinational support of the Sending States into the overall effort. Should the Korean Peninsula become a major theater of war again, the United States and ROK will need to leverage the international community in pursuit of their bilateral campaign objectives. The Sending States are a standing, ready body of diverse, respected UN member states that can serve as the foundation for wider international community support.

Lastly, the United States and ROK need to ensure that the two nations' manpower management efforts are better aligned. For the majority of the time since CFC was established in 1978, the two nations did a relatively decent job of synchronizing their activities. However, over the last 9-12 years they have not. It is past due that the two nations, in conjunction with the Sending States, embark on a better synchronized organization and resourcing of the theater commands operating in the ROK.

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Colonel Creamer's open source publications include:

- "The Light Infantry Defense," Center for Army Lesson's Learned (CALL) *News from the Front*, November- December 2002; https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=568, https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=570, https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=580.
- "Combined Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination (WMD-E) Operations at the Battalion Task Force Level," CALL *News from the Front*, April 21, 2015; https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=7291.
- "Time to Reassess the United States / Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty," U.S. Army War College, November 2016; https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1079393.pdf.
- "Answering the Korea Question, United States Government Policy toward the Unified Command and the Korean Armistice," U.S. Army War College, January 2017; https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1078448.pdf.
- "Theater-level Command and Alliance decision-Making Architecture in Korea," *International Journal of Korean Studies*, Volume XX, Number 2, Fall/Winter 2016; http://icks.org/n/data/ijks/1498534150_add_file_3.pdf.
- "The United Nations Command and the Sending States," *International Journal of Korean Studies*, Volume XXI, Number 2, Fall/Winter 2017; http://icks.org/n/data/ijks/2017FW-4.pdf.

ENDNOTES

[1] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 2019), 15.

[2] Ibid, 41.

[3] Ibid, 109. JP 1-02 utilizes the term "Multinational Staff" to describe integrated command staffs illustrated in JP 3-16, however for the purposes of this paper the term "integrated staff" is utilized to describe this concept.

[4] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Multinational Operations*, Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2013), II-4.

[5] Examples of Integrated commands include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the ROK / U.S. CFC, both of which maintain a military committee to provide strategic guidance and direction to the appointed commander.

[6] U.S. JCS, *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*, JP 1-02, 123.

[7] Ibid, 124.

[8] Ibid, 131.

[9] Ibid, 149.

[10] Ibid, 150.

[11] While "parallel" command structure not a doctrinal term defined in JP 1-02, there is a relatively close term to the concept, "parallel chains of command." This term is general used in amphibious operations, where there is "a parallel system of command, responding to the interrelationship of participating forces, wherein corresponding commanders are established at each subordinate level of all components to facilitate coordinated planning for, and execution of, the amphibious operation." Ibid, 167.

[12] U.S. JCS, *Multinational Operations*, JP 3-16, II-6.

[13] ROK Ministry of National Defense, *The History of the ROK-US Alliance, 1953-2013* (Seoul, ROK: Ministry of National Defense Institute for Military History, 2013), 285.

[14] U.S. JCS, *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*, JP 1-02, 217.

[15] U.S. JCS, *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*, JP 1-02, 218.

[16] Memorandum, Joint Chiefs of Staff 9-83 (MJCS 9-83) September 1983; National Defense University, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000*, Joint Force Staff College Publication 1, (Norfolk, VA: National Defense University Joint Forces Staff College, 2000), 1-35 and 1-42; Glenn Rice, "CFC and UNC Command Relationship Orientation," briefing slides and scripted commentary, Yongsan, ROK, ROK / U.S. CFC and UNC, July 1, 1993. MJCS 9-83 is also referred more commonly as the UNC Terms of Reference (TOR). The 1983-era UNC TOR was superseded by CM-0165-18, UNC TOR and Strategic Guidance to Commander, in June 10, 2018.

[17] U.S. JCS, *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*, JP 1-02, 226.

[18] U.S. Joint Doctrine defines "manpower" activities as managing spaces or positions, while "personnel" activities are the requisitioning and supporting the "faces" or people for specific manpower positions. They are considered two separate functions. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Personnel Support*, Joint Publication 1-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 31, 2016), II-5.

[19] The DPRK is the official name of the state, but is usually more commonly referred to as North Korea. This paper uses the official naming convention for both the northern and the southern Korean Governments.

[20] Shawn P. Creamer, "Theater-level Command and Alliance Decision-Making Architecture in Korea," *International Journal of Korean Studies* XX, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2016): 63 (note 46 and 47).

[21] UNC is routinely referred to in the United Nations and in a number of historical documents as the "Unified Command." UNC is a moniker given by the U.S. Government. The ROK, Philippines and Thailand retain forces

with the UNC Honor Guard Company, and the ROK maintains a battalion-sized element as part of the UNC Command Security Battalion – Joint Security Area at Panmunjom.

[22] The term "hostilities" is used within this paper as much as possible in lieu of other terms in contemporary vernacular, such as "war" or "contingency." Use of the term hostility recognizes the contrast between how the two ROK / U.S. Alliance partners would view a renewed large scale, high-intensity conflict on the Korean Peninsula. The United States generally would view and refer to a Korea campaign as a "contingency operation," while its ROK partner would very much refer to it as a "war." In legal terms the United States would not refer to a Korea campaign as a war unless it was so designated through our constitutional processes. For the ROK Government and its people, a Korea campaign is existential. The term hostilities is therefore used within this paper as a direct connection to the Armistice Agreement, which suspended active hostilities between the belligerents, as the international community was extremely careful in the early 1950s to not refer to the 1950-1953 fighting as a war.

[23] Multi-hatting personnel is often referred by the lexicons, "dual-hatting," "triple-hatting," "quad-hatting," etc depending on the number of appointed positions. In a few, select cases some U.S. service members have been appointed to four or more distinct duty positions.

[24] 2018 GDP Rankings. "World Development Indicators," *The World Bank Home Page*, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (accessed December 12, 2019); the ROK was previously ranked the number eleven economy as of 2015. The Centre for Economic and Business Research estimates that the ROK will continue its economic rise, climbing to the world's #7 economy by 2030. Mathew Burrows, "Global Risks 2035: The Search for a New Normal," Atlantic Council Strategy Paper, September 2016, 65. Moreover, Goldman Sachs estimated in 2009 that, despite the costs and risks associated with reunification, that a unified Korean state could overtake France, Germany and possibly Japan in terms of GDP within 30-40 years. Jonathan Thatcher, "United Korea economy could pass Japan: Goldman Sachs," *Reuters News Service*, posted September 21, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-united/united-korea-economy-could-pass-japan-goldman-sachs-idUSTRE58K0OA20090921 (accessed October 25, 2017).

[25] Korea Institute of Military History, *The Korean War, Vol 1*, (Lincoln, NE: Univ of Nebraska Press, 1997), 66-73; Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War*, (Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2000), 9-20.

[26] Korea Inst of Military History, *The Korean War, Vol 1*, 73-75. In some official documents, such as the aforementioned Korean War History, the Combined Chiefs of Staff Council is referred to as the Joint Staff Council. However, this difference in naming is due to mistranslation from Korean to English. Min-Koo Han, *2016 Defense White Paper*, (Seoul, ROK: ROK Ministry of National Defense, December 31, 2016), 48; ROK JCS Homepage, "History, 1941-1950" tab, http://jcs.mil.kr/mbshome/mbs/jcs2_eng/subview.jsp?id=jcs2_eng_010306000000 (accessed August 9, 2017). From August through November 1948 the Constabulary's naming convention did not change, although officials in the ROK Government informally referred to it as the National Defense Army. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 41.

[27] The ROK Government later organized a separate Air Force later in October 1949. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 93; Korea Inst of Military History, *The Korean War, Vol 1*, 87.

[28] Korea Inst of Military History, *The Korean War, Vol 1*, 74-75.

[29] ROK President Syngman Rhee and Commanding General United States Army Forces in Korea LTG John R. Hodge, *Executive Agreement Between the President of the Republic of Korea and the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, Concerning Interim Military and Security Matters During the Transitional Period*, (Seoul, ROK, August 24, 1948); Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 34 and 45-48; Kyung Young Chung, *An Analysis of ROK-US Military Command Relationship from the Korean War to the Present*, Master of Military Arts Thesis (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989), 22-24.

[30] The UN Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution (UNSCR) 84 on July 7, 1950. UNSCR 84 requested UN member nations place their force contributions in support of UNSCR 83, passed on June 27, 1950, under a unified command led by the United States. UNSCR 84 further requested for the U.S. Government to appoint a commander of these UN member nation force contributions, and authorized the U.S. led unified command to fly the UN flag during the course of its operations. The U.S. Government rapidly accepted the responsibility for the UN's first collective security mission, and proceeded with leading UN force military support to the ROK, including the

conclusion of formal and informal agreements with UN member nations and the ROK Government. Several agreements were concluded with the ROK Government prior to the UNC being formally established on July 24, 1950.

[31] On July 14, 1950, ROK President Syngman Rhee notified General of the Army Douglas MacArthur through a letter that he was transferring operational command of the ROK Armed Forces. It is widely recognized that President Rhee, through a combination of an error in translation, lack of familiarity in military affairs, and the pressing nature of the time, actually meant "operational control (less operational command)" vice "operational command." Most scholars assert that that this transfer of operational control was not formally codified beyond the scope of the letter until after the Armistice was concluded. However, the evidence shows the ROK President did formally codify the contents of his July 14 letter to MacArthur with a written ROK Government execution order on July 22, 1950 to the ROK Army Chief of Staff through the ROK Ministry of National Defense. ROK President Syngman Rhee, "Assignment of Command Authority over all Korean Forces to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur," memorandum for Chief of Staff, Korean Army through the Minister of Defense, Pusan, ROK, 22 July 1950; Walter Simmons, "Letter by Rhee Only Contract with 8th Army," *Chicago Tribune*, June 24, 1953, http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1953/06/24/page/3/article/letter-by-rhee-only-contract-with-8th-army (accessed March 13, 2017).

[32] The United States and ROK concluded a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) sixty-six days after the Armistice Agreement was implemented. The MDT serves as the "foundation of a comprehensive alliance that endures today." U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian Affairs, "U.S. Relations with South Korea Fact Sheet," October 17, 2016, *U.S. Department of State Homepage*, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm (accessed November 4, 2016). The MDT is a ratified treaty, and therefore serves as the legal foundation for the ROK / U.S. security relationship. In particular, the MDT provides the ROK Government legal justification for continued stationing of U.S. forces in Korea. The ROK National Assembly ratified the MDT on January 15, 1954, while the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on January 26, 1954. An exchange of notes between the United States and ROK occurred between January 28 and February 1, 1954 to clarify Article III; the exchange of notes resulted in a July 1954 summit that set in motion the conclusion of the "Agreed Minutes Relating to Continued Cooperation in Economic and Military Matters" later on November 17, 1954. The "Agreed Minutes" clarified the MDT's Article I and II, and once signed, resulted in the MDT entering into force. The Agreed Minutes most significant outcomes were the retention of the ROK armed forces under the operational control of the United Nations Command (UNC), the setting of the size of the ROK armed forces, and to outline the financial aid package the United States would provide to the ROK Government.

[33] Han, *2016 Defense White Paper*, 48; ROK JCS Homepage, "History, 1951-1960" tab, http://jcs.mil.kr/mbshome/mbs/jcs2_eng/subview.jsp?id=jcs2_eng_010305000000 (accessed August 9, 2017).

[34] During the war the ROK armed forces maintained operational units no higher than Corps level, with Corps (Groups), Army level formations, component commands provided by the U.S. FROKA was organized on December 15, 1953, then formally established on March 15, 1954, assuming the almost 90-mile eastern sector of the Demilitarized Zone from U.S. X Corps. I U.S. Corps (Group) remained postured in the western sector, protecting Seoul. SROKA was organized in Taegu, then activated on October 31, 1954, assuming responsibility for the logistics support and rear area defense of the ROK. U.S. X Corps Public Information Office (PIO), "Background Information – First ROK Army," March 06, 1954; UNC Command Historian Herman M. Katz, "UNC Operational Control of the ROK Army," memorandum for record, Yongsan Garrison, ROK, January 08, 1970; ROK MND, *History of the ROK-US Alliance*, 75 and 401. ROK Army Headquarters, "General Order No 8, Activation of the Second Army," Taegu, ROK, January 13, 1955 (Corrected Copy).

[35] ROK MND, *History of the ROK-US Alliance*, 72-75.

[36] GEN John W. Vessey Jr., *Headquarters United Nations Command / United States Forces Korea / Eighth United States Army Annual Historical Report, 1976*, (Yongsan Garrison, ROK: Command Historian Office), 46.

[37] The ROK Government requested that the United States integrate ROK service members into the UNC staff as early as 1955, and later in 1956 to have a ROK general officer assigned as the UNC Deputy Commander. Kwang Sub Kwak, *The US-ROK Alliance, 1953-2004: Alliance Institionalization* (Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest Books, 2006), 95. However, the acceptance of Italian humanitarian forces and designation of Italy as a UNC Sending State in 1951, despite its status as not being a UN member nation during the early war, is a contradiction in the U.S. position

in 1955-1956. While the United States' UNC narrative of only accepting UN member states into the command has this discrepancy, it is minor in that Italy's role within UNC during the war was largely non-existent beyond it showing its flag. Moreover, during the war the U.S. had only accepted one Sending State service member onto the staff, preferring to keep the UNC a U.S. Headquarters.

[38] ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs Y.T. Pyun, "Administrative Agreement Proposal," letter and attached Administrative Agreement to U.S. Embassy Seoul Charge d'Affairs Carl W. Strom, Seoul, ROK, April 28, 1955.

[39] On July 12, 1950 the United States and the ROK Government concluded an "Agreement Concerning Jurisdiction Over Offenses by the United States Forces in Korea," more commonly known as the Taejon Agreement. The Taejon Agreement in effect provided extraterritoriality to U.S. service members while they were serving in Korea. Later, on May 24, 1952, the United States negotiated, on behalf of the Unified Command, the "Agreement on Economic Coordination Between the Republic of Korea and the Unified Command" with the ROK Government. This agreement is commonly referred to as the Meyer Agreement. While the Meyer Agreement was overwhelmingly economic in nature it did include clauses regarding the privileges and immunities for non-U.S. friendly forces operating under the Unified Command in Korea. UNC Chief of Staff Major General James T. Callaghan letter to ROK Ministry of Justice Director General Bureau of Immigration Mr. Ki Hyun Cho, Yongsan, ROK, June 23, 1988. In this letter, the UNC Chief of Staff described how the Meyer Agreement was used as the authority for immigration and customs, including governing entry and exit procedures of U.S. and non-U.S. forces (i.e. Sending State personnel) assigned to the UNC. The ROK Government proposal in 1955 largely mirrored the agreement the U.S. negotiated in 1954 with the Government of Japan (GOJ) for UNC service members serving there and even included some provisions contained within the NATO Administrative Agreement. On February 19, 1954 the United States, on behalf of the Unified Command, negotiated the "Agreement Regarding the Status of United Nations Forces in Japan" with the GOJ. This agreement is more commonly known today as the UN-GOJ SOFA. U.S. Department of Defense Office of General Counsel, "Proposed Administrative Agreement," memorandum for record, Washington, DC, August 17, 1955.

[40] Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Army Annual Historical Report, 1976*, 1.

[41] The 1957 move was compelled by the implementation of the Unified Command Plan. This plan established regional and functional commands, each with subordinate commands with focused regions (e.g. U.S. Pacific Command with USFK in Korea, U.S. Forces Japan in Japan, etc) or focused functional commands. The establishment of USFK in Seoul facilitated, even mandated, the transfer of UNC to Seoul to be co-located with USFK as multiple command positions were being held by one officer. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Office,; "History of the Unified Command Plan: 1946-2012." (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), 18-20; GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer, CINCUNC, "UNC General Order No 15, Outline Plan for the Disestablishment of the Far East Command and Movement of United Nations Command to Korea," Tokyo, Japan, June 30, 1957.

[42] The British Commonwealth Division was reduced to a Brigade (Group) in 1955, and from 1956-57 a reinforced Battalion. After 1955, the Commonwealth force was largely provided by the United Kingdom with only token representation by the other partners. Jeffrey Grey, *The Commonwealth armies and the Korean War: An alliance study*, (New York, NY: Manchester University Press, 1988), 183-184. Turkey retained a brigade-sized force in Korea until 1960, but maintained a company-sized (261 soldier) expeditionary force until 1966 and representation in the UNC Honor Guard until 1971. Ethiopian forces departed Korea in January 1965. France reduced its contingent to 50, and later further reduced it to 15 personnel, with the last soldier departing in June 1965. Gordon L. Rottman, *Korean War Order of Battle: United States, United Nations and Communist Ground, Naval and Air Forces, 1950-1953*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 118; MacArthur Memorial Homepage, "Under One Banner: The United Nations Command in Korea" tab, http://www.macarthurmemorial.org/DocumentCenter/View/522 (accessed August 10, 2017); GEN John W. Vessey Jr., *Headquarters United Nations Command / United States Forces Korea / Eighth United States Army Annual Historical Report, 1978*, (Yongsan Garrison, ROK: Command Historian Office), 25 and 46-47; Eighth Army Historian Office, *Eighth Army Quarterly Historical Summary, April 1 – June, 30 1966*, (Yongsan Garrison, ROK: Command Historian Office), 22-24.

[43] As a data point, Thailand retained a company sized element (147 soldiers) with the U.S. 7th Infantry Division as of 1966, ultimately withdrawing the last of their forces from Korea by 1971. Eighth Army, *1966 Eighth Army Quarterly Historical Summary*, 24. The Philippines and Thailand still retain small contingents within the UNC

Honor Guard company today. Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, 25. Thailand also retained an aviation detachment, the last forward stationed forces at the UNC (Rear) bases in Japan until July 1976. Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, 46-47 and 344.

[44] By January 1975, only six Sending States (Australia, Canada, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and the Philippines) retained accredited liaison groups in Korea, with only three nations retaining small residual forces stationed in Korea (with duty on the UNC Honor Guard). Ethiopia ceased accrediting members to their UNC liaison group in June 1975. During this same period eight Sending States (Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and the Philippines) retained accredited liaison groups in Japan through the UNC (Rear) Headquarters. GEN Richard G. Stilwell, *Headquarters United Nations Command / United States Forces Korea / Eighth United States Army Annual Historical Report, 1975*, (Yongsan Garrison, ROK: Command Historian Office), 18. In 1978, Turkey withdrew its Liaison from the UNC HQ and France withdrew its liaison from UNC (Rear), leaving only five active nations in Korea and seven in Japan with UNC (Rear). Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1977*, 33; Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, 47. There are seven UN bases designated by the UN – GOJ SOFA Joint Board: Sasebo Naval Base; Camp Zama; Yokota Air Base (AB); Yokosuka Naval Base; Kadena AB; White Beach Naval Facility; and Futenma Marine Corps Air Station. The UNC Rear headquarters moved to Yokota AB from Camp Zama in 2007. UNC Rear Headquarters, "Fact Sheet," *Yokota Air Base Homepage*, http://www.yokota.af.mil/Portals/44/Documents/Units/AFD-150924-004.pdf (accessed March 11, 2017), 1; "Relocation of the United Nations Command (Rear) from Camp Zama to Yokota Air Base," October 26, 2007, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Homepage*, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2007/10/1176845_836.html (accessed August 15, 2017).

[45] Han, *2016 Defense White Paper*, 48; ROK JCS Homepage, "History, 1961-1970" tab, http://jcs.mil.kr/mbshome/mbs/jcs2_eng/subview.jsp?id=jcs2_eng_010304000000 (accessed August 24, 2017). The Joint Chiefs of Staff Council was reorganized into the ROK JCS on June 1, 1963 via Cabinet Decree No 1325. "Membership of the JCS consists of a chairman, appointed by the President for a 2-year term, and the incumbent chiefs of the three military services." U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *National Intelligence Survey 41-B: South Korea*, October 1973, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp01-00707r000200080004-3 (accessed August 24, 2017), 4.

[46] On May 26, 1961 the SCNR provided the UNC Commander a letter via the ROK Ministry of National Defense recognizing UNC's authority over ROK forces and stated they would follow prescribed channels for requesting ROK forces for unilateral purposes. Later, on September 20, 1961 the ROK Ministry of National Defense issued order 5043 to the ROK Armed Forces which provided instructions on procedures for use of ROK forces under UNC's operational control. UNC Deputy J5 COL Ernest R. Morgan, "Outline of ROKF OPCON 1950 – 1980," memorandum for UNC J5 Brig Gen Morgan, Yongsan, ROK, June 27, 1980.

[47] The formation of the I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group and TROKA is an interesting piece of Alliance evolutionary history as a precursor to what became CFC later in the decade. In conjunction with the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine and following the redeployment of ROK forces from the Republic of Vietnam significant force structure changes occurred within the Alliance. A decision was made in early 1971 to transform the I U.S. Corps (Group), which was responsible for defending the western half of the ROK, into a temporary integrated headquarters by embedding ROK officers into the Corps Group staff. The ROK would replace this command with a ROK Field Army like they had in the eastern half of the country (FROKA's AOR). The I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group became operational on July 1, 1971. The ROK military organized another Field Army headquarters, the TROKA, on July 1, 1973. The ROK Government was uncomfortable with this transition, preferring to keep the I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group operational. I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group remained operational until 1980 when it was redesignated and transformed (slightly) into the Combined Field Army (ROK/U.S.). C.M. Jackson, *Why the Combined Field Army*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1990); GEN John H. Michaelis, Commander Eighth Army, "Letter of Instruction 3-1, Establishment of the I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group," Seoul, ROK, HQ Eighth Army, March 10, 1971; Commander UNC GEN Richard G. Stilwell, "I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group," message to CINCPAC, Seoul, ROK, August 16, 1976. TROKA retained peacetime Title 10-like operational command, less operational control over three ROK Corps under the I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group's direct operational control from its establishment in 1973 through 1980, when it assumed the western part of the newly redesignated Combined Field Army's sector. ROK MND, *History of the ROK-US Alliance*, 197-201. Similarly, the Combined Battle Staff test concept and the move toward combined exercises in the years preceding CFC's

establishment also are illustrative of the evolutionary pathway the U.S. and ROK were on. In 1975 the UNC / USFK staff initiated a research project for a future ROK/U.S. combined, joint headquarters to serve as a successor command to UNC. Simultaneously, the ROK and U.S. merged two separately held exercises in May 1975, the ROK Government mobilization exercise ULCHI, and the UNC computer-assisted, Operation Plan-oriented, command post exercise FOCUS-LENS. FOCUS LENS was an annual computer-assisted UNC exercise held since 1968 (replacing the COUNTERBLOW AND STRONG SHIED exercises held by the Far East Command and UNC since the 1950s) ULCHI was an annual mobilization exercise held by the ROK since 1969, following the attempted DPRK special forces raid on the ROK presidential palace in 1968. This new combined exercise tested the proficiency of a ROK-US combined battle staff. It was after this first test iteration that the UNC/USFK Commander recommended these two exercises remain combined, and also that the U.S. and ROK Governments pursue a "joint Korean-American command structure." Thereafter the combined ULCHI-FOCUS LENS served as a vehicle to test out concepts envisioned for the future CFC. UNC Command Historian Herman M. Katz, "Highlights of US Military Presence in Korea," memorandum for record, Yongsan Garrison, ROK, August 24, 1977, 5; Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, 7; Global Security.org, "Ulchi-Focus Lens," http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/ulchi-focus-lens.htm (accessed March 19, 2016); Robert Collins, "A Brief History of the US-ROK Combined Military Exercises," February 26, 2014, linked from the *John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, U.S.-Korea Institute Home Page* at "38 North.org," http://38north.org/2014/02/rcollins022714/#_ftn4 (accessed March 19, 2016). Jeongwon Yoon, "Recalibrating the US-ROK Alliance, Chapter 6, Alliance Activities: Meetings, Exercises and CFC's Roles." May 2003, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB53.pdf (accessed January 18, 2016), 96.

[48] Shawn P. Creamer, *Answering the Korea Question: U.S. Government Policy toward the Unified Command and the Korea Armistice Agreement*, Civilian Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 24, 2017), 18 and 72-74; LtCol Mel T. S. Han and Maj Dong Hyun Yoon CFC Historical Branch, *Headquarters ROK / US Combined Forces Command Historical Summary, November 7, 1978 – December 31, 1979*, (Yongsan Garrison, ROK: Command Historian Office), 1-2; Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, 5-7.

[49] During the majority of the war, the UNC headquarters in Tokyo was overwhelmingly manned (in a quad-role capacity) by U.S. personnel assigned to the FECOM, SCAP and Army Forces Far East (AFFE). The foundation of this co-located headquarters was the FECOM, which was "essentially an Army headquarters, staffed almost entirely by Army personnel, and resembling the structure of General MacArthur's World War II headquarters. Spencer D. Bakich, *Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf and Iraq Wars*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 70; James F. Schnabel, *United States Army in the Korean War – Policy and Direction: The First Year*, (Washington DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1972), 46-48. "Although these three commands (*UNC, FEC & SCAP*) were organized for different purposes, their operations were all conducted by a single commander-in-chief through a joint headquarters and staff, and the activities of the three commands were so interdependent that they can not logically be separated for historical purposes." Headquarters Army Forces Far East / Eighth Army (Rear), *The Far East Command, 1 January 1947 – 30 June 1957*, (Camp Zama, Japan: Office of Military History, Headquarters AFFE / Eighth Army (Rear), June 30, 1957), iii and 36-37. In the early days, prior to the joint reorganization that occurred in the FECOM and UNC in 1953: "Although a lack of balanced representation from the three services keeps GHQ, FEC from being classified as a joint headquarters in the common accepted sense, certain joint features do exist…." "The Far East Command is a unified rather than a joint command with command lines following straight service seniority channels as opposed to command responsibilities on a joint basis by geographical area." The 1953 reorganization modified the composition of the staff from largely Army-based to one with joint representation; a review of the headquarters line-wire diagram (page 21) shows that the FECOM / UNC J-4 and J-5 were officers sourced by the U.S. Navy, whereas prior to 1953 those positions were staffed by Army officers. Virgil Ney, *Evolution of a Theater of Operations Headquarters, 1941-1967*, (Fort Belvoir, VA: Combat Operations Research Group (CORG) Memorandum 318 for Headquarters, United States Army Combat Developments Command, 1967), 55-73.

[50] When UNC was established in July 1950, the FECOM maintained a ground component called AFFE, however the staff for AFFE was resourced by detailing personnel from the FECOM to serve in an Army component capacity. AFFE provided operational guidance and direction to the Army operational commands deployed to the Korean peninsula (Eighth Army and then X Corps after September 1950 when it operated as a separate, parallel command to Eighth Army) from the start of the U.S. ground campaign in July 1950 through 1 Oct 1952. A Korea

Communications Zone (KCOMZ) was established on July 10, 1952 to manage the rear area operations in Korea, which allowed Eighth Army to focus on the forward edge of the battle area. The Japanese regained their sovereignty at the end of 1952 through the Treaty of San Francisco, which allowed for the Supreme Command for Allied Powers (SCAP) to deactivate, which allowed for AFFE to be reorganized and assigned responsibility of Army forces in Japan on October 1, 1952. This arrangement continued with a single staff performing UNC, FECOM and AFFE duties through November 20, 1954, when Eighth Army moved to Japan and was designated as the AFFE (an Eighth Army Rear headquarters was retained in Korea). This November 1954 transition relieved the FECOM/UNC Commander of his AFFE duties for the first time. However, this was a temporary state of affairs. On April 1, 1955 the Eighth Army and AFFE Commander, LTG Maxwell Taylor, was appointed as the FECOM and UNC Commander. This action maintained separate headquarters staffs, but returned the practice of the theater commander retaining the GCC duty and responsibility. Later, headquarters Eighth Army and AFFE displaced back to the Korean Peninsula on July 26, 1955, leaving Eighth Army and AFFE (Forward) headquarters back in Japan to handle Army in Japan affairs – in effect a swap of the Eighth Army (Forward) and Eighth Army (Rear) command posts. Eighth Army Homepage, "History" tab, http://8tharmy.korea.army.mil/site/about/history.asp (accessed March 19, 2016); LtCol Slepicka, "UNC Fact Sheet," command-internal historical background and current status of the command, January 30, 1975, Tab A - Brief History of the United Nations Command; HQ AFFE / Eighth Army (Rear), *The Far East Command, 1 January 1947 – 30 June 1957*, 29, 36-37 and 57-58. The air component, Far East Air Force (FEAF), duties were performed by the Fifth Air Force, while the naval component, Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE), duties were performed by Seventh Fleet. FEAF and NAVFE planned and executed strategic, operational and tactical control over the air and naval campaign respectively. Thomas A. Cardwell III, *Command Structure for Theater Warfare, The Quest for Unity of Command*, Strategy Research Project (Maxwell AFB, AL: U.S. Air Force Air University Press, 1984) 13-17. When the FECOM was dissolved in 1957, Eighth Army continued to serve as a stand-alone headquarters and staff as the GCC for UNC and the service component command for USFK until 1974. LtGen Walter E. Todd, UNC Chief of Staff, "UNC General Order No 38, Announcement of UNC Component Commanders," Seoul, ROK, HQ UNC, October 09, 1957 (General Order No 38 remained in effect until 1981); LtGen Walter E. Todd, USFK Chief of Staff, "USFK General Order No 19, Announcement of Component Commanders," Seoul, ROK, HQ USFK, October 09, 1957 (General Order No 19 remained in effect until 1980). "Eighth Army headquarters was served by a general or G staff while UNC/USFK was served by a joint or J staff." It is important to note that while the headquarters were geographically separated, maintaining separate staffs for the most part, some low-density special staff and leaders were still appointed duties to UNC, USFK, and Eighth Army. Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, 25.

[51] In 1974, Eighth Army was absorbed into the UNC and USFK headquarters architecture, serving as a theater headquarters (UNC and USFK) and component commands (UNC's GCC and USFK's Army service component command) until 1978. UNC Command Historian Herman M. Katz, "US and ROK Military Commands in Korea." memorandum for record, September 16, 1974, 1. Katz, "US Military Presence in Korea," 4. The "staffs serving HQ Eighth Army and HQ UNC/USFK were integrated into a single joint staff on 1 Jul 74. Twelve of the 20 HQ EUSA special and personal staffs also served HQ UNC/USFK and were only slightly affected by establishment of HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA." Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, 27.

[52] Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 46; Glenn Rice, "CFC Command Relationship Orientation," briefing slides and scripted commentary, Yongsan, ROK, ROK / U.S. CFC, circa-1986, *Nautilus Institute Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document*, http://nautilus.org/foia-document/cfc-command-relationships-orientation/ (accessed August 14, 2016), 7. As an example, United States and ROK Navy and Air Force personnel, despite their inherent skills and experience shortcomings in directly supporting the execution of a ground campaign, perform duties for the CFC GCC. Prior to 1974 a separate GCC (Eighth Army) was retained by UNC while this command was the headquarters responsible for the defense of the ROK. When the United States and ROK established CFC in 1978 the two nations were unable to resource a separate GCC headquarters staff, so the deliberate decision was made to temporarily consolidate the theater and ground component headquarters. USFK Assistant Chief of Staff J3 MG Richard L. Prillaman and ROK JCS Assistant Chief of Staff J5 MG Jang-Nai Sohn, "Joint Recommendation for the Activation of the Combined Forces Command," memorandum for the Commander USFK and ROK CJCS, Seoul, ROK, December 13, 1977, 6.

[53] I Corps (U.S.) Group transformed into I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group in 1971 by the addition of ROK leadership and personnel to the I Corps (U.S.) Group headquarters. I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group was established as a temporary measure until TROKA could be established in 1973 and assume the western half of the ROK border with the DPRK.

ROK Government apprehension over the ability of a newly established Field Army, TROKA, to defend the two key maneuver corridors north of Seoul (Gaesong-Munsan and Chorwan-Uijeongbu) led to I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group remaining an operational command until 1980, when it was transformed and redesignated as the Combined Field Army (CFA). Near simultaneously with the establishment of the CFA, TROKA was operationally incorporated into the combined defense architecture when it was assigned the western half of the CFA's sector.

[54] UNC Deputy Commander, LtGen Evan W. Rosencrans, "UNC General Order No 1, Rescission of General Orders 38, 1957 and Announcement of UNC Component Commanders," January 31, 1981; USFK and Eighth Army Chief of Staff MG Kenneth E. Dohleman, USFK Permanent Order 68-5, Announcement of USFK Army Component Commander," May 21, 1980.

[55] Robert Collins, former Chief of Strategy, J5/C5/U5, United States Forces Korea, with duty to Combined Forces Command and United Nations Command, email exchange with author, October 4, 2017; USFK Chief of Staff LTG William W. Crouch, *Organization and Functions: United States Forces Korea*, USFK Memorandum 10-1, (Yongsan, ROK: United States Forces Korea, January 19, 1993); Rice, "CFC and UNC Command Relationship Orientation," 1993-era briefing slides, 8.

[56] 314th Air Division was redesignated as a numbered air force (7th Air Force) on September 8, 1986. U.S. Seventh Air Force, "Fact Sheet," *U.S. Pacific Air Force Home Page,* http://www.pacaf.af.mil/Info/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/909893/7th-air-force/ (accessed October 9, 2017); U.S. Fifth Air Force, "Fact Sheet," *U.S. Pacific Air Force Home Page,* http://www.5af.pacaf.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/459102/5th-air-force/ (accessed October 9, 2017).

[57] Collins, email exchange with author, October 4, 2017; In Bum Chun, retired ROK Army Lieutenant General, email exchange with author, November 11, 2017. The provisional CFC staff's "first substantive effort" came in spring 1978 when it managed TEAM SPIRIT 78. "ROK officers and men were at a distinct disadvantage in this exercise, having no institutional experience in planning and directing a joint / combined maneuver of TEAM SPIRIT's magnitude, and not being familiar with US staff procedures that were used." Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, 8 and 14.

[58] Jackson, *Why the Combined Field Army*; ROK MND, *History of the ROK-US Alliance*, 199-200;

[59] Prior to 1992 the CFC Commander was also designated as the CFC GCC Commander, however the change to ROK leadership within the GCC was made to reflect the significant role the ROK ground forces play in the combined defense, and to signal the changing paradigm within the ROK / U.S. security relationship. The CFC Commander provided the newly appointed GCC Commander with initial operating guidance following the formal decision by the Military Committee. CFC Commander GEN Robert W. RisCassi, "Responsibilities of Commander, Ground Component Command," memorandum for Commander Ground Component Command, Seoul, ROK, November 24, 1992.

[60] SUSMOAK Robert W. RisCassi and ROK CJCS Pil Sup Lee, "Chief of Staff, ROK/US Combined Forces Command," Ninth Permanent Session Memorandum No 1, Seoul, ROK, ROK / U.S. Military Committee Permanent Session, May 19, 1992. From 1978 to the present, the CFC staff has been appointed to simultaneously serve as members of the CFC GCC. After 1992, this became slightly more complicated with the transition of CFC GCC command to the CFC Deputy Commander and the appointment of the Eighth Army Commander as the CFC GCC Deputy Commander. Thereafter, the ROK designated a standalone cadre separate from the CFC headquarters to perform CFC GCC duties. Likewise, with the appointment of the Eighth Army Commander as the CFC GCC Deputy Commander, by extension the Eighth Army staff also added GCC duties and responsibilities based on the long-standing principle that a staff is an extension of a commander.

[61] The ROK Government assumed the counter-infiltration mission set in 1967. In addition, the ROK Government retained operational control over its special forces since their creation in 1967. Moreover, when the U.S. and ROK established CFC in 1978, certain elements of the ROK Armed Forces were omitted from the designated force list from which the ROK Government delegated operational control to CFC.

[62] SUSMOAK Louis C. Menetrey and ROK CJCS Ja Bok Oh, "A review of the future roles, missions ROK / U.S. and organization of the Combined Forces Command (CFC 90)," Seventh Permanent Session, Seoul, ROK, Military Committee Permanent Session, September 23, 1987. This agreement was one of the first recorded combined explorations of modifying the CFC operating construct, including operational control arrangements.

[63] In Bum Chun, "Korean Defense Reform: History and Challenges," October 31, 2017, The Brookings Institute online https://www.brookings.edu/research/korean-defense-reform-history-and-challenges/ (accessed December 27, 2019).

[64] ROK CJCS GEN Pil Sup Lee letter to Commander CFC Robert W. RisCassi, Yongsan, ROK, June 29, 1992. While GEN Lee's letter was addressed to GEN RisCassi in his CFC capacity, the contents of the letter appears that the letter was intended to GEN RisCassi in his SUSMOAK, Military Committee capacity. The ROK CJCS letter to GEN RisCassi provided a window into ROK national authority rational for why it was considering withdrawing operational control of its forces from CFC. GEN Lee further reviewed that the 13th Military Committee Permanent Session meeting "agreed provisionally to transfer the armistice OPCON to ROK during Nunn-Warner phase II (1993-95)…" GEN Lee further proposed that the ROK and U.S. conduct a "joint study committee" to examine this issue in preparation for the 14th Military Committee Permanent Session meeting.

[65] Creamer, "Theater-level Command and Alliance Decision-Making," 49.

[66] "Any state that hosts foreign forces and relies on those forces for its defense is not fully sovereign: it is dependent upon others to ensure its security. This describes the Republic of Korea today." Jessica J Lee, "The U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Toward a Relationship of Equals," December 4, 2019, *Quincy Institute*, https://quincyinst.org/2019/12/04/quincy-brief-jesss-pieces-on-korea/ (accessed January 2, 2020), 1. The author's assertion is a common belief amongst Korean elites, particularly those of progressive leanings and the victimhood culture that they promulgate, but such a perspective unfortunately misses the fundamental underpinnings of collective self-defense (Article 7 of the UN Charter) and military alliances. If one subscribes to the assertion, that hosting or relying on foreign forces for defense means one is not sovereign, then the majority of Western Europe lost their status as sovereign powers when NATO was formed in 1949.

[67] Creamer, "Theater-level Command and Alliance Decision-Making," 49; Creamer, *Answering the Korea Question*, 21.

[68] Creamer, *Answering the Korea Question*, 24-25.

[69] ROK JCS and USFK were empowered through the incremental transfers of responsibilities from CFC and UNC, modifications to force structure and basing, and adjustments in operating concepts:

- The United States and the ROK concluded the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) agreements in 2004, which moved U.S. forces out of the Seoul Metropolitan area, returned other U.S. controlled bases and training facilities outside of Seoul back to the ROK Government, and facilitated the reposture of U.S. forces at bases and infrastructure in the southern part of the ROK. Sanghee Lee, *2008 Defense White Paper*, (Seoul, ROK: ROK Ministry of National Defense, December 31, 2008), 91-92; Jang Soo Kim, *2006 Defense White Paper*, (Seoul, ROK: ROK Ministry of National Defense, December 31, 2006), 98-100.
- The following ten Military Missions performed by CFC, USFK or UNC were transferred to ROK JCS between 2004 and 2008: Security Mission of the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom (October 2004); Rear Area Decontamination Operations (August 2004); Installation of Rapid Mines (August 2005); Management of Air-to-Ground training ranges (August 2005); Counterfire Fight headquarters (October 2005); Control of Main Supply Routes (October 2005); Counter-Special Operations Forces (C-SOF) Operations (January 2006); Close Air Support (CAS) Control (August 2006); Weather forecast (December 2006); and Combat Search and Rescue (September 2008). Lee, *2008 Defense White Paper*, 85; Kim, *2006 Defense White Paper*, 100-101.
- In 2005, the ROK Government implemented an aggressive, far reaching defense reform program called National Defense Reform 2020, to improve the individual military departments, its joint warfighting interoperability and warfighting capabilities, and prepare the Armed Forces capacity to function as a leading nation in a multinational coalition. ROK Army Headquarters, "Direction for the Future Army: Structure and Organization," ROK Army Homepage, http://www.army.mil.kr/webapp/user/indexSub.do?codyMenuSeq=219372&siteId=english (accessed January 12, 2017); Bruce W. Bennett, "A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea's Defense Reform Plan," (Santa Monica, CA: Research and Development (RAND) Corporation, 2006), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2006/RAND_OP165.pdf, (accessed January 17, 2017); Chun, "Korean Defense Reform: History and Challenges."

- Likewise, the United States also implemented several force structure changes to its posture on the Korean Peninsula, mostly by reducing, streamlining, and adjusting its forward stationed forces and headquarters units. While there were many visible physical changes, much of the change was conceptual and procedural. At least since 1992, U.S. service members have had to grapple with the dichotomy of operating in the co-located CFC, UNC and USFK headquarters, with its competing responsibilities, authorities, and in certain cases blurry chains of command. Despite the challenges the competing demands were by and large met, however in the mid-2000s U.S. service members focused disproportionately more on USFK duties at the expense of their CFC duties.
- Furthermore, as part of this effort to incrementally transfer mission responsibilities, the empowerment of the ROK JCS headquarters, and the conceptual shift by U.S. service members toward USFK duties, CFC stopped doing things that it previously had done. These included, but are not limited to, the development, refinement and production of combined doctrine, maintaining the CFC Organization and Functions Manual (O&FM), a combined manning document for the headquarters, and developing and promulgating combined doctrine and warfighting techniques such as the two volume CFC Combined Operation Guidance manuals (last produced in 1988). Moreover the United States and ROK have not updated the Terms of Reference for the Military Committee and ROK / U.S. CFC or the Strategic Directive since 1999 – over 17 years.

[70] The reasons for the course correction are many, but included a reappraisal of the threat posed by North Korea, concerns over operational shortcomings within the parallel command system, financial difficulties associated with the 2008 recession, and the concerns that insufficient time had been allotted for the South Korean Armed Forces to develop the minimum capabilities to operate more independently.

[71] Creamer, *Answering the Korea Question*, 24-25.

[72] General Headquarters, FECOM and SCAP, *Organization of General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command* (Tokyo, Japan, February 28, 1950), VFM Collection, Box 84, Folder 20, United States Army History and Education Center (USAHEC), 2.

[73] GHQ, FECOM and SCAP, *Organization of GHQ SCAP and FECOM*, 2; HQ AFFE / 8A (Rear), *The Far East Command, 1947-1957*, 14; Ney, *Evolution of a Theater of Operations Headquarters, 1941-1967*, 59-62; Korea Institute of Military History, *The Korean War, Volume 1*, 344.

[74] Ney, *Evolution of a Theater of Operations Headquarters, 1941-1967*, 65-68.

[75] Ibid, 68.

[76] Ibid, 68.

[77] "HQ COMDT provides support for the headquarters of USFK/EUSA in garrison and during field operations, less installation and facilities engineer assistance. Units assigned to HQ COMDT are: HHC EUSA, EUSA Band, USA Elm, Honor Guard Co, USA MP Det-K, 21st Trans Co (Car), 38th Chem Det, Sp Forces Det-K, and the EUSA Wightman NCO Academy." Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, 343.

[78] Prillaman and Sohn, "Joint Recommendation for the Activation of CFC," 8-9; GEN John W. Vessey Jr., *Headquarters United Nations Command / United States Forces Korea / Eighth United States Army Annual Historical Report, 1977*, (Yongsan Garrison, ROK: Command Historian Office), 14-15; Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, 20 and 33; Commander CFC GEN John J. Vessey, "Designation of Certain CFC Staff Members to Serve on UNC Staff" memorandum to the CFC Staff, Yongsan, ROK, November 7, 1978; Deputy Commander UNC, USFK and Chief of Staff CFC LtGen Charles A. Gabriel, "Letter of Instruction No 2-1, Composition of the UNC Staff," memorandum for the UNC, CFC and USFK staffs, February 22, 1979.

[79] UNC & CFC Chief of Staff LTG Richard F. Timmons, *Headquarters UNC/CFC Organization and Functions Manual*, (Yongsan, ROK: United Nations Command and Combined Forces Command, October 17, 1995); Crouch, *Organization and Functions: USFK*, USFK Memo 10-1; Rice, "CFC and UNC Command Relationship Orientation," 1993-era briefing slides, 8-10 and 12-13; Commander UNC GEN Robert W. RisCassi, "UNC Staff Organization," memorandum to CFC and USFK staff appointing officers to the UNC staff, September 28, 1992.

[80] It was accepted by senior leaders within the U.S. Government that neither the UNC nor the U.S. had any authority to establish strength levels for Korean forces. U.S. insistence on ROK Armed Forces force structure and

levels was solely based on availability of equipment and funding, not on what the ROK Government could put into the field. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 100 and 169.

[81] From 1957 to 1978 UNC and USFK headquarters were combined. Eighth Army was the designated Ground Component for UNC and the Army Forces component for USFK, but in 1974 its staff was consolidated into UNC and USFK.

[82] ROK MND, *History of the ROK-US Alliance*, 98-110; Daniel P. Bolger, *Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1991).

[83] By June 1979 active Sending State members in Korea with accredited liaison delegations included the Australia, Canada, Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom. Token forces continued to also be provided to the UNC Honor Guard by the Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom. U.S. Department of State, "U.S. and the UN in Korea," briefing paper for the National Security Council (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, June 01, 1979), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/NKIDP_The_Carter_Chill_Briefing_Book.pdf (accessed May 1, 2017), 529.

[84] One non-U.S. officer from the UNC Sending States was officially posted to the UNC staff from 1952-1954, followed by a replacement officer from 1954-1956. Both were from the UK. Creamer, *Answering the Korea Question*, 8.

[85] Per Article 2.B. paragraph 24 of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the MAC was established by the Korean War belligerents to supervise the implementation of the Armistice Agreement and to settle, through negotiation, any violations of the Armistice. Article 2.B. paragraph 20 of the Korean Armistice Agreement governs the MAC composition: It consists of ten senior officer members, five appointed by the Commander UNC, and five appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA) and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV). The UNC appointed delegation is referred to as the UNC MAC, or UNCMAC, and serves as the representative of the UNC Commander. The MAC was charged with the responsibility for jointly supervising, observing, inspecting and investigating within the confines of the Demilitarized Zone, while the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was established to carry out reciprocal supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation functions as stipulated in sub-paragraphs 13(c) and 13(d), and as requested by the MAC in paragraph 28 on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone.

[86] For example, the CFC headquarters in 1979 consisted of 556 service members and civilians from the United States and ROK. While in the aggregate the United States provided 195 (35%) and the ROK 361 (65%), it is important to note that of the 361 Koreans assigned to CFC, approximately 90 were assigned to duty with the Headquarters Commandant section. The Headquarters Commandant, a support section, was overwhelming manned by Koreans, with only token U.S. presence. Therefore, after stripping out the Headquarters Commandant personnel the core of the CFC was near-equally manned by the ROK (~58%) and U.S. (~42%). Prillaman and Sohn, "Joint Recommendation for the Activation of CFC," 11; Han and Yoon, *HQ ROK / US CFC Historical Summary*, 18.

[87] The I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group was later transformed slightly and redesignated as the CFA in 1980. In addition, while TROKA was established in 1973, in 1980 it became operational when it assumed the western half of the CFA's sector.

[88] Creamer, *Answering the Korea Question*, 72-73.

[89] UNC Rear was established in 1957 as a part of the Unified Command Plan's Pacific (FECOM / USINDOPACOM) Consolidation. The UN bases in Japan, and the privileges and immunities granted by the Government of Japan (GOJ) to UNC Sending States forces and their service members on duty in Japan are addressed via the 1954-era "Agreement Regarding the Status of United Nations Forces in Japan," more commonly referred to as the UN - GOJ Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). When UNC displaced forward from Japan to Korea in 1957, the GOJ stipulated that it would continue to support the UN-GOJ SOFA if UNC complied with the following stipulations (see Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, 31; UNC Rear HQ, "Fact Sheet," 2):

- UNC must maintain a presence in Japan
- UNC Rear must be multinational

- The U.S. and Japan must mutually designate U.S. bases for co-use by UNC Member Nations (Sending States)
- The UNC-designated bases must fly the UN flag
- UNC must exercise the use of those bases by UN-GOJ SOFA signatories

[90] Gabriel, "Letter of Instruction No 2-1," Memo; Rice, "CFC Command Relationship Orientation," 6.

[91] The reason for this is explained best in the 1991 version, "The two headquarters are separate and distinct legal entities, but there is a close operational relationship between the two that is addressed throughout this manual." MAJ GEN James F. Record, *Headquarters UNC/CFC Organization and Functions Manual*, (Yongsan, ROK: United Nations Command and Combined Forces Command, April 1, 1991), i.

[92] The CFC and UNC O&FM was first published in 1979, and revised in 1984, 1988, 1991, 1995, and 1997 (last update). For the most part this document focuses on the CFC organization and staff, with limited detailed breakout of the UNC staff.

[93] UNC & CFC Chief of Staff LTG Randolph House, *Headquarters UNC/CFC Organization and Functions Manual*, (Yongsan, ROK: United Nations Command and Combined Forces Command, November 7, 1997).

[94] UNC and ROK / U.S. CFC: Joint Table of Distribution, FY2003, hard copy file.

[95] It must also be stated that this U.S. manpower document might also include unfunded positions for U.S. or other non-ROK multinational personnel.

[96] Lee, *2008 Defense White Paper*, 87-88.

[97] France returned to active status in UNC in 1985 and Columbia returned in 1987.

[98] By 1990 the eight active Sending States on the Korean Peninsula were: Australia, Canada, Columbia, France, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom; while the ten active Sending States in Japan were: Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. UNC Chief of Staff MajGen Richard C. Carr, *Accreditation of Personnel to United Nations Command*, UNC Regulation 600-2 (Yongsan, ROK, HQ UNC, January 10, 1990). Italy and South Africa later ceased active involvement in the UN-GOJ SOFA.

[99] The last two Sending States to return to active status in the UNC headquarters on the Korean Peninsula were South Africa in 2010 and Italy in 2013. Both nations have not resumed yet involvement with UN-GOJ SOFA and the UNC Rear headquarters and the UN bases in Japan.

[100] While the ROK does maintain individual information sharing (secrecy exchange) agreements with the majority of UNC Sending States. These agreements do not extend into ROK / U.S. Alliance information. By not extending information sharing between the ROK and UNC Sending States into the ROK / U.S. Alliance domain, wartime planning and integration of UNC Sending States is therefore still retarded and immature after six decades of involvement in Korean Peninsula affairs.

[101] Creamer, *Answering the Korea Question*, 24-25; Kim, *2006 Defense White Paper*, 107-108.

[102] Lee, *2008 Defense White Paper*, 88-90.

[103] Executive branch transitions in both the United States and the ROK appear to be having an accelerating effect on Alliance Transformation efforts. Various Alliance managers have conveyed that organizational energy is being placed on realizing the post-CFC environment, which has put initiatives like the update to the CFC O&FM on the back-burner for the time being.

[104] This is largely due to the respective Military Departments requirements to analyze their ability to support with their existing (and projected) force structure, and by the fact that all changes must be programed into their future force structure.

[105] Organizational / Force Redesign and manpower document development are tedious and demanding whole of staff efforts that require determined leadership, foresight and the right supporting external conditions to be productive and successful. In the case of the Alliance command in Korea, both the United States and the ROK must agree on changes. When faced with uncertain conditions, Alliance leaders often make the conscious decision to

continue usage of the existing force structure and manpower documents for the time being, and await further clarifying outcomes of the bilateral process before pursuing new initiatives to update Alliance force structure or manpower documents.

[106] Components follow a similar letter designation format, with Army and Marine forces using the "G-Staff" designation to denote it is a single service, single nation "General Staff", while the Air Force headquarters use the "A-Staff" designation to telegraph that the headquarters is a Air Force unit. Naval headquarters use the "N-Staff" designation to likewise announce that the section is a staff supporting a Naval headquarters. Of note, the CFC GCC staff for the most part refers to itself using the "G-Staff" lexicon, but does also refer to itself in numerous forums in the "C-Staff" designation to highlight it is a combined staff.

[107] "Regardless of how the MNF (Multinational Force) is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces normally establishes a national component, often called a national command element, to effectively administer its forces. The national component provides a means to administer and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations directly to the multinational commander, and facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations. In an administrative role, these national components are similar to a service component command at the unified command level in a US joint organization." U.S. JCS, *Multinational Operations*, JP 3-16, II-6. "National command elements represent the national command channels from each individual nation within the multinational command." U.S. JCS, *Multinational Operations*, JP 3-16, II-7, II-8.

[108] U.S. Joint lexicon typically uses the term "director" in lieu of the more Army-centric "ACoS," however considering the Army domination of USFK, the term ACoS is more typically used.

[109] Within the General Staff Model, the term "Assistant Chief of Staff" (ACoS) is used to designate the senior officer within a staff section. All four theater level commands in Korea use this designation. In the case of the J3 / C3 / U3 and the J5 / C5 / U5, both ACoS positions are sourced by a U.S. O-8 GO/FO. In the case of both the C3 and C5, the staff section's deputy, or DCoS, is a ROK O-8 GO/FO and O-7 GO/FO respectively. This ROK DCoS is also appointed as the DCoS for the U3 and U5, respectively, as well. However in the case of the U5, a second DCoS, has been appointed. The second U5 DCoS is one of the Foreign Exchange Officers, an Australian O-7 GO/FO.

[110] The word "control" was purposely substituted in front of "command" to more accurately describe the relationship of this exercise of authority and direction in multinational commands. In multinational commands control is delegated by the respective nations, becoming the foundation of how the command functions operationally, all the while the contributing nation's retain command authority over their assigned forces. This fact of life of multinational commands is often lost on leaders whose formative experiences are often unilateral and single service, where command authority has a much higher place in terms of authority and direction over military affairs than a specific control relationship.

[111] For the purposes of this paper the staff structure is only considered CFC if both the United States and the ROK dedicate personnel resources to a particular staff organization. So when only the United States or the ROK have personnel assigned to a division, it is not considered CFC for the purposes of this paper, but a unilateral supporting adjunct to CFC. Examples include the USFK Commanders Initiative Group, Religious Affairs, or Knowledge Management Offices which are only sourced by the United States and the Financial Management Office and the Support Group which is only sourced by the ROK. U.S. Forces Korea J8, "ROK and U.S. CFC and USFK Master Joint Table of Distribution Working Spreadsheet," Seoul, ROK, U.S. Forces Korea, May 4, 2017; LTC Heather Reed, U.S. Army, Force Structure Analyst, J8, U.S. Forces Korea, email exchange with author, May 5, 2017. In addition, in early 2017 the Strategic Assessments and Strategic Communications Divisions were moved from the C5 to the CFC Commander's Personal / Special staff; Of note, within CFC, the Strategic Assessments and Strategic Communications Divisions are stand-alone organizations. However, within the USFK staff both these staff divisions operate under the USFK Commander's Initiative Group. Mr. Carl McGowan, International Relations Officer, U5 Policy, United Nations Command, email exchange with author, May 5, 2017.

[112] The addition of structure to the CFC headquarters was routinely exercised through bilateral agreement by the Military Committee's Permanent Session. These Permanent Session decisions on structure historically (through 1997) were codified in the CFC O&FM, but also endorsed by the Plenary Session when it met annually. In certain cases the United States and ROK have updated the Terms of Reference for the Military Committee and ROK / U.S.

CFC, although this happened so infrequently that most changes were just updated in the CFC O&FM, although this has not been updated since 1997. As an example, the Military Committee's Permanent Session established a bilateral Provost Marshal staff section for the CFC staff on December 19, 2003. SUSMOAK GEN Leon J. LaPorte and ROK CJCS GEN Jong-hwan Kim, "Establishment of a ROK / U.S. Combined Force Command Provost Marshal Staff Section," ROK / U.S. Military Committee Permanent Session memorandum for record, Seoul, ROK, December 19, 2003. However, since the CFC O&FM has not been updated since 1997 and the Terms of Reference has not been updated since 1999, this decision on the Provost Marshal office has not been formally codified as previously had been the practice.

[113] CFC used to maintain a combined Financial Management section with the C5 until the early 2000s. This section developed a combined budget, obligated funds, and performed other bilateral financial matters. LTG House, *HQ UNC/CFC Organization and Functions Manual*, 6-5-1 and 6-5-3.

[114] There are incomplete references within the CFC archives of three failed attempts between 1978 and 1987 to establish an independent GCC and at least two failed attempts in the 1990s. Manpower shortfalls and infrastructure start-up costs appear to have been the primary impediment over the years.

[115] This practice is a post-2008 paradigm. Prior to 2008, the U.S. CFC staff were resourced from the U.S. maintained combined manning document for CFC. This combined manning document also included U.S. personnel for UNC. USFK staff were resourced separately in another JTD document. After 2008 the overwhelming majority of U.S. personnel for all three theater commands the U.S. provided staffing for, were resourced through USFK JTD manning documents in conjunction with a very small residual JTD manning document for UNC.

[116] Creamer, "Theater-level Command and Alliance Decision-Making," 43-44.

[117] Ibid; Vessey, *HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Annual Historical Report, 1978*, 14 and 16.

[118] There are two operational ROK Field Armies commanded by O-10 GO/FO, First ROK Army (FROKA) and Third ROK Army (TROKA). FROKA is responsible for defending the eastern half of the ROK, while TROKA is responsible for defending the western half of the ROK. These Field Armies control forward ROK Army units and during Armistice remain under the operational control of ROK JCS. At a pre-determined point during crisis, the United States and ROK would transfer responsibility for defending the ROK from ROK JCS to CFC, provide CFC with requisite authorities to prosecute a campaign, and provide CFC with forces (including the two ROK Field Armies and their subordinate units). Creamer, "Theater-level Command and Alliance Decision-Making," 48-49; Creamer, *Answering the Korea Question*, 21-22.

[119] As an example, at times there will be meetings between CFC and ROK JCS regarding Alliance affairs. In some of these meetings some (or all) ROK CFC officers will end up sitting across the table or on the side of the room with the ROK JCS service members, instead of sitting with their U.S. CFC counterparts.

[120] From the earliest inception of CFC, a deliberate effort was exerted by both the U.S. and ROK leadership within the Alliance command to ensure the headquarters staff was integrated, and not just co-located, operating separately under the respective NCE. In the early days of CFC, the U.S. appointed CFC Commander provided descriptive instructions to his ROK appointed Deputy Commander on the functions, duties and priorities he wished his Deputy to concentrate his attention on. In two separate mission letter iterations the CFC Commander stressed the necessity of having the staff work combined under the direction of the Chief of Staff. Two separate CFC Commanders conveyed that they (Commander and Deputy Commander) must not permit the staff to operate divided along national lines with the ROK officers reporting to you (Deputy Commander) and the U.S. officers reporting to me (CFC Commander)." Commander in Chief Combined Forces Command, GEN John W. Vessey Jr., "Mission Letter," memorandum for the Deputy Commander in Chief Combined Forces Command, GEN Byung-hun Ryu, which described the functions and duties he wanted concentrated on, Seoul, ROK, November 10, 1978; Commander in Chief Combined Forces Command, GEN John A. Wickham Jr., "Mission Letter," memorandum for the Deputy Commander in Chief Combined Forces Command, GEN Seok-ju Baek, which described the functions and duties he wanted concentrated on, Seoul, ROK, July 15, 1980.

[121] ROK MND, *History of the ROK-US Alliance*, 280-285; Tara O, "U.S. – ROK Strategic Alliance 2015," *Council on Foreign Relations: Asia Unbound*, blog entry posted September 1, 2010, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2010/09/01/u-s-rok-strategic-alliance-2015/ (accessed April 26, 2017); Lee, *2008 Defense White Paper*, 88-90; Kim, *2006 Defense White Paper*, 102-104 and 107-108.

[122] Dr. Bruce Bechtol, "Symposium on OpCon Transfer and its Implications for the U.S.-ROK Alliance," panelist statement, Willard Intercontinental, March 25, 2010, https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/OpconTranscript.pdf (accessed November 29, 2017). Moreover, between 2007 and 2012, the U.S. and ROK developed and established a CFC functional component command, called the Combined Joint Task Force 8 (CJTF-8). The United States Eighth Army headquarters was designated as the organizational foundation for CJTF-8, with the Eighth Army Commander serving as the CJTF commander once the command was activated. CJTF-8 had the Alliance mission to conduct weapons of mass destruction elimination operations during hostilities and post-hostilities. "Operations Group Alpha trains U.S., Korean forces," *Fort Leavenworth Lamp*, March 29, 2013, http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/article/20130328/News/130329044/?tag=1 (accessed April 28, 2016); Walter T. Ham IV, "Enter the Dragon: Eighth Army unveils new emblem," *Korea Stars and Stripes*, April 18, 2013, http://korea.stripes.com/base-info/enter-dragon-eighth-army-unveils-new-emblem (accessed April 29, 2016).

[123] ROK MND, *History of the ROK-US Alliance*, 284-285.

[124] Assertions that the Military Committee would exist as a consultative body without power to issue guidance, direction or orders, or that American forces would be commanded or controlled by the Korean government are without merit. There is no doubt that the U.S. Government would have an active say in the strategic to tactical prosecution of any campaign that its Armed Forces participate in, for Alliances, by their very nature, are a "matter of sovereignty sharing." Dr. Patrick Cronin, "Symposium on OpCon Transfer and its Implications for the U.S.-ROK Alliance," panelist statement, Willard Intercontinental, March 25, 2010, https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/OpconTranscript.pdf (accessed November 29, 2017).

[125] See note 69.

[126] Since its inception, USFK has maintained stronger levels of control over U.S. Army forces forward stationed to the Korean Peninsula, while it has at the same time maintained lesser control over U.S. Air Force units. USFK control over U.S. Naval and Marine Corps forces has been negligible, largely resulting from an absence of forces being forward stationed on the Korean Peninsula, than an issue of Military Department policy.

[127] One minor modification was made by the author from the information contained on the USFK Homepage to the ACoS J5 Divisional and the Personal / Special Staff structure. While the USFK Homepage articulates that policy and strategy are consolidated into one division, the command maintains a separate Strategic Assessments Division from the Policy Division (even though the Policy Division still officially retains the "Strategy" lexicon in its title). Furthermore, the Strategic Assessments and Strategic Communications Divisions were moved under the USFK Commander's Initiative Group in 2017. HQ USFK, "Commander's Strategic Initiative Group Terms of Reference," Yongsan, ROK, October 2016.

[128] This was driven by the bilateral decision to transition from an integrated, CFC-led combined defense to a parallel, ROK JCS (supported) / KORCOM (supporting) combined defense in the 2002-2006 timeframe. CFC was in the process of being disestablished while ROK JCS and USFK (KORCOM) were being reinforced for a 2009-2012 transition window.

[129] At one point in the late 1970s through early 1990s, the U.S. had appointed its O-10 GO/FO assigned to the ROK with eight different positions / roles – Commander-in-Chief, UNC; Commander-in-Chief, CFC; Commander, USFK; Commander UNC GCC; Commander, CFC GCC; Commanding General, U.S. Eighth Army; Senior U.S. Military Officer Assigned to Korea (SUSMOAK); and Senior Defense Representative (SDR) to the ROK. Rice, "CFC Command Relationship Orientation," 6-7. Over time some of these positions / roles have been transferred to other parties. Currently this U.S. O-10 GO/FO retains five distinct positions / roles - Commander, UNC; Commander, CFC; Commander, USFK; SUSMOAK; and SDR to the ROK.

[130] Duty appointments have evolved over time. While the Army O-9 was appointed as the Chief of Staff to USFK and UNC, during the 2011-2012 timeframe, he was given permission to step back from an active daily role as the Chief of Staff and his USAF O-8 FO/GO Deputy Chief of Staff assumed the daily functions. This temporary measure was instituted to allow the Army O-9 to dedicate time and energy toward the Eighth Army transformation from an Army Service Component Command to a Field Army, including the operationalization of the CJTF-8. Later in 2017 the Army O-9 was reportedly again relieved from duties as the USFK and UNC Chief of Staff, returning to the 2011-2012 paradigm with the USFK and UNC Chief of Staff duties being performed by an USAF O-8 GO/FO.

[131] "UN Security Council Resolution 84, Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea, S/RES/84," July 7, 1950, Lake Placid, NY, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/84(1950) (accessed January 10, 2017).

[132] See note 16.

[133] The 1978 mission transfer from UNC to CFC also resulted in a personnel transition to support the change. In effect, the UNC staff became the U.S. contribution to the CFC staff, to which the ROK added a contingent of personnel to staff the newly formed CFC. At this time the USFK and Eighth Army headquarters were separate from UNC. The USFK and Eighth Army staffs were unified with the service members dual-hatted to both commands, and remained separate and distinct from UNC after the 1978 change of mission. A personnel sourcing solution for UNC was not specified when CFC was in development, under the assumption that UNC's reduced mission and functions could be handled by the UNC Commander and the supporting UNC MAC Secretariat. In addition, the Joint Activation Committee for the establishment of CFC also recommended that the "staff officers of CFC will serve as the staff of UNC." Prillaman and Sohn, "Joint Recommendation for the Activation of CFC," 1.

[134] The UNC headquarters has never been a stand-alone headquarters due to personnel limitations. UNC was established in 1950 and shared a staff with the FECOM until the FECOM was disestablished. USFK was simultaneously established in 1957 as the FECOM cased its colors. The UNC then shared its staff, in a dual-hatted capacity with USFK until 1978 (also sharing personnel with Eighth Army from 1974 until 1978), when the UNC / CFC mission transition occurred. Thereafter UNC staff has remained largely connected with the CFC staff, with a few isolated exceptions. A decade after the CFC – UNC transition, co-location of the headquarters, and sharing of the staffs, an independent assessment had this to say about the arrangement, "The headquarters organization of these two commands are so interwoven as to be inseparable from a manpower accounting perspective." OSD Study Team Chairman Derek J. Vander Schaaf, "Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters," study report to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, February 1988, App E13, 1.

[135] Despite the recommendation of the Joint Activation Committee, the CFC / UNC staff relationship was not codified officially in the activation agreements. Therefore, in order to address the emerging personnel gap for the UNC, the UNC Commander in collaboration with the new CFC Commander (they were the same individual) appointed a nominal UNC staff. Vessey, "Designation of Certain CFC Staff Members to Serve on UNC Staff" Memo. In early 1979 an exchange of letters occurred between the members of the Military Committee Permanent Session that legitimized the November 1978 appointment of CFC staff members to perform UNC duties, and for those appointed officers to utilize CFC staff members in the course of their duties. Commander CFC GEN John J. Vessey, "Designation of Certain CFC Staff Members to Serve on UNC Staff" letter for ROK CJCS GEN Jong-Hwan Kim, Yongsan, ROK, January 16, 1979; ROK CJCS GEN Jong-Hwan Kim, "Letter concerning the 'Designation of Certain CFC Staff Members to Serve on UNC Staff'," letter for Commander CFC GEN John J. Vessey, Yongsan, ROK, January 19, 1979.

[136] The UNC MAC Secretariat assumed many duties previously performed by the UNC staff after 1978. The UNC Commander initiated a revitalization initiative in 2015, which resulted in the UNC MAC Secretariat transferring many of the duties they assumed post-1978 back to the UNC staff. UNC Commander Curtis M. Scaparrotti, "Revitalizing the United Nations Command," letter to the UNC Sending State Ambassadors, Seoul, ROK, April 9, 2015; UNC Deputy Chief of Staff MajGen James C. Slife, "DCoS Decisions from UNC Revitalization OPT Outbrief on 26 April 2016", memorandum for record, Seoul, ROK, May 4, 2016; HQ UNC, *Headquarters United Nations Command Organization and Functions Manual – Final Draft*, (Yongsan, ROK: United Nations Command, July 6, 2017). Below are list of the transferred duties and which staff directorate assumed the duties previously performed by the UNC MAC Secretariat:

- Liaison Accreditation: U1, U5
- Issuance of UNC Identification (ID) cards: UNC no longer issues ID cards; Liaison Group personnel are now issued a U.S. Installation Visitor Access Card, while FEOs are issued a U.S. Armed Forces Common Access Card: U1 processes request and issues CAC to FEOs, while the Installation Visitor Center issues the installation Visitor Access Card
- UNC Distinguished Visitors: Secretary of the Joint Staff
- UNC Commander Ambassador Roundtable Forum: Commander's Strategic Initiatives Group (reportedly renamed from Commander's Initiatives Group in spring 2017)

- UNC Sending State Exercise Planning and Coordination: U3 MNCC
- Logistical Support and Coordination with UNC Sending States: U4
- Operations and Intelligence Updates to UNC Liaison Group: As tasked by the Commander's Strategic Initiatives Group
- Mail Support Operations for UNC Liaison Group: U1
- UNC Liaison Group staff coordination office in UNC headquarters: U3 MNCC

[137] "The United Nations organization is largely a paper one, which has predominantly diplomatic and representational functions." Vander Schaaf, "Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters," App E13, 2.

[138] One example of how UNC operated within the CFC architecture is the use of duty titles. For the most part the appointed UNC staff members utilized their CFC position (specifically their C-staff designation / position) in UNC administrative actions and correspondence. Use of U-staff designations did not materialize until the early 2000s, after the 1999 staff change by the UNC Commander (discussed later). However, the UNC Commander and the personnel associated with the UNC MAC continued to utilize stand-alone UNC designations and titles in administrative actions and correspondence.

[139] Gabriel, "Letter of Instruction No 2-1," Memo.

[140] Commander UNC GEN William J. Livsey, "UNC Staff Members," memorandum for the UNC Staff regarding the reappointment and new appointment of staff members to the UNC staff, June 19, 1987.

[141] RisCassi, "UNC Staff Organization," Memo. GEN RisCassi did not materially alter the CFC staff members designated or their functional assignments on the UNC staff, but did designate specific USFK staff to the UNC staff in his 1992 appointment memorandum.

[142] The ROK Government often refers to the ROK JCS as the "Integrated Defense Headquarters" when articulating the ROK JCS operational mission. Han, *2016 Defense White Paper*, 64-65; ROK JCS Home Page, "Legal Authority" tab, http://jcs.mil.kr/mbshome/mbs/jcs2_eng/subview.jsp?id=jcs2_eng_020300000000 (accessed August 14, 2017).

[143] Creamer, "Theater-level Command and Alliance Decision-Making," note 59. In recent years ROK Government officials have started to challenge CODA in open forums as directive authority over ROK forces, particularly as ROK JCS was ceded power and authority from CFC as part of the Alliance Transformation effort to a parallel (ROK JCS / KORCOM), combined defense concept.

[144] This staffing challenge does not apply to personnel assigned under foreign exchange officer programs, which are addressed in bilateral, international agreements.

[145] HQ UNC / USFK / 8A Judge Advocate COL Richard J. Bednar, "Combined Command," legal memorandum for UNC / USFK / 8A J3 MG Richard L. Prillaman, Yongsan, ROK, December 2, 1977. MG Prillaman was serving in the capacity as the U.S. lead negotiator (under his USFK J2 duty) for the CFC Activation Committee. COL Bednar also stated in his legal opinion that there was "no specific legal objection to the concept" of dual hatting CFC officers to UNC positions, largely on the principle that the "commander may choose his own staff," and that any "potential legal snags can be anticipated and provided for by alert organization and staffing."

[146] Commander UNC GEN John H. Tilelli, "UNC Staff Organization," memorandum to CFC and USFK staff appointing officers to the UNC staff, March 11, 1999; HQ UNC and CFC, "UNC Operational Staff," undated (provided by the UNC Command Historian Office).

[147] Commander UNC GEN Leon J. LaPorte, Designation of UNC Staff," memorandum to CFC and USFK staff appointing officers to the UNC staff, dated April 17, 2004. The purported driver of the UNC staff expansion in 2004 was stated in an internal UNC memorandum available in the UNC Command Historian's office, which asserted the expansion was required primarily to ensure the transportation corridor operations between the ROK and DPRK adhered to the Armistice. Additional considerations at the time warranting expansion included the necessity to ensure that the UNC staff remained "aware of the Armistice maintenance implications of actions taken by either CFC or USFK," to maintain the "existing system that allows use of UNC designated bases in Japan," and to provide a "structure and mechanism for the efficient integration of UNC Member Nations forces." Identification of "certain billets" served two purposes: First, designation of specific positions as "being responsible for considering the UNC

implications of any action." Secondly, designating these positions provided "points of contact below the General Officer level that are responsible for UNC mission related actions." UNC U5 Policy Mr. Glenn Rice, "HQ UNC Staff Requirements," memorandum for the UNC staff, Yongsan, ROK, undated (provided by the UNC Command Historian Office). The 1999-era "UNC Staff Organization" memorandum signed by GEN Tilelli was attached.

[148] The ROK Ministry of National Defense last affirmed their continued support for the appointment of CFC staff members to perform UNC staff duties in 2015 via an exchange of letters with UNC leadership. ROK MND Policy Planning Director MG Kyung Soo Jang, "UNC Staff organization procedure between ROK MND and UNC," letter to UNC Deputy Chief of Staff MajGen Dillon, April 21, 2015; UNC Deputy Chief of Staff MajGen Dillon, "UNC Staff organization procedure between ROK MND and UNC," response letter to ROK MND Policy Planning Director MG Kyung Soo Jang, May 29, 2015.

[149] The first four Sending States to augment the UNC MAC Secretariat were Australia, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Commander UNC GEN B.B. Bell, letter to the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff GEN R.J. Hillier, Seoul, ROK, May 11, 2006; UNC Deputy Chief of Staff MajGen Mark C. Dillon and UNC MAC Senior Member MG Hyung-suk Suh (ROK Army), "ROK officers assigned to UNC MAC Secretariat," Memorandum of Understanding Between UNC and the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, Seoul, ROK, April 22, 2014.

[150] CFI was initiated by the request of the Canadian Chief of Defense Staff to expand the 2004-era UNC initiated program to embed Sending State Liaison Group personnel directly into the UNC MAC Secretariat. CFI was designed to embed non-Liaison Group Canadian personnel directly onto the UNC headquarters staff, and ultimately was implemented with the posting of three Canadian officers on 2-3 year tours into the UNC headquarters (one each to the to the U2, the U3 MNCC and the U5) and one officer to the UNC Rear headquarters in Japan. Commander UNC GEN Walter L. Sharp, letter to the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff GEN W.J. Natynczak, Seoul, ROK, February 24, 2011; Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff GEN W.J. Natynczak, letter to Commander UNC GEN James D. Thurman, Ottawa, Canada, July 28, 2011; Commander UNC GEN James D. Thurman, letter to the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff GEN W.J. Natynczak, Seoul, ROK, September 8, 2011.

[151] Collins, email exchange with author, October 4, 2017.

[152] Under a U.S. Department of Defense FEO program, Australia has provided an O7 GO/FO to the UNC Staff since early 2015, while the United Kingdom has embedded two senior field grade officers into the staff since early 2016.

[153] Australia provides one officer to command the UNC Rear headquarters detachment; Australia has provided the UNC Rear headquarters detachment commander since 2010 based on a U.S. proposal via an exchange of letters (previously it had always been a U.S. Officer). UNC Commander Walter L. Sharp letter to Australian Chief of the Defence Force Air Chief Marshall Angus Houston, Yongsan, ROK, undated; Australian Chief of the Defence Force Air Chief Marshall Angus Houston response letter to UNC Commander Walter L. Sharp, Canberra, AUS, October 29, 2009. Additionally, the UN - GOJ SOFA members provide a multinational UNC Rear Force Representative to the staff. Historical UNC Rear Force Representatives are: Thailand (1957-1976), United Kingdom (1976-1978), Philippines (1978-2002), Australia (2006), United Kingdom (2006-2007), Thailand (2008), Australia (2009), Turkey (2009-2011), and Canada (2011-present). UNC Rear headquarters Commander Group Captain Michael W. Jansen (RAAF), email message to author containing internal UNC Rear document "UNC-R Historical Leadership," December 18, 2016.

[154] Hwan Kang, "Korea Passing: Seoul's New Foreign Policy Concern," *Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)*, http://keia.org/korea-passing-seoul%E2%80%99s-new-foreign-policy-concern (accessed December 30, 2019); Hyungu Jeong and Jiwon Park, Korea Passing and the ROK-U.S. Alliance, November 6, 2017, The Stimson center, https://www.stimson.org/content/korea-passing-and-rok-us-alliance (accessed December 30, 2019). One of the earliest references to a Korea Passing occurring was during the Imjin Waeran (1592-1598) after Ming China intervened on behalf of Choson (Korea) against the Japanese. The Choson King and the Korean elites harbored a lot of anger over Ming China leaving Choson out of the war's decision-making and for its separate negotiations with the Japanese. Samuel Hawley, *The Imjin War: Japan's sixteenth-Century Invasion of Korea and Attempt to Conquer China*, (The Conquistador Press, 2014), 331, 338-342, 366-370. Notable contemporary examples of Korea Passing in the 20th Century where Korea's future was decided by the Great Powers are the Taft-Katsura Agreement

of 1905 and the Armistice Agreement negotiations in 1951-1953, both of which U.S. Alliance managers should be familiar with.

[155] See note 66.

[156] Mr. Carl McGowan, International Relations Officer, U5 Policy, United Nations Command, email exchange with author, October 10, 2017.

[157] The below list of DPRK attacks on the U.S. and ROK over the last 50 years are not all inclusive, but highlight several very extraordinarily daring attacks and provocations by the DPRK. The ROK maintains some resentment that its U.S. partner / patron repeatedly "held them back" from responding, and perceives that the U.S. responses were either non-existent or at best weak and ineffectual.

- 1966-1969 the DPRK initiated over 400 attacks on ROK and U.S. forces during a period known as the Second Korean War.
- January 23, 1968: DPRK seizure of the USS Pueblo and resulting 11 month detainment of the crew.
- January 21, 1968: DPRK special forces attack on the ROK Presidential Palace.
- April 15, 1969: DPRK aircraft shoots down a U.S. EC-121 operating over international waters in the East Sea / Sea of Japan, killing 31 Americans.
- August 18, 1976: DPRK killing of two U.S. officers at Panmunjom with axes.
- October 9, 1983: DPRK bombing in Rangoon, Burma that attempted to kill the ROK President, but killed three senior ROK officials and several other attendees.
- November 29, 1987: North Korean bombing of a ROK airliner that killed 115 people in an attempt to derail the 1988 Olympics held in Seoul.
- March 3, 1990: Fourth infiltration tunnel from the DPRK into the ROK is found. The ROK Government estimates that up to 17 tunnels likely exist based off information gained by debriefing defectors.
- September 18, 1996: DPRK submarine runs aground along the northeast coast of the ROK as part of an infiltration mission. All but one of the infiltrators are killed attempting to flee through the DMZ, killing four civilians and 12 ROK soldiers in the process.
- March 26, 2010. ROK Navy Corvette Cheonan sunk by torpedo fired by a DPRK submersible. 46 ROK Sailors died.
- November 23, 2010: DPRK shells the ROK island of Yeonpyong with artillery, killing four South Koreans, wounding 19.
- August 4, 2015: DPRK soldiers infiltrate south of the DMZ and place landmines on the southern side, wounding two ROK soldiers in two separate blasts.

[158] Chico Harlan, "Yeonpyeong attack raised South Korea's resolve," *The Japan Times as reported in The Washington Post*, April 16, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/16/asia-pacific/yeonpyeong-attack-raised-south-koreas-resolve/#.WHkPgMszW-4 (accessed January 13, 2017); Tania Branigan and Ewen MacAskill, "South Korean defense minister quits over response to North Korean attack," *The Guardian*, November 25, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/25/south-korea-defence-minister-quits (accessed January 13, 2017); CNN Wire Staff, "South Korea warns of 'firm' response to future attacks," *CNN*, November 28, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/11/28/koreas.crisis/ (accessed January 13, 2017); Sang-ho Song, "Defense Chief stresses swift Self-Defense," *The Korea Herald*, December 07, 2010, http://v.media.daum.net/v/20101207190423709 (accessed January 13, 2017); Bruce Klingner, "The Cheonan: a retrospective Assessment," *The Heritage Foundation*, March 25, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/03/the-cheonan-a-retrospective-assessment (accessed January 13, 2017).

[159] Robert Oppenheim, *Kyongju Things: Assembling Place* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), 47. "Yusin" is the term former President Chung Hee Park used to describe a series of despotic reforms in late 1971 and 1972, leading to a virtual military dictatorship under the "Yusin" Constitution promulgated in November 1972.

[160] Keith Pratt, *Everlasting Flower: A History of Korea* (Londong, UK, Reaktion Books, 2006), 266; Hyung Baeg Im, "The Origins of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled," in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press, 2011) 234. The Meiji Restoration, or Meiji "Ishin" is translated or known by multiple names in English, including "renovation," "revolution," "reform," "renewal," and "revitalization."

[161] Michael Keefe, International Relations Analyst, C5 Policy, United States Forces Korea with duty to Combined Forces Command, email exchange with author, September 29, 2017.

[162] Additionally, one can reference: ROK JCS Headquarters Homepage, "Legal Authority" tab, http://jcs.mil.kr/mbshome/mbs/jcs2_eng/subview.jsp?id=jcs2_eng_020300000000 (accessed August 11, 2017).

[163] ROK Plan 818, instituted in 1990, formalized the ROK CJCS' command authority over ROK forces and direct reporting role to the ROK President role. Prior to this the ROK Army Chief of Staff commanded ROK Army forces and reported directly to the ROK President. Plan 818 was instituted to posture the ROK Armed Forces to operate more jointly along U.S. lines and to set the conditions for a resumption of operational control over ROK forces during Armistice. Chun, "Korean Defense Reform: History and Challenges."

[164] Naval Operations Command consists of three Fleet Commands and a Submarine Force Command. Northwest Islands Defense Command (NWIDC) is a geographic joint operational command with an AOR covering the northwest islands vicinity the undemarcated waters of the West Sea (Yellow Sea) near the DPRK. Air Force Operations Command consists of an Air Combat Command, an Air Mobility and Reconnaissance Command, and Air Defense Missile Command and an Air Defense Control Command. Han, *2016 Defense White Paper*, 49-51. The ROK Government instituted Defense Reform 2020 in 2005 to modernize and transform the ROK Armed Forces to meet anticipated future threats and challenges, but also to mitigate serious demographic challenges of Korea's very low birthrate. Chun, "Korean Defense Reform: History and Challenges." The ROK Government has instituted Defense Reform 2020 in varying forms as Presidential Administrations have changed over the last 15 years. The ROK transformed its rear area Field Army, SROKA, into the Second Operations Command in 2007. The transformation of the two forward Field Armies, FROKA and TROKA, required additional time to set the conditions. On January 9, 2019, the ROK Army merged these two forward Field Armies into one command, the Ground Operations Command (GOC) in an effort "meant to streamline the Army's structure and operations." ROK First and Third Armies combined into Ground Operations Command, Hankyoreh, Jan 10, 2019, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/877843.html (accessed October 26, 2019). This move by the ROK Government more importantly provides better unity of command for ground combat operations and mitigates the shell of a CFC GCC. The elimination of the Field Army from ROK force structure, left the next highest command structure being the Corps.

[165] ROK JCS Home Page, "Organization" tab, http://jcs.mil.kr/mbshome/mbs/jcs2_eng/subview.jsp?id=jcs2_eng_010200000000 (accessed August 9, 2017).

[166] 1st Operations Division consisting of joint operations, integrated defense, special operations, and command control center (CCC) branches / sub-divisions.

[167] 2nd Operations Division consisting of naval, amphibious, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) branches / sub-divisions.

[168] 3rd Operations Division consisting of air (fixed wing) and deep operations, air defense, aviation (rotary wing), and fires (non-kinetic/non-lethal, and kinetic, indirect cannon and rocket artillery) branches / sub-divisions.

[169] ROK JCS Home Page, "Organization" tab; Han, *2016 Defense White Paper*, 48 and 103.

[170] Lieutenant Colonel Don King, USFK Army LNO to ROK JCS, United States Forces Korea J3 Joint Operations Coordination Element, email exchange with author, November 19, 2017.

[171] In consultation with several ROK military officers in early 2016, the author learned that there were about a dozen ROK service members assigned, in a dual-hatted capacity, to both CFC GCC and ROK JCS fires support elements. The CFC GCC members were a part of the ROK's stand-alone CFC GCC cadre and did not have duties within the CFC staff. At the time of the author's consultations, the ROK Armed Forces were undergoing a manpower document adjustment for their CFC JTD (discussed in detail in Part III), which in U.S. Army vernacular, was projected to have an Effective Date (E-Date) of summer 2016, after the information cut-off point of this paper. These ROK officers commented that this manpower document adjustment was intended to distinctly source separate personnel to both the CFC and GCC staff with minimal dual-hatting. ROK dual-hatting within CFC and CFC GCC

thereafter was intended to be limited to the GO/FO population. This fires support element anomaly was purported to be one of the initiative's subordinate objectives.

[172] CFC Chief of Staff LTG William W. Crouch, "CFC Headquarters Policy on Language Usage," CFC Memorandum 1-4 for the CFC Staff, Seoul, ROK, October 15, 1994.

[173] A JTD is a "manpower document that identifies the positions and enumerates the spaces that have been approved for each organizational element of a joint activity for a specific fiscal year (authorization year), and those accepted for the four subsequent fiscal years (program years). U.S. JCS, *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*, JP 1-02, 134. More simply, a JTD identifies, validates and resources "peacetime manpower requirements for the current and succeeding five fiscal years in sufficient detail to support Service personnel systems." U.S. JCS, *Joint Personnel Support*, JP 1-0, II-5.

[174] UNC was the principle vehicle for U.S. military support to the defense of the ROK from 1950-1978. Therefore, the bulk of theater-level operational manpower in Korea for the most part was sourced through the UNC JTD. From 1950 through 1957 the Korean Peninsula was within the FECOM AOR with UNC as the theater command responsible for operations on the Peninsula. The FECOM and UNC were headquartered in Japan, with UNC retaining a forward command post in the ROK after the Armistice was signed. The FECOM and UNC staffs headquartered in Japan were merged, but remained separate and distinct legal entities just as USFK and UNC are today. The 1957-era Unified Command Plan's reorganization within the Pacific disestablished the FECOM, and incorporated its geographic area into USINDOPACOMs. UNC displaced forward to Korea from Japan, leaving a small residual headquarters in Japan (referred to as UNC Rear) to manage the UN bases and comply with the terms of the UN - GOJ SOFA. In addition, USFK was established as a subordinate unified command, concurrent with the Pacific consolidation, and under the command of USINDOPACOM to perform the function of a planning headquarters to coordinate matters of joint concern in the ROK. The establishment of a USFK headquarters necessitated the development and use of a separate JTD document from the one in place for UNC, resulting in the use of two JTDs. These UNC and USFK JTDs remained in use through the end of 1978, when the United States and ROK established CFC. From late 1978 to around 2008 the United States maintained a single JTD for CFC and UNC (separate from the USFK JTD). Since around 2008, CFC manning was dropped from the UNC JTD and CFC positions were consolidated within the USFK JTD in preparation for the expected Alliance transition to the ROK JCS and KORCOM parallel command construct. This parallel ROK / U.S. Alliance transformation effort was planned for execution in 2012, but delayed to 2015, and then the abandoned in favor of returning to an integrated design. The current integrated command effort is still in development and not expected to be implemented until sometime in the 2020s.

[175] The reason the CFC Commander is exempt from serving in a GCC capacity is that as the higher headquarters commander, it would be inappropriate for the CFC Commander to then be appointed as a subordinate on a lower level component staff to an officer he commands at a higher echelon. However, this exemption for the CFC Commander has never been officially spelled out in an Alliance document, it is a logical extension of the 1992 decision.

[176] Per Article 2.B. paragraph 22 of the Korean Armistice Agreement, a Secretariat was established to support the MAC with "record keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat." UNC maintained a separate UNC MAC Secretariat from 1953 through 1957, when it merged the Secretariat with the Armistice Affairs Branch (J-3) as part of the Unified Command Plan consolidation of the Pacific. This merged staff maintained two titles, the "Armistice Affairs Division" when performing UNC, USFK or Eighth Army duties and the "UNC MAC Secretariat" when performing duties in support of the UNC MAC Delegation. The Armistice Affairs Division was redesignated as the UNC MAC Secretariat on January 21, 1980. UNC Deputy Commander Lt Gen Evan W. Rosencrans, "Armistice Affairs Division Redesignation to UNC MAC Secretariat", memorandum for the UNC, CFC, USFK and Eighth Army staffs, Seoul, ROK, January 21, 1980; Armistice Affairs Division Chief COL Kenneth T. Trinkler, "Renaming Armistice Affairs Division," JK Form 243 Staff Summary Sheet routed to the UNC Deputy Commander, Seoul, ROK, December 28, 1979.

[177] Subsequent Commanders (post-1978/9) continued this practice of appointing CFC staff to the UNC, albeit using their UNC Commander vice CFC Commander position (which in reality was GEN Vessey acting in his SUSMOAK capacity).

[178] Select UNC Sending States, i.e. those that are signators to the UN - GOJ SOFA, maintain accredited UNC Liaisons in Japan in addition to their liaison personnel in the ROK. The senior representative of each Liaison Group to the UNC has direct access to the UNC Commander when representing their country on matters of national importance. However, coordination for Liaison Groups is typically conducted via the UNC DCoS. UNC Sending State National Representatives, normally Ambassadors accredited to the ROK, have direct access to the UNC Commander, as needed.

[179] It is important to note that the only Sending State personnel on the UNC JTD are those directly supporting the UNC MAC, its supporting Secretariat, and FEOs; the majority of the UNC Sending States Liaison Group personnel functioning in Korea or Japan are not on any personnel document maintained by the United States.

[180] As an example, these liaison personnel cannot be formally tasked by U.S. UNC or UNC MAC personnel and cannot make decisions on behalf of the UNC or the UNC MAC. The USG does not fund their salary, their expenses, nor does the U.S. have any "control" over these personnel. The system operates off common goals and common purpose, a military organization that operates off "askers" vice "taskers." It functions, even under pressure, because the liaison's parent nation instructs (and enforces) their personnel to contribute and support the UNC mission. However, there are risks to such an operating construct, such as when national political goals diverge considerably during a crisis or the resumption of hostilities.

[181] U.S. Department of Defense, *Visits and Assignment of Foreign Nationals*, DoD Directive 5230.20, (Washington DC: DoD Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P), June 22, 2005).

[182] In an interesting anecdote, in 2015 a meeting was conducted between the Australian Defense Forces (ADF) and USFK. The senior member for both legations were FEOs, a U.S. officer representing the ADF and an Australian officer representing USFK.

[183] "Combatant command support agent" is the contemporary term for what used to be referred to as Military Department "executive agent" support responsibilities to unified commands. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense D.O. Cooke, "Executive Agent Responsibility for the United Nations Command / U.S. Forces Korea / Eighth U.S. Army Headquarters," memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, June 16, 1975. This executive agency memoranda has not been rescinded or superseded, however the UNC as a headquarters activity has been slowly omitted from DoD and Joint Staff instructions over the last several years, leading to ambiguity in financial and logistical support provided to UNC. Examples include: U.S. Department of Defense, *Major DoD Headquarters Activities*, DoD Instruction 5100.73 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 1, 2007), does not recognize the UNC as a headquarters activity. Furthermore, it is also not recognized in U.S. DoD, *Combat Support Agencies* DoD Directive 3000.06 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 27, 2013), or U.S. Department of Defense, *Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands*, DoD Directive 5100.03 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 9, 2011). While USFK is recognized in DoD Directive 5100.03, the UNC is not. Additionally, U.S. Department of Defense, *Reimbursable Operations Policy*, DoD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, Volume 11A (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 2014), which contains the listing of international military headquarters that are supported by U.S. elements; the document includes the CFC, but not the UNC.

[184] Also referred to as Army Support to Other Services (ASOS), which encompasses Executive Agency, Lead Service, and Directive Authority for Logistics, as directed by the U.S. DoD. U.S. Headquarters Department of the Army, *Sustainment*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 4-0, (Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, July 31, 2012), 2-1 to 2-4. The U.S. is Army is tasked with over 40 Executive Agent responsibilities, including chemical and biological defense, detainee operations, DoD support for UN missions, etc. ASOS include but are not limited to: missile defense; intra-theater transportation; fire support; food, water, fuel, mail and ammunition; theater lines of communication; detainee operations; general engineering; intra-theater medical evacuation; base defense, etc.

[185] A TDA is an "authorization document that is not based on a TOE [table of organization and equipment]. It prescribes the organizational structure, the manpower and/or equipment requirements, and authorizations to perform a mission for which no TOE exists. TDAs can include military, civilian, and standard and commercial equipment. TDA manpower requirements are workload-based. Workload shall be in direct support of HQDA level directed missions and functions only." TDAs are "approved for the current year, budget year, and first program year." An

Augmentation TDA (AUGTDA) is a "form of TDA that augments an MTOE unit. It establishes organizational structure, personnel, and equipment required for the unit to execute administrative and operational functions beyond the capabilities of the MTOE. The AUGTDA can include military, civilian, and standard or commercial equipment." MG William E. Rapp, *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2015-2016*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, August 28, 2015) 3-31. "TDA units are organized to perform specific missions for which there are no appropriate TOEs and are discontinued as soon as their assigned missions have been accomplished. Unlike TOE units, TDA organizations are considered non-deployable, even when organized overseas, as their missions are normally tied to a geographic location. The personnel of TDA organizations can be military, civilian, or a combination of both. In some instances, provisional-type units have been organized under TDAs until suitable TOEs were established." U.S. Army Center of Military History, "History of Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) Units," May 20, 2011, http://www.history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/tda-ip.html (accessed November 15, 2016).

[186] An MTOE is a "resource-informed authorization document derived from a TOE through the application of HQDA directed guidance and personnel changes at billet and line item number (LIN) level of detail. It establishes the personnel and equipment authorizations to resource the Minimum Mission Essential Wartime Requirements (MMEWR) to execute the organization's doctrinal mission, as documented in the TOE. MTOEs are approved and published "for the current year, budget year, and first program year." Rapp, *How the Army Runs*, 3-30. In addition to Eighth Army's role as the USFK Army service component, the command is also designated as the GCC for UNC. Eighth Army no longer has a specified component command role designated for CFC, instead it is anticipated to be a U.S. subordinate command under the CFC GCC. From around 2011 to 2015, Eighth Army was designated for a short period as a CFC functional component command, CJTF-8, to perform Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination tasks for the Alliance, however since 2015 this mission function has been incorporated into the wider CFC GCC mission profile.

[187] "In reviewing the EUSA structure and staffing, the Study Team was struck by the difficulties experienced in determining how many people were assigned to and working in various organizational elements of the headquarters. The Study Team also received some information that there were additional people performing headquarters functions who were not carried on the books of the headquarters. Short tour lengths and poor documentation no doubt contribute to the problems in tracking manpower." Vander Schaaf, "Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters," App E10, 2.

[188] Low density staff personnel are primarily special and personal staff such as the Inspector General, Chaplain, Staff Judge Advocate, etc.

[189] The U.S. Air Force refers to their U.S. Army MTOE-like authorization document as Unit Manning Documents (UMD).

[190] The U.S. Marine Corps maintains a similar lexicon for its unit authorization documents, referring to theirs as a TOE. The U.S. Army uses TOEs as well, but in the U.S. Army a TOE is the doctrinal foundation for a unit structure based on the manpower requirements to achieve 100% of the MMEWR. Resources available influence the level of manning and equipping that can be supported, usually through the Force Design Update (FDU) process, resulting in a modified TOE, or MTOE, for what the Army commits to resource to a specific unit.

[191] The U.S. Navy refers to their manpower and equipping authorization documents as Activity Manpower Documents (AMD).

[192] Though a designated service component, Special Operations Command organizations (including SOCKOR) are joint headquarters, staffed by personnel from the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Therefore, SOCKOR utilizes JTDs to staff their headquarters.

[193] "The simultaneous appointment of USFK component commanders as UNC component commanders is one of the most overlooked, but powerful orders out there. Its expressed purpose is for the Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSO) and eventual Integration (I) of Sending State forces, using the Title 10 assets of USFK. The linking of UNC to USFK decreases confusion to the battlefield, lowers the risk of fratricide, and economizes resources and infrastructure already accounted for in existing plans in lieu of creating stand-alone RSO architecture." Mr. Carl McGowan, International Relations Officer, U5 Policy, United Nations Command, email exchange with author, September 29, 2017.

[194] The 7AF Commander has been designated as the CFC ACC Commander. Agreements are in place for the 7AF and ROK Air Force personnel to perform duty at the CFC ACC. As previously documented, the Eighth Army Commander is also appointed to serve as the CFC GCC Deputy Commander. However, there are no known agreements in place for additional Eighth Army personnel to perform duty at the GCC headquarters, largely for the simple reason that the GCC is currently embedded inside the CFC footprint and utilizes CFC manpower (with some robust ROK augmentation) to perform its duties. The lack of formally designating an Eighth Army staff role to support the CFC GCC in an Alliance document has left Eighth Army without a formal requirement to document the workload. This omission had adverse effects to Eighth Army to be able to support its Alliance obligations when the U.S. JCS and HQDA directed headquarters staffs cuts twice in the last decade.

[195] There are some exceptions. For example, the Commander of MARFORK, a U.S. Marine Corps O-8 GO/FO, is appointed as the USFK J5, the UNC U5, and the CFC C5. Additionally, the Chief of Operational Law for USFK, also serves as the SJA for NAVFORK. The overwhelming reason for this heavy USFK reliance on Eighth Army is both historical and due to the U.S. Army being the designated combatant command support agent for USFK. Additionally, Eighth Army is a robustly-sized headquarters, co-located on the same installation as USFK. MARFORK and NAVFORK are petite in comparison, with little extra capacity to significantly augment USFK. 7AF is geographically distributed from USFK, which inhibits easy accessibility by USFK to this staff. In addition, 7AF's obligations to the CFC ACC also limit their inclusion into USFK staff work.

[196] The JTMD is a component of the Personnel Service Support's Manpower Management function for a joint headquarters activity. The JTMD identifies, validates and resources "additional manpower and organization required" for a command to "shift to wartime, mobilization or contingency operations." U.S. JCS, *Joint Personnel Support*, II-5. A JMD documents a joint command's non-permanent Joint Individual Augmentation (JIA) personnel requirements predominantly while in support of a Presidential or Secretary of Defense directed or approved operation. JIA procedures and JMD submission are addressed in U.S. CJCS, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures*, CJCSI 1301.01F (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 17, 2014).

[197] A MOBTDA is a "form of TDA that establishes the mobilization mission, organizational structure, and personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations for units authorized under the non-deployment mobilization troop basis subsequent to a declaration of mobilization." Rapp, *How the Army Runs*, 3-31. MOBTDAs "reflect Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) and Partial mobilization requirements." MOBTDAs facilitate the rapid "expansion of an organization to support operational requirements due to unforeseen circumstances, contingency operations or war." MOBTDAs are resourced with pre-assigned personnel who are "able to report to and perform their assigned duties without delay, orientation or post-mobilization training." MOBTDAs are "resourced using the funded individual mobilization augmentation (IMA) program, through the Active Duty for Operational Support (ADOS) program or as directed by the mobilization authority. Positions may be filled by IMA personnel assigned to a position on the unit MOBTDA, from Reserve Component unit personnel, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) or retiree recalls." These reserve component service members train with their designated units during peacetime and are "subject to immediate, involuntary order to active duty whenever a PSRC is invoked under 10 USC 12304 or by Partial mobilization under 12302." U.S. Army Director Force Management HQDA G8 MG John M. Murray, "Army Mobilization Table of Distribution and Allowances (MOBTDA) and Augmentation Table of Distribution Allowances (MOBAUGTDA) Documentation Guidance, memorandum for distribution, Washington, DC, August 2, 2012, 2-4. A MOBTDA does not include equipment; equipment requirements are "documented on equipment only TDA where necessary." U.S Department of the Army, Force Development and Documentation, Army Regulation 71-32 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, July 1, 2013), 62-63. See Army Regulation 140-145, Army Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentation Program, dated March 21, 2016 for additional information on the IMA program.

[198] The EMD was tested during these exercises through the sourcing of exercise augmentee participants. Furthermore, the EMD also serves as a framework for the U.S. to engage the UNC Sending States Home Governments on integrating multinational skills and experience within the UNC headquarters.

[199] JIA are an "unfunded temporary duty position (or member filling an unfunded temporary duty position) identified on a joint manning document by a supported combatant commander to augment headquarters operations during contingencies." U.S. JCS, *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*, JP 1-02, 128.

[200] LTC Timothy Leitch, Chief Force Structure Branch, J82, United States Force Korea, email exchange with author, September 8 and 27, 2017; Mr. Gregory Jaskolka, Chief Force Structure Branch, J82, United States Force Korea, email exchange with author, January 5, 2020.

[201] Colonel Kelly Lawson, "USPACOM Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC)," briefing slides, Camp H.M. Smith, HI, U.S. Pacific Command, May 1, 2013, 4; LTC Ramon Valle, "Is a deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) a Viable Tool for U.S. Northern Command during Consequence Management Operations?" School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2003) 27-30.

[202] JECC, "2015 USTRANSCOM JECC – JECC Trifold," *USTRANSCOM JECC Homepage*, http://www.jecc.mil/Portals/21/Documents/JECC-Trifold-Web.pdf (accessed November 9, 2016).

[203] The JECC likely would not possess all the requisite grades and skill sets needed in Korea. However, they would bring proficiency in joint doctrine and joint experience. In particular, many of the candidates from the JECC leveraged for immediate augmentation regularly participate in exercises held in Korea, bringing relevant and recent experience to the commands.

[204] The institutional force supports the operational force. Institutional organizations provide the infrastructure necessary to raise, train, equip, deploy, and ensure the readiness of all military forces. The language from the prior description of the ROK institutional force is drawn from the U.S. Army description to better inform a U.S. audience that is digesting this product. Headquarters Department of the Army, "Organization: Who We Are," *U.S. Army Homepage*, https://www.army.mil/info/organization/ (accessed November 9, 2016). Augmentation from the ROK reserve component and activation of its retired officer population will undoubtedly be a source pool of personnel for these staffs as well.

[205] "UN Security Council Resolution 83, Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea, S/RES/83," June 27, 1950, Lake Placid, NY, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/83(1950) (accessed January 10, 2017).

[206] The approval by the ROK Government for multinational forces deploying to the ROK would also include legal arrangements governing the deployment of Sending State military personnel and forces, either in the ROK reaffirmation of the 1952-era "Agreement on Economic Coordination Between the Republic of Korea and the United Command," more commonly referred to as the Meyer Agreement, or the conclusion of a new, legally binding Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). A VFA is an international agreement similar in scope and purpose to a SOFA, except that it governs short-term training and operational deployments of forces to a specified country. Currently, none of the active Sending States maintain a VFA with the ROK, and the status of the Meyer Agreement is opaque, neither confirmed, nor denied as remaining in force by the ROK Government when it has been asked.

[207] The U.S., Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, South Africa, Australia and the Philippines were the original UN - GOJ SOFA signatories in 1954. The current active signatories are Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Italy and South Africa are inactive signatories. Only active signatories to the UN - GOJ SOFA are authorized access to the UN bases and to transit their forces through Japan. Richard Baxter, *Humanizing the Laws of War: Selected Writings of Richard Baxter* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 82-83. The U.S. Government negotiated the agreement on behalf of the Unified Command (UNC); U.S. national interests in Japan are represented separately in the U.S. - GOJ SOFA. In 1957, the U.S.-Japan Joint Board designated five bases for UNC use: Camp Zama; Yokosuka AB; Sasebo Naval Base; Tachikawa AB; and Fuchu Air Station. Today there are seven bases. UNC Rear HQ, "Fact Sheet," 1-2; Fumio Kishida, *Diplomatic Blue Book 2016, Chapter 3: Japan's Foreign Policy to Promote National and Worldwide Interests, Section 2: Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements*, (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2016/html/chapter3/c030102.html (accessed May 1, 2017).

[208] While the ROK constitution (promulgated in 1948, last revised in 1987) asserts that the entire Korean Peninsula is sovereign ROK territory, per international law it is not. The DPRK is considered by international law as a sovereign country separate and distinct from the ROK. The ROKG accepted this in 1991 when it agreed to be admitted, along with the DPRK, as a UN member state. So unlike the internationally recognized "one China" single state solution (PRC - Republic of China (ROC) / Taiwan), the Korea Peninsula has been a two-state solution since the 1991 entrance of the two Koreas into the UN. Prior to the 1991 entry into the UN, the UN General Assembly had recognized one Korea (the ROK) since 1948.

[209] This sketch of the manpower activities during crisis and hostilities depicts a USFK JMD. While USFK presently does not have a Joint Staff validated JMD, the JMD submission presently residing at USINDOPACOM would be rapidly be converted into a JMD.